Table Of Contents
Bartels, D. M., Bauman, C. W., Skitka, L. J., & Medin, D. L., Eds. (forthcoming). Moral
Judgment and Decision Making: The Psychology of Learning and Motivation, Vol. 50. San
Diego: Elsevier
TABLE OF CONTENTS
1. Causal Models: The Representational Infrastructure for Moral Judgment
Steven A. Sloman, Philip Fernbach, & Scott Ewing—Brown University
2. Moral Grammar and Intuitive Jurisprudence: A Formal Model of Unconscious
Moral and Legal Knowledge
John Mikhail—Georgetown University
3. Law, Psychology & Morality
Kenworthey Bilz & Janice Nadler—Northwestern University
4. Protected Values and Omission Bias as Deontological Judgments
Jonathan Baron & Ilana Ritov—University of Pennsylvania & Hebrew University of
Jerusalem
5. Attending to Moral Values
Rumen Iliev, Sonya Sachdeva, Daniel M. Bartels, Craig M. Joseph, Satoru Suzuki, &
Douglas L. Medin—Northwestern University & University of Chicago
6. Instrumental Reasoning Over Sacred Values: An Indonesian Case Study Jeremy
Jeremy Ginges & Scott Atran—New School for Social Research & University of Michigan
7. Development and Dual Processes in Moral Reasoning: A Fuzzy-Trace Theory
Approach
Valerie F. Reyna & Wanda Casillas—Cornell University
8. Moral Identity, Moral Functioning, and the Development of Moral Character
Daniel Lapsley & Darcia Narvaez—University of Notre Dame
9. “Fools rush in”: A JDM Perspective On The Role Of Emotions In Decisions, Moral
And Otherwise.
Terry Connolly & David Hardman—University of Arizona & London Metropolitan
University
10. Motivated Moral Reasoning
Peter Ditto, David Pizarro, & David Tannenbaum—University of California-Irvine &
Cornell University
11. In the Mind of the Perceiver: Psychological Implications of Moral Conviction
Christopher W. Baumann & Linda J. Skitka—University of Washington & University of
Illinois-Chicago
INTRODUCTION TO THE SPECIAL VOLUME
This represents the 50th volume of a series that began in 1967. The current Editor, Brian
Ross, thought (correctly) that this fact entitles the series to a little nostalgia. He therefore invited one
of the old Editors, Douglas Medin, to organize a special volume of the series. Medin was delighted
to do so for three reasons: 1. to celebrate the occasion, 2. because three stellar co-editors agreed to
work with him and 3. because it represented an opportunity to give at least equal time to the
motivational side of The Psychology of Learning and Motivation.
Although historically the series has published quite a few outstanding chapters on
motivation, overall the learning side of learning and motivation has been much better represented.
In part, this imbalance reflects the history of cognitive versus social psychology where the former
has tended to neglect the dynamic, motivational aspect of cognition but the latter consistently has
embraced it. The current volume is edited by two cognitive and two social psychologists and our
goal is to bridge and balance the learning and motivation components.
This volume presents a variety of perspectives from within and outside moral psychology.
Recently there has been an explosion of research in moral psychology, but it is one of the subfields
most in-need of bridge-building, both within and across areas. Interests in moral phenomena have
spawned several separate lines of research that appear to address similar concerns from a variety of
perspectives. The contributions to this volume examine key theoretical and empirical issues these
perspectives share connect these issues with the broader base of theory and research in social and
cognitive psychology.
The first two chapters discuss the role of mental representation in moral judgment and
reasoning. Sloman, Fernbach, and Ewing argue that causal models are the canonical
representational medium underlying moral reasoning, and Mikhail offers an account that makes use
of linguistic structures and implicates legal concepts. Bilz and Nadler follow with a discussion of
the ways in which laws, which are typically construed in terms of affecting behavior, exert an
influence on moral attitudes, cognition, and emotions.
Baron and Ritov follow with a discussion of how people’s moral cognition is often driven
by law-like rules that forbid actions and suggest that value-driven judgment is relatively less
concerned by the consequences of those actions than some normative standards would prescribe.
Iliev et al. argue that moral cognition makes use of both rules and consequences, and review a
number of laboratory studies that suggest that values influence what captures our attention, and that
attention is a powerful determinant of judgment and preference. Ginges and Atran follow with a
discussion of how these value-related processes influence cognition and behavior outside the
laboratory, in high-stakes, real-world conflicts.
Two subsequent chapters discuss further building blocks of moral cognition. Lapsley and
Narvaez discuss the development of moral character in children, and Reyna and Casillas offer a
memory-based account of moral reasoning, backed up by developmental evidence. Their theoretical
framework is also very relevant to the phenomena discussed in the Sloman et al, Baron and Ritov,
and Iliev et al., chapters.
The final three chapters are centrally focused on the interplay of hot and cold cognition.
They examine the relationship between recent empirical findings in moral psychology and accounts
that rely on concepts and distinctions borrowed from normative ethics and decision theory.
Connolly and Hardman focus on bridge-building between contemporary discussions in the
judgment and decision making and moral judgment literatures, offering several useful
methodological and theoretical critiques. Ditto, Pizarro, and Tannenbaum argue that some forms of
moral judgment that appear objective and absolute on the surface are, at bottom, more about
motivated reasoning in service of some desired conclusion. Finally, Bauman and Skitka argue that
moral relevance is in the eye of the perceiver and emphasize an empirical approach to identifying
whether people perceive a given judgment as moral or non-moral. They describe a number
behavioral implications of people’s reported perception that a judgment or choice is a moral one,
and in doing so, they suggest that the way in which researchers carve out the moral domain a priori
might be dubious.
It has been a pleasure to work together on this volume. Thanks for making this possible, Brian.
—Dan Bartels, Chris Bauman, Linda Skitka, and Doug Medin
