V 22 Osprey Or Albatross
No. 72
January 8, 2003
V-22: Osprey or Albatross?
by Charles V. Peña
Executive Summary
The V-22 Osprey is a tilt-rotor aircraft that
terms of speed, range, and payload but
takes off and lands vertically like a helicopter
costs four to five times as much. And
but flies like an airplane when its wing-mount-
despite more than 15 years of development
ed rotors are tilted to become propellers.
and $12 billion spent, the Osprey is still in
Supporters of the V-22 argue that it has the
a test phase and nowhere near ready for
operational flexibility of a helicopter but is
operational deployment. Instead of admit-
twice as fast, can carry more troops, and has
ting that the V-22 program has failed and
five times the range. And unlike helicopters, the
using the money to buy proven helicopters
V-22 can fly to its area of deployment and does
for the same missions, the Marine Corps,
not have to be transported, either by ship or by
with considerable help from Congress, has
cargo aircraft. Critics contend that the Osprey
kept the program alive—continually trying
is prohibitively expensive (which is why
to fix various problems. But at least one
Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney tried to
problem—vortex ring state (VRS)—can
cancel the program in 1989) and unsafe (the V-
never be fixed or eliminated. And “flying
22 program has experienced four crashes, two
around” the VRS problem by slowing the
of which killed 23 Marines). Moreover, they
descent rate of the V-22 makes the Osprey
argue that existing helicopters, which the ser-
more vulnerable than helicopters (despite
vices are already buying, can accomplish the
claims that it is more survivable).
same missions at considerably lower cost.
In short, the V-22 Osprey is an albatross
The reality is that the V-22 is only mar-
around the Pentagon’s and taxpayers’
ginally more capable than helicopters in
necks. The program should be terminated.
Charles V. Peña is senior defense policy analyst at the Cato Institute.
The V-22 does not
would be allowed to proceed as a test program.
Introduction
Cambone says: “I think it would be fair to say
provide any truly
that there isn’t a desire to cut a major weapons
revolutionary
The V-22 Osprey is a tilt-rotor aircraft that
system for the purposes of saving money. The
operational mili-
takes off and lands vertically like a helicopter
question is whether the weapons system at
but flies like an airplane when its wing-
issue is going to support the kind of joint oper-
tary capability.
mounted rotors are tilted to become pro-
ational capability that we are attempting to
pellers. The V-22’s vertical takeoff and landing
construct.”3Cutting the V-22 would save
(VTOL) capability allows it to operate without
money (which could then be used on other
traditional runways (it can operate from the
needed weapon systems) and would not under-
decks of amphibious ships). Its winged-air-
mine any important goal or reduce the mili-
craft configuration gives it the speed and
tary’s capabilities. The V-22 does not provide
range of a traditional turboprop airplane and
any truly revolutionary operational military
permits aerial refueling and self-deployment
capability necessary for defense moderniza-
(flying directly from its base to a theater of
tion. Therefore, to reduce an already bloated
operations rather than being partially disas-
defense budget, the Pentagon should eliminate
sembled and transported via sealift or airlift)
the V-22 tilt-rotor program.
anywhere in the world.
Supporters of the V-22 argue that it has the
operational flexibility of a helicopter but is
The Tilt-Rotor Concept
twice as fast, can carry more troops, and has
and the V-22
double the range. The V-22’s multimission
capabilities include troop and cargo transport,
The idea of combining the vertical takeoff
amphibious assault, transport for special
and landing capabilities of a helicopter with
operations, and search and rescue operations.
the winged flight of an airplane dates back to
According to an issue brief by the Lexington
the mid-1940s. Wynn Laurence LePage (a
Institute, “It’s hard to imagine an aircraft bet-
pioneer in rotary wing design) and Haviland
ter suited to a period of uncertainty about the
H. Platt (a mechanical engineer with a num-
future because no matter what kinds of
ber of rotary wing patents) formed the Platt-
threats arise in the next century, the Osprey is
LePage Aircraft Company in 1938. They pro-
nearly certain to be useful everyday.”1
posed and patented the first tilt-rotor aircraft
Critics contend that the Osprey is prohib-
design in the United States. But Platt-LePage
itively expensive and unsafe (the V-22 pro-
was forced to shut down in 1947 because of
gram has experienced four crashes, two of
its small size, lack of capital, and lack of
which killed 23 Marines). The V-22 entered
orders for military aircraft. Robert Lichten,
full-scale development in 1986, and its esti-
an ex-Platt-LePage engineer, went to Bell
mated per unit cost has more than tripled
Helicopter where he developed the XV-3—
from $24 million to $85 million since the
under contract with the National
program started. Now—more than 15 years
Aeronautical and Space Administration and
later and having survived an attempt to ter-
the Army. The XV-3 was remarkably similar
minate it by then–secretary of defense
to the Platt-LePage in design.4 The XV-3 was
Richard Cheney in the first Bush administra-
the first successful demonstration of tilt-
tion—the program is still essentially in a test
rotor feasibility and, from 1953 to 1966,
phase with 40 preproduction V-22s built.
made 250 test flights, including 110 full con-
Although news reports have speculated
versions from helicopter mode to airplane
that the V-22 Osprey might be on the
mode and back.5
Pentagon’s chopping block,2 the director of
Beginning in 1972, Bell Helicopter devel-
program analysis and evaluation, Stephen A.
oped the XV-15 tilt-rotor aircraft (again
Cambone, recently announced that the V-22
under contract with NASA and the Army)
2
and produced two aircraft in 1977. The XV-
civilian executives (the VV-22). The U.S.
15 flew in helicopter mode in May 1978 and
Special Operations Command was
in airplane mode in July 1979. The prototype
formed and took over acquisition respon-
XV-15s accumulated more than 800 hours of
sibility for the special operations vari-
testing, and they served as test beds for refin-
ant—the CV-22—from the Air Force.
ing tilt-rotor concepts.6
• 1989: A test flight of the first of six
planned FSD prototype aircraft was con-
ducted in March. Secretary of Defense
History of the V-22 Program
Cheney canceled the V-22 program—cit-
ing cost—in the fiscal year 1990 amended
In 1981 the Department of Defense began
budget. Production was terminated, but
the Joint Services Advanced Vertical Lift
Congress disagreed with Cheney’s deci-
Aircraft (JVX) Program—based in large part on
sion and continued to fund the V-22.
demonstration of the XV-15—that was intend-
• 1991: An FSD aircraft crashed in an acci-
ed to meet the needs of all four military ser-
dent on vertical takeoff due to mis-
vices for a vertical takeoff and landing aircraft.
wiring of flight control system rate
The Army lost interest in the program because
gyros. Prototype aircraft exceeded the
The Army lost
of competing funding requirements for heli-
specified weight, resulting in failure to
copters, perhaps portending the current
meet several range and payload require-
interest in the JVX
affordability questions associated with the V-
ments for the aircraft as specified by the
program because
22. As a result of Army withdrawal, the Navy
Joint Services Operational Requirement.
became the lead service for the JVX program in
• 1992: A second FSD aircraft crashed due
of competing
1982. In 1984 the JVX was designated the V-
to a fire during landing approach,
funding require-
22, and the secretary of the navy chose the
resulting in seven deaths. The V-22 pro-
ments for heli-
name “Osprey” for the new aircraft.
gram moved from FSD to engineering
The objective of the V-22 program was to
and manufacturing development
copters, perhaps
develop and produce 913 tilt-rotor aircraft
(EMD).
portending the
for the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air
• 1993: The new Clinton administration
current afford-
Force. The plan was to achieve initial operat-
favored the V-22 and the program was
ing capability for the Marine Corps version in
funded in the Five Year Defense Plan for
ability questions
1992. The following is a summary history
the first time in four years. The under
associated with
that highlights some of the important events
secretary of defense for acquisition
in the V-22 Osprey program.7
ordered the program to continue as a
the V-22.
joint effort. Congress passed FY94
• 1986: The program entered full-scale
defense authorization and appropria-
development (FSD) after review by the
tion bills, both with funds identified for
Defense Systems Acquisition Review
the continuation of the V-22 into pro-
Council, the predecessor of the current
duction (the appropriations bill also
Defense Acquisition Board (DAB). A
added funds for restart of the CV-22).
fixed-price contract for a joint service V-
• 1994: The V-22 passed a Joint
22 was awarded to Bell/Boeing.
Requirements Oversight Council review.
Bell/Boeing began preliminary design
The DAB formally approved the V-22
studies on an anti-submarine warfare
EMD program.
variant of the V-22, the SV-22.
• 1997: The first EMD aircraft underwent
• 1987: The Army withdrew from its com-
a test flight. The DAB authorized the
mitment to procure the V-22. Bell/Boeing
first lot of aircraft for low-rate initial
conducted budgetary cost estimates for
production (LRIP). Authority for
the SV-22. Also, the company initiated a
approval of further low-rate and full-
feasibility study for a variant to transport
rate production was delegated to the sec-
3
retary of the navy.
the end of 2000. In September the first
• 2000: In April an EMD aircraft crashed
LRIP V-22 resumed flight test opera-
when the pilot lost control during a
tions. The Air Force resumed flight tests
high-rate descent, killing 19 Marines. In
of its version of the V-22.
December an LRIP aircraft crashed dur-
ing a routine night approach, killing all
Although the tilt-rotor concept is more
four Marines on board. V-22 aircraft
than 50 years old and the V-22 program has
were grounded pending a review of the
now been in existence for more than 15 years,
program by a blue-ribbon panel.
the program is still in a test phase. Forty pre-
According to press reports, the V-22
production models have been built, but no
maintenance records had been falsified
aircraft are operationally deployed. And
for two years at the explicit direction of
despite claims that there is a global market
the squadron commander.
for tilt-rotor capability, there are currently no
• 2001: In January the squadron comman-
civil or commercial tilt-rotor aircraft.9
der admitted falsifying maintenance
Development of the Bell Agusta BA609 civil-
records. In April the Panel to Review the
ian tilt-rotor aircraft is currently on hold—in
V-22 Program published its report and
large part due to the problems associated
concluded:
with the V-22 program.10 This simply high-
lights the fact that tilt-rotor technology is
The need for a capability of the type
still not proven to be sufficiently safe and
the V-22 was designed to satisfy
reliable and remains largely experimental.
appears to be justified, and by its
demonstrated performance, the V-22
has shown unique potential to meet
Requirement for the V-22
that need. There is no evidence that
the V-22 concept is fundamentally
The V-22 program is driven largely by a
flawed; however, the aircraft is not
Marine Corps requirement to replace the
ready for operational use in a number
aging CH-46 assault-transport helicopter.11
of key respects, chief among them sys-
The CH-46 provides all-weather, day or night
tem reliability and maintainability.
assault transport of combat troops, supplies,
At this point, the soundest manage-
and equipment for the Marine Corps. Its pri-
ment approach for the V-22 program is
mary mission is troop transport; the move-
to restructure the program by temporar-
ment of supplies and equipment is sec-
ily reducing production to a minimum
ondary. The CH-46 can carry up to 22 troops,
Tilt-rotor technol-
sustaining level while simultaneously
plus 2 aerial gunners and a cargo payload of
ogy is still not
initiating a Development Maturity
5,000 pounds. It has a maximum speed of
proven to be suf-
Phase.8
145 knots (167 mph), and a maximum range
of 132 nautical miles (152 statute miles) for a
ficiently safe and
In September three Marines were found guilty
land assault mission.12
reliable and
of misconduct and two were reprimanded in
Based on a 10,000-hour service life estab-
remains largely
conjunction with the falsified V-22 mainte-
lished by the Navy in 1978,13 the Marines
nance records. In December the secretary of
claim that
experimental.
defense for acquisition announced that the V-
22 Osprey would go through a new two-year
finding an aircraft to meet the Corps’
flight test program.
medium lift needs is the most pressing
• 2002: The V-22 was cleared for flight-
issue for Marines this year. The aging
testing. In May the Marines resumed
CH-46 helicopter is entering its 26th
flight-testing of the V-22 for the first
year of service life. While it has served us
time since the aircraft was grounded at
well, we can no longer expect it to carry
4
Marines in harm’s way on the modern
Frederick McCorkle, the Marine
Critics point out
battlefield. Precision-guided munitions
Corps Deputy Commandant for
that “because the
and hand-held surface-to-air missiles
Aviation has written, “The Osprey’s
place the 30-year-old helicopters and
introduction to the Marine forces is
V-22 can carry
the Marines they carry at risk.14
of paramount importance to the
only troops and
Marine Corps as it epitomizes our
light weapons,
In addition to its age, other deficiencies of
philosophy of procuring and field-
current medium lift15 helicopter capability
ing leap-ahead technology systems
the Marines must
cited by the Marine Corps include
to best employ our expeditionary
still rely on much
forces.” The Marine Corps believes
•
slower heli-
inadequate payload, range, and speed;
that the Osprey will give them an
• lack of ability to communicate, navigate,
unprecedented capability to quickly
copters and hov-
and operate in adverse weather condi-
and decisively project power from
ercraft to carry
tions, day or night;
well over the horizon. Indeed, the
• lack of self-deployment or aerial refuel-
Marine Corps considers the V-22
heavy weapons
ing capability;
Osprey more than just an aircraft.
into battle.”
• inability to operate in a nuclear, biologi-
Instead, the Osprey is an important
cal, chemical (NBC) environment;
foundation upon which its vision for
• insufficient threat detection and self-
projecting naval power ashore (oper-
protection capabilities;
ational maneuver from the sea, or
• unacceptably high maintenance and
OMFTS) rests.19
inspection rates; and
• limited communication capability for
Traditionally, the primary mission of the
embarked troop commanders.16
Marines Corps has been amphibious assault.
However, there has not been a large-scale
Interestingly, the V-22 Osprey is not a
amphibious assault since Inchon during the
direct replacement for the CH-46. Indeed, the
Korean War. OMFTS is a departure from the
helicopter that will replace the CH-46 is the
traditional operation of launching a large
CH-60 Seahawk, which is a variant of the
amphibious assault from a fleet off the coast
Army’s UH-60 Blackhawk. The CH-60 is a
and then building up forces to establish a
medium lift utility and assault helicopter
beachhead before advancing to the main
that can carry 13 passengers or a total pay-
objective or objectives further inland.
load of 10,000 pounds.17 It has a top speed of
Underpinning the concept of OMFTS is the
180 knots and a range of 380 nautical miles
ability “to move units from ships lying over
(but range becomes unlimited with aerial
the horizon to objectives lying far from the
refueling capability).18 Clearly, the CH-60
shore.”20 Even with this new concept, the
addresses the CH-46’s deficiencies related to
Marine Corps nonetheless recognizes that
payload, speed, range, and aerial refueling.
“amphibious assaults are essential to the
The requirement for the V-22 stems not so
landward dominance of battlespace.”21
much from a need to replace the CH-46 heli-
Critics point out that “because the V-22
copter’s traditional vertical lift capability as
can carry only troops and light weapons, the
from the Marine Corps’ desire to have a new
Marines must still rely on much slower heli-
aircraft that supports its doctrine of expedi-
copters and hovercraft to carry heavy
tionary maneuver warfare, crisis response, and
weapons into battle.”22 Thus, Marines would
naval forward-presence operations. According
be conducting inland combat operations
to the Congressional Research Service:
without the benefit of supporting weapons
that could be critical to the success of such
The U.S. Marine Corps considers the
operations. In his book Putting “Defense” Back
V-22 its highest priority. Lt. Gen.
into U.S. Defense Policy, Ivan Eland asserts:
5
An unsupported assault inland by
Instead, the Marine Corps developed the doc-
marines using V-22s is every bit as
trine of operational maneuver from the sea,
risky as an unsupported airborne
which—at least in part—seems to convenient-
assault by light army troops using
ly justify the need for the V-22.
parachutes. Since the end of World
Finally, there is the even larger policy issue
War II, large airborne assaults have
assumed by OMFTS: “To influence events over-
been rare. . . . For equally compelling
seas, America requires a credible, forwardly
reasons, inherently risky amphibious
deployable, power projection capability”27 (which
assaults have also been rare. It seems
is a basis for needing the V-22). The requirement
unwise to add even more risk by
for forward deployment and power projection is
landing unsupported marines
primarily based on the premise that the United
inland, with only light equipment,
States must be the world’s policeman because
against a reasonably capable foe.23
international disorder threatens American securi-
ty. Indeed, one justification given for the V-22 is
He concludes that “landing marines with
that “the world has changed. Expanding interna-
heavy equipment and supplies on the beach
tional trade and humanitarian efforts have more
from over the horizon (to reduce vulnerabili-
Americans living abroad. Protecting their lives . . .
The Marine
ty of amphibious ships) may be a good idea,
is an increasingly dangerous world is a serious
Corps developed
but risky, unsupported landings inland via V-
challenge.”28 And according to the Congressional
22 are less attractive.”24
Budget Office: “Cutting V-22 purchases might
the doctrine of
There is also the question of whether the
decrease the Corps’s ability to perform peacekeep-
operational
V-22 supports the new Marine Corps doc-
ing missions and other smaller-scale contingency
maneuver from
trine of OMFTS or vice-versa. In April 1989
operations, which have grown more frequent in
then–secretary of defense Cheney told the
recent years.”29
the sea, which
House Armed Services Committee that he
Alternatively, the United States could adopt a
seems to conve-
“could not justify spending the amount of
strategy of noninterventionism—“described vari-
money . . . proposed . . . when we were just get-
ously as minimalist realism, offshore balancer,
niently justify the
ting ready to move into procurement on the
and balancer of last resort”30—that avoids
need for the V-22.
V-22 to perform a very narrow mission that I
promiscuous military intervention. Such a strat-
think can be performed . . . by using heli-
egy—by eliminating or reducing such missions—
copters instead of the V-22.”25 In July 1990,
would reduce or obviate the need for the V-22.
testifying before the Senate Appropriations
Defense Subcommittee, Assistant Secretary
of Defense for Program Analysis and
V-22s vs. Helicopters
Evaluation David Chu said, “The driving fac-
tor underlying the V-22 cancellation decision
Advocates of the V-22 argue that the tilt-
was the comparative up-front investment
rotor aircraft will combine the operational
cost of the V-22 versus an alternative force of
flexibility of a helicopter with the capabilities
helicopters . . . judged capable of performing
of an airplane.31 They cite greater speed, range,
[Marine Corps assault and Navy search and
payload capability, and the ability to self-
rescue missions] reasonably well.”26 In other
deploy. And the Bell/Boeing contractor team
words, the V-22 was deemed too expensive
claims the V-22 is up to 21 times less vulnera-
for traditional Marine Corps operations fer-
ble to small arms fire than helicopters, is 75
rying troops and equipment the relatively
percent quieter than helicopters, and has NBC
short distances from amphibious ships to shore.
warfare protection.
But the Marine Corps (and Congress)
resisted the recommendation to eliminate
Speed
the V-22 and make do with lower-cost heli-
Supporters of the V-22 claim that it is
copters to accomplish the same missions.
twice as fast as a helicopter.32 The maximum
6
speed of the V-22 is 275 knots. The maxi-
also carry 24 troops; the CH-60 carries fewer
mum speed of the CH-46 that the V-22 is
troops than either the V-22 or the CH-46 (13
intended to replace is 145 knots. The CH-60
troops);41 and the CH-53 can carry more than
helicopter, which is a replacement for the
all the others (37 troops). So this measure of
CH-46, has a top speed of 180 knots, reduc-
payload capability does not substantiate the
ing the V-22’s speed advantage (about 50 per-
claim that the V-22 can carry three times
cent faster than the CH-60). And the CH-53—
more payload than a helicopter.
which is another helicopter slated to be
The one area in which the Osprey may
replaced by the V-22—has a top speed of 160
have a payload advantage (but not quantifi-
knots (making the V-22 just over 70 percent
able as three times greater) is its demonstrat-
faster than the CH-53). But if the V-22 has to
ed ability to carry a 10,000-pound external
carry cargo on an external hook, it must keep
load (using a single cargo hook) at 230
its rotors upright and fly in helicopter rather
knots.42 The CH-60 can carry a 9,000-pound
than airplane mode, thus eliminating most
external load, but at much slower speeds
of its speed advantages over helicopters.33
(40–45 knots).43
Range
Survivability
Osprey supporters claim that the V-22’s
Another area in which the V-22 supposed-
range is five times that of a helicopter.34 The
ly outshines helicopters is survivability.
V-22’s range for amphibious assault missions
Certainly, while flying as an airplane, the V-
is 515 nautical miles. This is slightly less than
22 is faster and a harder target to hit than are
four times the range of the CH-46, which has
slower helicopters. So at least while going to
a range of 132 nautical miles for the same
and from the landing zone, the V-22 should
mission. The V-22’s range advantage over the
be less vulnerable. But the biggest danger is
CH-60 is less pronounced—515 nautical
in the landing zone itself. Because the V-22
miles vs. 380 nautical miles, or about 1.4
will use vertical flight mode (like a heli-
times greater. And the V-22 has no advantage
copter) to take off and land, it would be just
over the CH-53, which has a range of 578
as vulnerable as helicopters while in takeoff
nautical miles.
or landing modes.
One advantage the V-22 does have over
The V-22 is supposed to be more resistant
most helicopters is an in-flight aerial refuel-
to small arms fire and thus more survivable.
ing capability that makes its range almost
But that does not mean that helicopters can
unlimited.35 But the CH-60 helicopter can be
be easily shot down with small arms. Indeed,
fitted with auxiliary fuel tanks to extend its
the CH-60 (one alternative to the V-22) will be
Because the V-22
range36 and also has aerial refueling for near-
fitted with self-sealing fuel tanks capable of
will use vertical
ly unlimited range.
withstanding 7.62 mm rounds.44 And the real
threat from the ground is not so much from
flight mode to
Payload
small arms fire as from rockets—often fired
take off and land,
V-22 supporters claim that it can carry
from portable launchers that can be carried
three times more payload than a helicopter.37
and fired by a single person—such as the one-
it would be just as
Maximum internal load for the V-22 is
shot disposable Light Anti-Tank Weapon, the
vulnerable as
10,000 pounds.38 The maximum cargo capa-
AT4,45 the RPG-18, or the reusable Shoulder
helicopters in
bility of the CH-46 is 5,000 pounds; that of
Launched Multipurpose Assault Weapon or
the CH-60 is 4,000 pounds,39 and that of the
RPG-7.46 While flying vertically in the landing
those modes.
CH-53 is 8,000 pounds. At best, the V-22 can
zone, the V-22 and helicopters would be equal-
carry 2.5 times more than a comparable heli-
ly vulnerable to rockets.
copter and, at worst, only 25 percent more.
Another claimed survivability advantage
The V-22 is supposed to be able to carry
of the V-22 is that it is supposed to provide
24 combat-ready Marines.40 The CH-46 can
NBC protection. But it has been reported
7
All rotary aircraft
that the NBC protection unique to the V-
In the tilt-rotor V-22, the onset of
22—overpressure and filtration systems—will
VRS can occur in the proprotor on
are subject to the
be dropped because it is considered too diffi-
one side without the other side los-
effects of VRS, but
cult and expensive to accomplish.47Instead,
ing lift. In such a case, the aircraft
the V-22’s unique
troops aboard the V-22 will wear special suits
tends to roll sharply into the side
for NBC protection, which they could pre-
that first loses lift, resulting in large,
side-by-side rotor
sumably wear on helicopters as well.
unexpected bank angles, followed
configuration
Most important, if a helicopter loses engine
immediately by rapid dropping of
power (e.g., the engine fails or is shot out by hos-
the nose of the aircraft and a steep
appears to make it
tile fire), it can still safely land by using autoro-
dive. At low altitudes, there may be
easier for this cat-
tation (analogous to “gliding” without engine
no opportunity for recovery.51
astrophic condi-
power for a fixed-wing aircraft).48 But this oper-
ational requirement for all other Navy heli-
VRS is a fundamental technical character-
tion to occur.
copters was waived for the V-22, largely because
istic that cannot be remedied by design
it cannot autorotate. Elaine Grossman of Inside
changes. The only real solution is to restrict
Defense reported of the V-22 that “should a pilot
V-22 operations to avoid VRS (that is, to
lose engine power and try to restart it, ‘autoro-
descend at lower rates of speed). The speci-
tation descent cannot be maintained,’ [quota-
fied descent rate for the V-22 to avoid VRS is
tion from GAO report] which could ostensibly
800 feet per minute (fpm) at 40 knots.
lead to a crash.”49 In this respect, the V-22 may
Modern helicopters can descend at rates
actually be less survivable than helicopters.
more than twice as fast. And as one V-22 crit-
ic points out, “While that [800 fpm] would be
Vortex Ring State
adequate for a commercial operation, it’s far
Related to the V-22’s inability to autoro-
short of what the military needs—several
tate is a phenomenon known as vortex ring
thousand feet per minute—during tactical
state or VRS (sometimes also called “power
insertions.”52 In this respect, the V-22 might
settling”). When rotary aircraft hover or
actually be more vulnerable to hostile fire
descend, the rotor exerts a downward force
than are traditional helicopters.
and flow of air. VRS occurs when a secondary
The problem, according to Coyle, is that
vortex is created (usually brought on by low
“should a pilot inadvertently exceed published
forward airspeeds and high rates of descent)
limitations, there may be no easily recogniz-
that exerts an upward force and flow of air
able warning that the aircraft is nearing the
above the rotor. The result is an unsteady
danger zone.”53 Making the problem worse is
flow of turbulent air over the rotor that caus-
the fact that normal pilot control inputs may
es a loss of rotor efficiency even though it is
not be able to counter the rolling brought on
still being powered by the engine.50 An analo-
by entering the VRS region. Therefore, the roll
gous situation for a conventional aircraft is
will simply continue, and, at low altitude, the
when it stalls as a result of insufficient for-
result will be a catastrophic crash.
ward airspeed or too steep an angle of climb.
By comparison, VRS occurrences with heli-
All rotary aircraft are subject to the effects of
copters are extremely rare. And according to the
VRS, but the V-22’s unique side-by-side rotor
Navy Judge Advocate General’s report after the
configuration appears to make it easier for this
April 2000 V-22 crash that killed 19 soldiers:
catastrophic condition to occur. The crash of a
V-22 during a training mission on April 8, 2000,
In traditional rotorcraft, power set-
which killed the 4 crewmembers and 15
tling would cause uncommanded
Marines on board, was attributed to VRS.
rates of descent and, depending on
According to former director of opera-
altitude, may result in a hard landing
tional test and evaluation for the Pentagon,
or quite possibly a controlled crash. In
Phillip Coyle:
all likelihood, however, such an event
8
would result in the aircraft at least hit-
•a military version of the Sikorsky S-92 com-
ting the ground in an upright atti-
mercial helicopter, which—like the V-22—has
tude. In this respect, with regard to
a capacity between that of the CH-60 and the
Vortex Ring State and/or Blade Stall,
CH-53 to carry troops and equipment.57
the MV-22 appears to be less forgiving
than conventional helicopters.54
Cost
The V-22 Is Only Marginally Better Than
To date, $12 billion has been spent on the
Helicopters
V-22 program.58 When the program entered
In the final analysis, the increased capabil-
FSD in 1986, the armed forces planned to
ities over helicopters promised by the V-22
build 923 aircraft, at an average cost of $24
are marginal. Performance differences in
million per aircraft.59 The current program
speed, range, and payload are, for the most
plan calls for building 437 Ospreys at a total
part, unimportant if the Marine Corps’
cost of $37.2 billion, or more than $85 mil-
OMFTS requirement—operating from over
lion each.60 So less than half the number of
the horizon and to inland points far from
aircraft will cost more than 3.5 times as
In the final analy-
shore—is eliminated. More typical landing
much per aircraft.
operations will have ship-to-shore distances
More important, comparable helicopter
sis, the increased
considerably less than the V-22’s combat
capability can be purchased at a considerably
capabilities over
radius of 250 nautical miles and well within
lower cost. For example, the FY98 program
the range capabilities of existing heli-
estimate for the CH-60 was $9.1 billion for
helicopters
copters.55 The V-22 might have greater in-
166 helicopters, or $19 million each.61 The
promised by the
transit survivability than helicopters, but it is
1999 firm fixed-price contract for five CH-60
V-22 are marginal.
likely to be just as vulnerable in vertical flight
helicopters was $67.4 million, or about $13.5
mode in landing zones. And although heli-
million apiece.62 A Sikorsky S-92 has an esti-
copters can recover from an engine failure via
mated civilian market price of $15 million.63
autorotation, the V-22 (flying in vertical heli-
And even though the S-92 is not built under
copter mode) cannot—gravity simply takes
military contract or with government sub-
over. Also, the V-22 appears to be more sus-
sidy, it is designed to be used by the military
ceptible to VRS—a phenomenon common to
as an off-the-shelf acquisition alternative.64
all rotary aircraft—which, when combined
Given the less than stellar success of the V-
with the V-22’s inability to autorotate, could
22 program to date, the marginal gains in
have catastrophic results. Another potential
speed, range, and payload do not seem worth
problem for the V-22 is that if the rotors
the high costs and risks associated with the
become stuck in the forward position (that
program—especially when there are lower-cost
is, while flying horizontally like an airplane),
alternatives. Tilt-rotor technology may even-
the aircraft cannot land because the rotor
tually prove viable, but it makes no sense to
blades extend well below the fuselage.56
throw good money after bad. True, $12 billion
Helicopter alternatives that could accom-
in sunk costs has already been spent. But
plish the same missions as the V-22 include
spending another $25 billion on a system that
might not be needed (if the Marines scale back
• the CH-60—a variant of the Army’s UH-
their risky OMFTS doctrine), that may never
60 Blackhawk helicopter—that the Navy
achieve suitable operational effectiveness and
is procuring instead of the V-22 to replace
safety (VRS is an inherent problem and any
the CH-46 for transport missions;
potential fixes may become cost prohibitive),
• the CH-53, which Marines already use
and that has lower-cost, proven alternatives
for heavy lift missions during amphibi-
readily available would be wasting money. And
ous assault; and
needless spending on the V-22 would mean
9
lost opportunity costs to invest in other more
into the marketplace.”68 But it is not the gov-
badly needed defense programs. Indeed, the
ernment’s responsibility to pay for research
CBO has noted that canceling the V-22 pro-
and development and assume risks so that
gram and buying conventional helicopters
companies can make a profit in the commer-
would save $9.6 billion over 10 years.65
cial marketplace. If Bell/Boeing (or other
manufacturers) thinks there is a commercial
market for tilt-rotor aircraft, then they need
Conclusion
to make their own capital investment based
on the risk and return on that investment.
That after more than 15 years and $12 bil-
Despite the considerable time and money
lion the V-22 Osprey is still in a test mode
invested, the V-22 Osprey is still nowhere near
should speak volumes about the efficacy of
ready to be operationally deployed. Although
the program. If the V-22 was proven to be
the Marines claim that the V-22 is not a case of
operationally effective and safe and cost only
blind love,69 they cannot close their eyes to the
$24 million each, it might be a viable aircraft.
fact that the same missions can be accom-
Indeed, retired admiral Stephen Baker (who
plished with less-expensive helicopters. The
was the operational test and evaluation com-
hard truth is that the V-22 Osprey is an alba-
mander for the Navy from 1995 to 1999) has
tross around the necks of the Pentagon and
said, “If the program were not 10 years behind
taxpayers. It’s time to cut it loose.
schedule due to developmental problems, the
V-22 just might have been a major performer
in Operation Enduring Freedom.”66 But tilt-
Notes
rotor technology has yet to be operationally
1. Jim Courter and Loren Thompson, “V-22
proven for either military or civilian use, and
Versatility Argues for Faster Production,”
the cost of the V-22 has more than tripled.
Lexington Institute Issue Brief, December 14, 1998,
Moreover, while tilt-rotor technology itself
www.lexingtoninstitute.org/defense/v22ib.htm.
might be “revolutionary,” it doesn’t offer any
2. “[T]he Osprey is among dozens of programs
truly revolutionary operational capabilities
Defense Secretary Rumsfeld has ordered reviewed
for the military.
for possible cuts or cancellation as early as this fall.”
Instead of admitting that the V-22 pro-
Richard Whittle, “Air Force Begins Flight Testing
of Its Version of V-22,” Dallas Morning News,
gram has failed and using the money to buy
September 17, 2002, p. 1D. See also Thom Shanker
proven helicopters for the same missions, the
and James Dao, “Defense Secretary Wants Cuts in
Marine Corps (with considerable help from
Weapons Systems to Pay for New Technologies,”
Congress) has kept the program alive—always
New York Times, April 16, 2002, www.nytimes.com
That after more
/2002/04/16/national/16BUDG.html.
trying to fix various problems. But at least
than 15 years and
one problem—VRS—can never really be fixed
3. Thom Shanker, “Military Spending Proposals
$12 billion the V-
or eliminated. And “flying around” the VRS
Envision Changing Battlefield,” New York Times,
problem by slowing the descent rate of the V-
November 22, 2002, www.nytimes.com/2002/11
22 Osprey is still
/22/politics/22DEFE.html.
22 makes the Osprey more vulnerable than
in a test mode
helicopters in landing zones—despite claims
4. Jay Hendrickson, “Platt-LePage Aircraft Co.,”
should speak vol-
that the Osprey is more survivable.
Helicopter History Site, www.helis.com/pioneers
Also, Bell/Boeing is using the V-22 as a
/f_plp.htm (accessed November 15, 2002).
umes about the
way to subsidize commercial tilt-rotor
5. “XV-3,” GlobalSecurity.org, updated October 21,
efficacy of the
research and development at considerable
2001, www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems
taxpayer expense.67 This subsidy was appar-
/aircraft/xv-3.htm.
program.
ent when Bell Helicopter president John
6. NASA Ames Research Center, “XV-15 Tilt-Rotor
Murphey announced that the civilian BA609
Research Aircraft,” updated November 30, 2001,
would be put on indefinite hold and said,
www.simlabs.arc.nasa.gov/library/tiltrotor/ctr20th.
“The V-22 must lead tilt-rotor technology
html#Background.
10
7. Primary sources for this history are Christopher
17. “CH-60 Description,” Naval Supply Systems
Bolkcom, “V-22 Osprey Tilt-Rotor Aircraft,”
Command: Naval Inventory Control Point, updat-
Congressional Research Service Issue Brief for
ed April 14, 2000, www.navicp.navy.mil/03
Congress IB86103, updated November 5, 2001;
/0320/ch60.htm; and “SH-60 Seahawk,” United
and U.S. Department of Defense, Report of the
States Navy Fact File, updated November 10, 2002,
Panel to Review the V-22 Program, April 2001.
www.chinfo.navy.mil/navpalib/factfile/aircraft/air
-sh60.html.
8. Ibid., p. 75.
18. Ibid.
9. “The Osprey program was central to viability of
a civil tilt-rotor commuter aircraft. The military
19. Bolkcom, p. 1.
program had to come first so that commercial
operators had the confidence that a large tilt-rotor
20. Gen. Charles C. Krulak, commandant of the
would be safe, reliable and efficient.” David
Marine Corps, “Operational Maneuver from the
Godfrey, “Transitional Flight,” Bell Helicopter
Sea: A Concept Paper for the Projection of Naval
website, www.bellhelicopter.textron.com/content
Power Ashore,” p. 12, www.dtic.mil/jv2010/usmc
/products/HelicopterMag/transFlight.html
/omfts.pdf (accessed November 15, 2002).
(accessed November 15, 2002); article originally
appeared in Helicopters Magazine Canada.
21. U.S. Marine Corps, Ground Combat Operations,
updated February 10, 1997, pp. 4–5, http://
10. Bill Wagstaff, “Bell Shelves Civilian Tilt-Rotor
web.mit.edu/afs/zone/user/jlwfnord/Tactics
Indefinitely,” April 2002, www.ainonline.com
/ed6ch4.pdf.
/issues/04_02/04_02_bellshelvespg1.html.
22. Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., “It’s a Bird, It’s a Plane. . . ,”
11. The CH-46 was first procured in 1964 to meet
National Journal, March 25, 2000, p. 979.
Marine Corps’ requirements for medium lift
capability in Vietnam.
23. Ivan Eland, Putting “Defense” Back into U.S. Defense
Policy (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2001), p. 145.
12. “CH-46D/E Sea Knight,” United States Navy
Fact File, updated February 12, 2002, www.chinfo.
24. Ibid.
navy.mil/navpalib/factfile/aircraft/air-ch46.html.
25. Quoted in Bolkcom, p. 3.
13. Note that the 10,000-hour service life was only
for planning purposes and not based on a fatigue
26. Bert H. Cooper Jr., “V-22 Osprey Tilt-Rotor
test of the airframe to determine exactly how
Aircraft,” Congressional Research Service Issue
many hours a CH-46 can be safely used for opera-
Brief for Congress 86103, updated December 6,
tional purposes. In all likelihood, the service life
1996, www.fas.org/man/crs/86-103.htm.
of a CH-46 exceeds the 10,000-hour specification.
“Evaluation of the CH-46 airframe fatigue analy-
27. Krulak, p. 2.
sis, fatigue test results, and in-service experience
data indicates the CH-46 airframe can be safely
28. Capt. Landon R. Hutchens II, USMC, “Marine
operated beyond 10,000 hours. . . . Some civilian
Sounds Off on V-22 Osprey,” editorial, Osprey
operators have logged over 25,000 hours on the
Facts 12, no. 6 (July 2001), reprint of letter to the
BV-107 [civilian version of CH-46].” Maj. Kenneth
editor, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, June 4, 2001.
D. Bonner, USMC, “Use of and Future of the CH-
Emphasis added.
46 Assault Helicopter in the United States Marine
Corps,” 1990, www.globalsecurity.org/military/
29. Congressional Budget Office, Budget Options
library/report/1990/BKD.htm.
2001, February 2001, p. 142, ftp://ftp.cbo.gov
/ 2 7 x x / d o c 2 7 3 1 / E N T I R E - R E P O RT. P D F.
14. Gen. Alfred M. Gray, then-commandant of the
Emphasis added.
Marine Corps, Testimony at hearing of the House
Armed Services Committee, February 20, 1990,
30. Ted Galen Carpenter, Peace & Freedom: Foreign
quoted in Bonner.
Policy for a Constitutional Republic (Washington: Cato
Institute, 2002), p. 11.
15. There is no exact specification for or definition
of “medium lift,” but it can best be described as the
31. Unless otherwise noted, data for comparing the V-
ability to carry troops and cargo with a total payload
22 with helicopters are drawn from the following
capability of approximately 10,000 pounds.
sources: “V-22 Osprey,” Boeing, www.boeing.com/
rotorcraft/military/v22/flash.html (accessed Novem-
16. U.S. Department of Defense, Report of the Panel
ber 15, 2002); “V22 Osprey Web,” U.S. Navy NavAir,
to Review the V-22 Program, p. 10.
http://pma275.navair.navy.mil (accessed November
15, 2002); “CH-46D/E Sea Knight,” United States
11
Navy Fact File, updated February 12, 2002, www.chinfo.
hooks, the V-22 can carry a 15,000-pound exter-
navy.mil.navpalib/factfile/aircraft/air-ch46.html; “CH-
nal load.
53D Sea Stallion,” United States Navy Fact File,
updated May 17, 1999, www.chinfo.navy.mil.navpalib
43. “CH-60 Description.”
/factfile/aircraft/air-ch53d.html; and “SH-60 Sea-
hawk,” United States Navy Fact File, updated
44. “CH-60S/MH-60S Knighthawk,” GlobalSecurity.
November 12, 2002, www.chinfo.navy.mil.navpalib/
org, updated April 10, 2002, www.globalsecurity.org
factfile/aircraft/air-sh-60.html.
/military/systems/aircraft/ch-60.htm.
32. See for example, “V-22 Osprey: Missions
45. At least one fully functional example of this weapon
/Requirements,” GlobalSecurity.org, updated
was for sale on the Internet at www.gunsamerica.
November 8, 2001, www.globalsecurity.org/military
com/guns/976239627.htm (accessed November 15,
/systems/aircraft/v-22-mission_req.htm; “Osprey or
2002).
Albatross? Should the V-22 Tiltrotor Aircraft Fly or
Die?” Cato Institute Policy Forum, May 11, 2002, p.
46. During the fighting in Mogadishu, Somalia, in
6, www.cato.org/events/transcripts/010511et.pdf;
October 1994, the two U.S. Army Blackhawk heli-
Hutchens; and Bolkcom, p. 8.
copters that were shot down were reached with RPG
rocket launchers. Lester W. Grau, “A Weapon for All
33. The V-22’s speed in helicopter mode is 185
Seasons: The Old but Effective RPG-7 Promises to
knots; see “Bell/Boeing V-22 Osprey,” Helicopter
Haunt the Battlefields of Tomorrow,” http://
History Site, www.helis.com/Since80s/h_v22.
f m s o . l e a v e n w o r t h . a r m y. m i l / f m s o p u b s
htm (accessed November 15, 2002).
/issues/weapon.htm (accessed November 15, 2002),
originally appeared as “The RPG-7 on the
34. See “V-22 Osprey: Missions/Requirements”;
Battlefields of Today and Tomorrow,” Infantry,
and Bolkcom, p. 8.
May–August 1998. Grau wrote for the Foreign
Military Studies Office, which provides direct sup-
35. Specified maximum range for the V-22 is
port to the senior U.S. Army and Department of
2,100 nautical miles. “V-22 Osprey.”
Defense leadership and general support to the U.S.
Army Combined Arms Center: “It [the RPG-7] is rel-
36. The UH-60 Blackhawk, which is the basis for
atively cheap, quite effective and found everywhere.
the CH-60, “can carry external fuel tanks that can
The RPG-7 was adopted by the Soviet Armed Forces
extend the Blackhawk range up to 1,150 nautical
in 1961. Today, it is part of the TO&E [table of orga-
miles.” “UH-60 Blackhawk,” FAS Military
nization and equipment, which prescribes the orga-
Analysis Network, updated April 23, 2000,
nizational structure and equipment of military
www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/ac/uh-60.htm.
units] of over 40 different countries’ armies and sev-
eral of these countries, besides Russia, are licensed to
37. See “V-22 Osprey: Missions/Requirements”;
build their own. Other manufacturers include
and Bolkcom, p. 8.
Bulgaria, China, Iran, Iraq, Romania and Pakistan.”
38. “V-22 Osprey,” U.S. Naval Institute Military
47. Christopher J. Castelli, “V-22 Program Cancels Plans
Database, updated January 1, 1998, www.periscope1.
for Two Chem-Bio Protective Features,” InsideDefense.
com/demo/weapons/aircraft/rotary/w0004388.html.
com, October 22, 2001, www.insidedefense.com/public
/special.asp.
39. “CH-60 Description.” Note that “SH-60 Seahawk”
states that “the Army’s UH-60L Black Hawk can carry
48. For a more complete explanation of helicopter
. . . 2,600 pounds (1,170 kg) of cargo.”
autorotation, see Rey Madrid, “Helicopter
Aerodynamics for the Layperson,” Vertical
40. The U.S. General Accounting Office, however, has
Reference, www.verticalreference.com/vertical_
raised concerns about the V-22’s ability to carry 24
reference_helo_aero_by_Rey3.htm (accessed
combat Marines and their equipment. U.S. General
November 15, 2002); and Mick Spiers, “What
Accounting Office, “Presentation to the V-22 Blue
Happens When a Helicopter’s Engine Fails?”
Ribbon Panel,” January 12, 2001, p. 18, www.gao.
Helicopter History Site, www.helis.com/howflies/
gov/new.items/d01369r.pdf. One critic claims that
autorot.htm (accessed November 15, 2002).
the V-22’s cargo compartment is almost four feet
shorter than the CH-46’s. Carlton Meyer, “The V-22
49. Elaine M. Grossman, “GAO Sounds Alarm on
Fiasco,” G2mil.com, www.g2mil.com/v-22.htm
Osprey Waiver for ‘Autorotation,’ Other Tests,”
(accessed November 15, 2002).
InsideDefense.com, February 1, 2001, www.insidedefense.
com/public/special15.asp.
41. “CH-60 Description.”
50. For a more detailed explanation of vortex ring
42. Bolkcom, p. 4. Note that, using dual cargo
state, see Paul Cantrell, “Settling with Power,”
12
Helicopter Aviation Home Page, www.copters.
Better Spending,” January 31, 2002, www.cdi.org
com/aero/settling.html (accessed November 15,
/mrp/transformation.cfm.
2002); and “V-22 Osprey: Vortex Ring State
(VRS),” GlobalSecurity.org, updated August 9,
60. U.S. Department of Defense, OUSD(AT&L)
2002, www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems
AR&A/AM, “Selected Acquisition Report (SAR)
/aircraft/v-22-vrs.htm.
Summary Tables,” November 14, 2001, p. 3,
www.acq.osd.mil/ara/am/sar/SARST0901.pdf.
51. Quoted in U.S. General Accounting Office, p.
31.
61. “CH-60 Fleet Combat Support Helicopter,”
GlobalSecurity.org, www.globalsecurity.org/military
52. Carlton Meyer, “Keeping the V-22 Alive,”
/library/budget/fy1998/dot-e/navy/98ch60combat.
G2mil, www.g2mil.com/v-22alive.htm (accessed
html (accessed November 15, 2002), excerpted from
November 15, 2002), quoting an article in Armed
Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, FY98
Forces Journal, February 2002. Meyer also points
Annual Report.
out that to avoid the VRS region, “the V-22’s
NATOPS (operating manual) used by ALL pilots
62. “Sikorsky Back in U.S. Navy Production with
of the V-22 clearly states on Page 1-4-13, WARN-
CH-60S,” October 25, 1999, Helicopter History
ING ‘Air Combat Maneuvering and Aerobatics
Site, www.helis.com/news/1999/h60cs.htm.
are PROHIBITED.’ This is a simple and direct
mandate.” It would seem obvious, however, that a
63. Ron Bower, “Flying the Friendly Giant,”
combat aircraft such as the V-22 should be able to
Aviation Today: Rotor & Wing, February 2001, www.
perform air combat maneuvers in order to per-
aviationtoday.com/reports/rotorwing/previous
form its missions and ensure the survivability of
/0201/0201s92.htm.
the aircraft and crew.
64. Ibid. For example, the S-92 meets military
53. Ibid.
standards for electronics compatibility, making it
easy to integrate military avionics into the S-92
54. Ibid., p. 28.
without incurring the added costs of built-in spe-
cial avionics and electronics packages.
55. A more typical ferry distance for a Marine
amphibious assault from ship to shore is 50 nau-
65. Congressional Budget Office, p. 142.
tical miles.
66. Rear Adm. (ret.) Stephen H. Baker, “The V-22
56. Presumably, the V-22 could crash land on
Osprey: It’s Time for Realistic Testing,” Defense
water in such a situation.
Week, April 29, 2002.
57. Congressional Budget Office, p. 142.
67. “All threw up their hands in frustration when
their military R&D money dried up.” “Bell
58. Council for a Livable World, “V-22 Osprey:
Agusta: BA609,” AINOnline.com, www.ainonline.
Technical Flaws Should Call for Cancellation,
com/Features/newrotorcraft02/ba609.html
Not Delay,” press release, April 18, 2001,
(accessed November 15, 2002).
www.clw.org/milspend/ospreycancel.html; and
Taxpayers for Common Sense, “Bailout Watch,”
68. Quoted in Wagstaff.
June 7, 2002, www.bailoutwatch.org/defense.org.
69. Linda de France, “Marine Commandant
59. Center for Defense Information, “U.S. Military
Insists Love of V-22 Is Not Blind,” Aerospace Daily,
Transformation: Not Just More Spending, But
March 15, 2001, p. 403.
Published by the Cato Institute, Cato Foreign Policy Briefing is a regular series evaluating government poli-
cies and offering proposals for reform. Nothing in Cato Foreign Policy Briefing should be construed as nec-
essarily reflecting the views of the Cato Institute or as an attempt to aid or hinder the passage of any bill
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