News Letter
NEWS
LETTER
No. 03-27
OCT 03
Operation OUTREACH
Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures
Visit the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL)
on the Web at:
http://call.army.mil
FOREWORD
T his newsletter represents the efforts of two teams from the Joint Readiness Training Center
(JRTC) that deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan as part of Operation OUTREACH. A team
from the JRTC Intelligence Division, headed by LTC Bob Chamberlain, with Major Dan Pinnel
of the Fire Support Division, deployed to Iraq, Qatar, Afghanistan, and Kuwait from 31 May to
13 June 2003.
The JRTC observers collected and documented observations that included lessons learned/
tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP). The areas observed centered on general intelligence
topics, human intelligence (HUMINT) operations, unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) operations,
and general fire support operations, to include targeting. This collection effort provides
immediate feedback to units engaged in combat for Operations ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF)
and Iraqi Freedom (OIF), as well as incorporating TTP and lessons learned into future rotations.
CALL military analysts contributed doctrine, organizations, training, materiel, leadership and
education, personnel and facilities (DOTMLPF) implications concerning lessons learned/TTP for
each issue/observation.
LAWRENCE H. SAUL
COL, FA
Director, Center for Army Lessons Learned
Operation OUTREACH Newsletter
TABLE
OF
CONTENTS PAGE
Introduction
1
General
Intelligence
3
Human
Intelligence
(HUMINT)
9
Targeting
17
Fire
Support
23
Observation
29
The Secretary of the Army has determined that the publication of this periodical is
necessary in the transaction of the public business as required by law of the Department.
The Commander, U. S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, IAW AR 25-30, has
approved the use of funds for printing this publication.
Unless otherwise stated, whenever the masculine or feminine gender is used, both are
intended.
LOCAL REPRODUCTION OF THIS NEWSLETTER IS
AUTHORIZED AND ENCOURAGED!
Center for Army Lessons Learned
Director Colonel
Lawrence
H.
Saul
Managing
Editor Mr.
George
Mordica
II
CTC
Project
Analyst
Mr.
Thomas
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Odom
CALL
Project
Analyst
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D.
Nichols
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Labels
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i
Center for Army Lessons Learned
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Introduction
JRTC Observations from Operations IRAQI FREEDOM and ENDURING FREEDOM
(31 May-13 June 2003)
The Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) Intelligence and Fire Support Team, comprised of
LTC Bob Chamberlain, MAJ Dan Pinnel, CPT Mike Liverpool, and SSG Norris Whitford,
viewed various topics while in the CENTCOM area of responsibility. From 31 May to 13 June
2003, they visited numerous units and locations throughout Iraq, Afghanistan, Qatar, and
Kuwait.
The team found many items to cover, but mainly focused on intelligence- and fire
support-related issues: Intelligence (General), Human Intelligence (HUMINT) Operations,
Targeting (aspects from both intelligence and fire support), Fire Support, and Random
Observations.
Following is a compilation of their observations.
General Intelligence
Is sue: Iraq — Un manned Ae rial Ve hi cle (UAV) Op er a tions.
Ob ser va tion: “The vac uum through a straw.” UAVs pro vided vast amounts of in tel li gence
dur ing high-in ten sity op er a tions but were lim ited dur ing sta bil ity operations.
Discussion: During the initial phases of OIF, the UAV was the “drug of choice.” It brought a
unique set of capabilities to the military intelligence (MI) arsenal. With well-trained operators,
raw combat data was used to acquire and target the enemy. The system was responsive and
productive in high-intensity combat, with enemy maneuver formations and prepared defenses
easily identified. While high-intensity maneuver battles occurred, the UAV flew
preprogrammed flights or was dynamically re-tasked over short distances. Oddly enough, with
all of its previous success, the UAV had participated little in subsequent operations such as
Operations SIDEWINDER and SCORPION.
During stability operations and support operations (SOSO), the UAV becomes much less
capable. Small enemy forces over large geographic areas degrade the system’s ability to cover
numerous named areas of interest (NAI). Its slow flight speed and relative small peripheral
vision limits its ability to see small units in large areas, especially in urban environments. The
UAV was high maintenance in operational terms of updating priority intelligence requirements
(PIRs), specific information requirements (SIRs), specific orders and requests (SORs), and
instructions. Collection managers seemed to be overwhelmed keeping up with these tasks and
getting the UAV at the right place at the right time to support maneuver commanders. An
operator, in effect, had to get lucky to have the system fly near a reported enemy location. If not,
by the time the system left the departure airfield to the target, the event would have been most
likely be over. The UAV simply cannot fly fast enough to move to the sound of the guns. The
daily mortar and rocket attacks on bases and convoys became virtually undetectable to the
UAVs. Planners and collection managers could have the UAVs fly the convoy routes but with
the number of friendly convoys, civilian traffic and the limited amount of operational UAVs,
luck would be the deciding factor.
Dissemination of UAV data was a problem. The UAV Company, the Corps analysis and control
element (ACE), and Kuwait were the only elements to have UAV video feeds. It is almost
impossible for a maneuver unit that is fighting or on the move to receive critical, time sensitive
information from the UAV.
Les sons Learned/TTP: De tailed plan ning be comes par a mount for UAV mis sions dur ing
sta bil ity op er a tions. Pat tern anal y sis is the key in de vel op ing tar geted ar eas for sur veil lance
by the UAV. Re-look the al lo ca tion of the Re mote View ing Ter mi nal (RVT). The RVT in
Ku wait could be used in a gen eral-sup port (GS) role to help one of the brigades in the fight.
Doctrine, Organizations, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel and
Facilities (DOTMLPF) Implications: (Training.) Emphasize integration and synchronization
of UAV assets with applicable battlefield operating systems (BOSs) to assist in target
identification during the planning phase of the Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP).
***
Issue: Iraq — UAV, Modified Table of Organization (MTOE).
Observation: The current MTOE did not allow for the optimal use of the system.
Discussion: The HUNTER UAV Company had no internal analysis capability. Operators were
trained to interpret the images from the system but they have no ability to analyze the
information. Thus, the information was transmitted to an analysis and control element where
analysis was conducted. The operators at the UAV Company received little feedback on their
interpretation of the imagery, other than updated collection plans. The current MTOE also makes
split-based operations difficult when jumping forward in support of maneuver operations.
Lessons Learned/TTP: UAV units are bound to airfields and cannot be moved to the analysis
unit (this unit’s analysis facility was in Baghdad). Either an analysis element will have to be
assigned to UAV organizations, collocate an analysis facility to the airfield, or a better
communications architecture with greater bandwidth will be necessary.
Doctrine, Organizations, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel and
Facilities (DOTMLPF) Implications: (Organizations, Training, Leadership and
Education.) Conduct an analysis of the roles and functions of the current MTOE. If no
additional personnel are available in the Army personnel inventory to plus up the MTOE to
create an internal analysis capability, examine the possibility of repositioning personnel in
required/authorized positions. If changes are made to the MTOE, then also update Army
education and training in operational units in the field to reflect these changes.
***
Issue: Iraq — UAV, Frequency De-confliction.
Observation: The HUNTER UAV system sat idle in theater for the first 30 days waiting on
operational frequencies.
Discussion: This was an ongoing issue. Operational frequency problems have plagued the UAV
from fielding new systems, training of current systems, and real-world operations such as OIF.
As the Army continues to develop UAVs, frequency de-confliction will occur at each level of
command. Every country or region (such as the European Union) assigns frequencies and sets
their own regulations. The flight coordination center (FCC) had established ours, but there was
no effective method in place to determine and de-conflict our frequencies when we deploy.
Lessons Learned/TTP: As high technology systems are fielded, staffs need to examine
mission analysis constraints and limitations to include the electronic spectrum. Frequency
de-confliction must be addressed before the deployment.
Doctrine, Organizations, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel and
Facilities (DOTMLPF) Implications: (Training.) Frequency de-confliction should be
included as part of the MDMP process during mission analysis. Units must plan across the BOS
spectrum to ensure frequencies support mission requirements.
***
Issue: Iraq — Intelligence, Collection Management at the Division and Corps Levels.
Observation: Disjointed collection planning: Poor collection management is a recurring trend
at the combat training centers (CTCs)), so it is not surprising that this trend was observed during
real-world operations. In many units, the collection manager was a junior officer who has had
no formal training.
Discussion: In many cases, the officer had only a general understanding of the collection
management process and a very limited understanding of the capabilities and limitations of the
assets that he was tasking. The collection managers could understand generic PIR, but failed to
develop Specific Intelligence Requirements (SIRs), those questions that the tasked assets
specifically answer. As a result, collection plans were disjointed. SIRs for the UAV, signal
intelligence (SIGINT), human intelligence (HUMINT), and long-range surveillance (LRS) were
at times, poorly written. A glaring example of this was that the UAV was tasked to find buried
aircraft and to monitor a safe house for groups of people. These highlight both a
misunderstanding of the capacities of the collector and the process of tasking a system. Most
assets had poor SIRs assigned to them, which caused the asset team leader to guess what was the
collection manager’s intent. Other collection control measures that were usually ignored or
forgotten were the latest time of value and start-stop times.
Lessons Learned/TTP: Well-written SIRs will help prevent assets from being improperly
utilized.
Doctrine, Organizations, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel and
Facilities (DOTMLPF) Implications: (Training.) SIRs are an integral part of the IPB process.
Collection assets must be well-managed and used in the proper manner according to doctrine. If
SIRs are not well written, it has a ripple effect, skewering not only the IPB process, but also
hindering MDMP overall.
***
Issue: Iraq — Digital Connectivity.
Observation: No standard exists for the intelligence officer when using digital equipment.
Discussion: Many units received new versions of software immediately prior to or during
deployment. We would not give a qualified M-249 gunner an M-4 right before deploying, yet
every echelon from battalion to higher had operators who described the confusion of getting new
and unfamiliar software without the training before deployment. In some cases, these versions
of the new program were completely different. To compound this issue, intelligence soldiers at
different command levels were using different programs to handle the same information. One
intelligence report could be transmitted from the All-Source Analysis System (ASAS) to the
Automated Deep Operations Command System (ADOCS) at theater to the Maneuver Control
System (MCS) at brigade and battalion. In many cases, operators had multiple laptops that they
had to monitor, and data had to be manually inputted from one system to another. Intelligence
soldiers’ use of other than ASAS was driven by their need to be able to communicate with the
targeteers and commanders. The strength of ASAS is in its ability to collate and query its
database. When intelligence soldiers use other systems, we lose that ability. The problem was
compounded as you moved to echelons above division. At theater, without the ability to query,
the operator had to search reams of information; at battalion there was frustration, but no real
loss. Add to this the movement of data from system to system and trying to import operational
graphics to aid in a common operating picture between levels of command and within staffs.
Between manually inputting data and graphic control measures, the chance for human error
increased dramatically.
Lessons Learned/TTP: The Army must set a standard for digital connectivity and train
soldiers prior to implementing the programs. Why have updated versions of the system when
soldiers are unable to operate it and other adjacent units are unable to access the
information?
Doctrine, Organizations, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel and
Facilities (DOTMLPF) Implications: (Doctrine, Training, Leadership and Education.)
Doctrinal standards need to be established for digital connectivity. Soldiers must be educated on
the standards in an institutional setting (i.e., Army schools), and operational units in the field
must train on the new standards after they have been set.
***
Issue: Iraq – The All-Source Analysis System (ASAS).
Observation: The productivity of ASAS was generally limited to division and echelons above
division (EAD).
Discussion: Generally, the ASAS was useful at division and EAD. There continued to be a
disparity between what brigade and battalion knew and what division and higher knew (common
operational picture). One of the supporting issues was higher not cleaning up external database
coordination (EDC) and lower echelons having to clean up all the double reporting. Another
issue was the bandwidth at light units and maneuver battalions and brigades. This became
extremely challenging when these units could not set up their signal assets for any long period of
time because of maneuver or contacts. The issue of multiple systems (Maneuver Control System
(MCS), Air Defense Operations Center System (ADOCS), Force XXI Battle Command Brigade
and Below System (FBCB2), Blue Force Tracker) caused the small battalion and brigade staffs
to expend much of their limited manpower to converting data from one system to the other. It
was not uncommon for intelligence soldiers (S2 section) to monitor seven systems during a
battle. (1. FM, 2. ASAS, 3. MCS (light), 4. FBCB2, 5. Digital Non-Secure Voice Terminal
(DNVT), 6. Secure Telephone Unit (STU) III, and 7. Tactical Satellite (TACSAT) or High
Frequency (HF)).
Lessons Learned/TTP: As seen at the CTCs, the ASAS has little value or worth at the
maneuver battalion level. Battalion and brigade S2s seem to have some success using the
FBCB2.
Doctrine, Organizations, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel and
Facilities (DOTMLPF) Implications: (Training.) Lower echelons can be quickly
overwhelmed with “information overflow” because of more limited communication networks
that they have to work with compared to higher headquarters, as is the case with the ASAS
capabilities. Until more communication systems are fielded to lower levels, units must adapt to
the capabilities that they currently possess.
***
Issue: Iraq/Afghanistan — Are Junior Military Intelligence Soldiers Prepared for Tactical
Roles?
Observation: Why do commanders in the field think that junior intelligence officers and
soldiers are not prepared to take on tactical intelligence roles? Comments from military
intelligence and maneuver commanders were that junior military intelligence (MI) officers and
96Bs should have been better prepared for tactical assignments. The trend that we observed
during OIF and OEF was that lieutenants, who have been serving in units for 6-8 months, and
E-1 thru E-4 96Bs did not appear to be prepared for tactical assignments. Captains serving as
battalion S2s generally possessed the skill needed to be an S2, but lacked any advanced
analytical capabilities.
Discussion: These are some of the issues that we observed on junior MI soldiers from OIF and
OEF (the officers referred to are lieutenants and the 96Bs, E-1 thru E-4):
• Officers: Did not understand the targeting process and were unable to produce the
products to support the targeting process. Most of the officers understood the concept of
intelligence support to targeting…at the division and corps levels. During interviews with
many officers, they stated that they were never taught targeting at the battalion and brigade
levels.
• Officers and 96Bs: Weak intelligence briefing skills. If the primary (S2, senior
intelligence analyst) was unable to brief, commanders usually forwent the intelligence
portion of the brief.
• Officers and 96Bs: Very little to no analytical skills. This is also a trend that we have
observed at the CTCs for the past 10 years.
• Officers and 96Bs: Did not understand their role in the MDMP. This was extremely
evident during the COA development and the wargaming process.
• Officers and 96Bs: Unable to develop the intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance
(ISR) plan and lacked the fundamentals of collection management. Did not understand the
asset capabilities and limitations.
• 96Bs: Only understood the basic fundamentals of ASAS. Basically, they could perform
limited data entry. This might not have had an adverse effect on operations considering
that ASAS did not function well below division level.
• Officers and 96Bs: Lacked common tactical skills such as operating communications
systems.
Lessons Learned/TTP: The Intelligence Center and School at Fort Huachuca, AZ, believes
that they prepare soldiers to support tactical commanders. The soldier might leave the school
with the fundamentals of tactical intelligence, but who is responsible for that soldier’s
continuing intelligence education? The G2s? The MI battalion commanders? The maneuver
commanders? It appears that no one takes ownership of this matter. One recommendation is
to strengthen the foundation of the junior intelligence soldier’s education. In the late 90s, the
Intelligence Officer’s Advanced Course was a block of instruction titles “Brigade Operations
and Intelligence.” Junior majors and senior captains still talk about this class today, crediting
it with giving them the tools that they needed to succeed in the tactical world. By teaching this
block of instruction during MIOBC and 96B advanced individual training (AIT), the soldier
could possibly depart Huachuca at a higher level of proficiency, which gives him a better
chance of succeeding if there is a lack of concurrent training.
Doctrine, Organizations, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel and
Facilities (DOTMLPF) Implications: (Training, Leadership and Education.) Army schools
(MI and FA in particular) must emphasize the importance of MDMP and the targeting process at
the tactical/operational level (brigade and below). The ASAS process must be instilled to
students in the institutional environment (school), so that our young officers and soldiers can
apply what they have learned in training and real-world operations more effectively.
Human Intelligence (HUMINT)
Issue: Iraq — HUMINT Asset Management.
Ob ser va tion: There were 69 tac ti cal hu man in tel li gence teams (THTs) op er at ing in Iraq, with
mis sion re quire ments for at least 15 more teams. With this many teams op er at ing in coun try, the
ex pec ta tion of the HUMINT Op er a tions Cell (HOC) was to re ceive at least 120 in for ma tion
in tel li gence reports (IIRs) daily.
Dis cus sion: On the av er age, the HOC re ceived 30 re ports daily. The lack of re ports was not
be cause of the lack of ac tiv ity, but be cause of the lack of guid ance and fo cus pro vided by the
HOC. The HOC should be pro vid ing mis sion fo cus to the op er a tional man age ment teams
(OMTs), who then pro vide guid ance and fo cus to the THTs. The HOC, OMTs, and THTs
op er ated off dif fer ent PIRs, which were not de vel oped into SIR/SOR, and many of the teams
con ducted un con ven tional mis sions that did not support the HUMINT effort.
Les sons Learned/TTP: The lack of HUMINT fo cus for the THTs is a com mon prob lem we
ob served at the JRTC. A trend through out the Army is to man the THTs with se nior war rant
of fi cers, while man ning the HOC and OMTs with ju nior war rant of fi cers and NCOs. More
se nior and ex pe ri enced op er a tors should con duct HUMINT man age ment and analysis.
Doctrine, Organizations, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel and
Facilities (DOTMLPF) Implications: (Training, Leadership.) Emphasize the importance of
HUMINT in training. Recommend more senior operators be placed in charge of HUMINT
management and analysis to enhance mission effectiveness.
***
Issue: Iraq —HUMINT Communications.
Ob ser va tion: Com pat i bil ity and con nec tiv ity be tween HUMINT com mu ni ca tions sys tems
hin dered op er a tions in Iraq.
Dis cus sion: Con nec tiv ity be tween the ter mi nals was non ex is tent, and had an ad verse ef fect on
HUMINT mis sion ca pa bil i ties and pro duc tiv ity. The com mu ni ca tion sys tems were de signed to
link HUMINT el e ments to gether with time-sen si tive and per ish able in for ma tion, as well as
cre ate da ta bases for this in for ma tion. Be cause these sys tems did not work, the com put ers
pro vided with the HUMIINT com mu ni ca tions soft ware were used solely as stand-alone lap top
com put ers, with in for ma tion be ing pro cessed as Word and Ac cess doc u ments. Ad di tion ally, the
HUMINT com mu ni ca tion sys tems were not com pat i ble with other sys tems through out the Joint
force, lim it ing the exchange of information with HUMINT assets throughout the theater.
Les sons Learned/TTP: The units are mak ing do by us ing the sys tem’s com put ers as
stand-alones and pass ing in for ma tion us ing Word and Ac cess programs.
Doctrine, Organizations, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel and
Facilities (DOTMLPF) Implications:
• Training. Units must continue to apply adaptability and flexibility with the assets they
have to effectively accomplish missions.
• Material. Field communications packages that are compatible across Joint forces. There
is no viable reason for developing single system communications systems. On the
contrary, there is every reason for making sure such communications systems can be
networked with others.
***
Issue: Afghanistan — HUMINT Communications.
Ob ser va tion: Com mu ni ca tions be tween THTs and the OMT in the Kandahar re gion of
Af ghan i stan were chal lenged dur ing the best of times. The sys tems were not re li able and
pro vided no con nec tiv ity be tween other HUMINT assets in theater.
Dis cus sion: Be cause of the geo graphic lo ca tion of some teams op er at ing in the Kandahar
re gion, the only way they could pro vide the OMT or higher head quar ters with in tel li gence was to
travel to Kandahar Air field (KAF) and phys i cally pro vide hard copy of all re ports. This
pre sented a prob lem with per ish able in for ma tion be cause the teams could only travel to KAF
ev ery 3 to 5 days. As in Iraq, the HUMINT com mu ni ca tion sys tems were used as stand-alone
com put ers, and FM and cell phone con nec tiv ity was spo radic. An other ad verse ef fect of poor
com mu ni ca tions was that the teams did not have ac cess to the source da ta bases, nor did they
have ac cess to in tel li gence collected by other HUMINT agencies in country.
Les sons Learned/TTP: Rec om mend sat el lite tele phones for all THTs.
Doctrine, Organizations, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel and
Facilities (DOTMLPF) Implications: (Training, Materiel.) During planning phase of
MDMP (mission analysis), ensure that capabilities and limitations of communication equipment
are adequately examined to support all contingencies. Distribute existing assets to maximize
capabilities (while overcoming, or at least minimizing limitations) such as issuing satellite
phones to units and personnel who are in remote locations that must maintain contact with other
units over long distances. Doctrine states that intelligence drives maneuver; in an
intelligence-driven SOSO, absolutely no unit should have priority over intelligence
collection—especially HUMINT.
***
Issue: Iraq/Afghanistan — HUMINT Capabilities.
Ob ser va tion: Com mand ers, at ev ery ech e lon, were gen er ally not cer tain how HUMINT as sets
could best sup port their operations.
Dis cus sion: HUMINT teams and MI com mand ers who were frus trated at the mis use of
HUMINT as sets by ma neu ver com mand ers ap proached this sub ject to us. The MI per son nel
be lieved that com bat arms of fi cers did not un der stand the man age ment and ca pa bil i ties of
HUMINT as sets, es pe cially when teams were tasked in the di rect sup port (DS) role, and that it
was the “Big Army’s” job to teach them.
Les sons Learned/TTP: The MI per son nel were cor rect that many HUMINT as sets are poorly
uti lized as a re sult of a lack of un der stand ing of the mis sion on the part of the sup ported
com mander and staff. Mis man age ment of HUMINT as sets in the DS role is, more of ten then
not, a re sult of poorly trained or weak HUMINT team lead ers. It is the HUMINT team’s
re spon si bil ity to en sure the sup ported com mander knows his ca pa bil i ties and lim i ta tions and
how best he can sup port his mis sion. This is one of the most com mon re oc cur ring trends that
we see at the JRTC. Fre quently, the HUMINT team leader re lies on the sup ported unit’s S2
to en sure the com mander and staff un der stands their mis sion and re spon si bil ity. What makes
this S2 the expert?
Doctrine, Organizations, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel and
Facilities (DOTMLPF) Implications: (Training, Leadership.) Units must attempt to
effectively use DS HUMINT assets to maximize their capabilities in training. Leaders must
properly train HUMINT team leaders and soldiers.
***
Issue: Iraq — Intelligence, HUMINT.
Ob ser va tion: Some HUMINT teams were ini tially given the com mand re la tion ship of gen eral
sup port re in forc ing (GS-R) from Corps.
Dis cus sion: Team lead ers were in ef fec tive at ward ing off di vi sions that, in re al ity, even tu ally
be came DS. THT em ploy ment is not taught to tac ti cal in tel li gence of fi cers (35D) and most S2s
have trou ble with the em ploy ment is sue. Many THTs end up at tached to units con duct ing
non-doc trinal mis sions, and, in many cases, THTs ac tu ally aug mented four-man stacks dur ing
build ing raids (they were usu ally the num ber two man, who sta tis ti cally is the person who gets
shot).
Les sons Learned/TTP: THTs rely on the rap port they gen er ate with the lo cal pop u la tion and
the abil ity to col lect in for ma tion. Putt ing them on a door kicker team ru ins that rap port and
there would be no ad van tage to them col lect ing in for ma tion. Be ing on a door kicker team can
be fun, but with crit i cal short ages of HUMINT mil i tary oc cu pa tional spe cial ties (MOSs)
through out the Army, es pe cially in Iraq, it would be more ben e fi cial to have them per form ing
their mission after the site takedown.
Doctrine, Organizations, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel and
Facilities (DOTMLPF) Implications: (Training, Leadership.) Soldiers must be used in roles
for which they have been educated and trained. Mal-utilization of personnel can hamper mission
effectiveness.
***
Issue: Iraq/Afghanistan – Interpreters.
Ob ser va tion: The lack of com pe tent in ter pret ers through out the the ater im peded op er a tions.
When in ter pret ers were in te grated into op er a tions, they were not used to their full capability.
Dis cus sion: Bot tom line, the U.S. Army does not have a frac tion of the lin guists re quired to
op er ate in the Cen tral Com mand (CENTCOM) area of re spon si bil ity (AOR). We have to rely on
con tract lin guists for Dari, Pashtun, and the nu mer ous di a lects of Arabic. This de vel ops into a
big prob lem, be cause, not only do you have to have flu ent lin guists, but you also have to ob tain
one that can com pre hend mil i tary terms and op er a tions. In most cases, the in ter pret ers also need
some de gree of phys i cal stam ina to sup port mil i tary op er a tions in a field en vi ron ment. Laugh if
you will, but many of the lin guists with which I con versed were con ve nience store work ers and
cab driv ers, most over the age of 40. None had any pre vi ous mil i tary ex pe ri ence. Most mil i tary
lin guists work ing in Iraq and Af ghan i stan only pos sess, on the av er age, a 2/2 Forces Com mand
(FORSCOM) rat ing (which ba si cally gives them the ability to tell the difference between a burro
and a burrito).
The next problem with interpreters was asset utilization. With this limited asset, what is the
priority for employment? Because of the limited number of interpreters, we observed that there
was not much continuity in working with the same elements, or, in many cases, interpreters
working to the point of burnout. They are mercenaries and are getting paid, but the tradeoff with
long hours is that the quality of support is degraded.
There are TTP for working with interpreters. For most soldiers, the notion of working with a
foreign-speaking civilian is a new and novel concept. Home-Station training with linguists is not
common, and rarely occurs at the CTCs. The most common mistake soldiers make while
working with interpreters was that they speak directly to the interpreter and wait for him to
translate rather then have eye contact and speak directly to the foreign national, with the
interpreter speaking in the background. In many cultures, not speaking directly to a person
shows a lack of respect and trust. Another observation is that the foreign national gives a
10-minute answer and the interpreter translates yes or no. Who knows what agenda the
interpreter has? If the soldier isn’t keen enough to pick up on this, there could be problems with
a common understanding of future situations.
Les sons Learned/TTP: There are nu mer ous rec om men da tions, but only a few that we can
in flu ence in the near future.
• Have language training at Home Station. The days of going to the “language lab” one
day a week to read foreign comic books or interrogate your roommate are over.
Immersion training is the key to success.
• Incorporate interpreter scenarios at the CTCs, at least with HUMINT soldiers. The
interpreter scenario was attempted during the Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT)
rotation at the JRTC.
• Add an asset manager at the unit level, similar to a collection manager for
interpreters. We can no longer afford to send interpreters in “support” of units to buy
chickens and soft drinks.
Doctrine, Organizations, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel and
Facilities (DOTMLPF) Implications: (Training.) Recommend suggestions in above
paragraph be adapted whenever possible.
***
Issue: Afghanistan — Operational Management Team (OMT) Operations.
Ob ser va tion: OMT op er a tions in the Kandahar AO were not as pro duc tive as they could have
been be cause of a lack of an a lyt i cal feed back and op er a tional fo cus, which is due in part to not
con duct ing 24-hour op er a tions and be ing manned by an inexperienced staff.
Dis cus sion: An other dis turb ing trend that we have seen at the JRTC is that the OMTs that drive
the THTs are not pro vid ing timely anal y sis, feed back, and guid ance to teams in the field. Ju nior
war rant of fi cers and NCOs ha bit u ally man the OMTs. Af ghan i stan was no ex cep tion. The
THTs in Kandahar be came very frus trated be cause af ter work ing a source, pre par ing re ports, and
fi nally con tact ing the OMT af ter nu mer ous at tempts with spo radic com mu ni ca tions, they found
out that the OMT does n’t re port to work for an other 5 hours. Then, the OMT con ducted only
min i mal anal y sis on the in for ma tion that the THTs sub mit ted be cause, “We don’t have enough
time during the day to conduct an analysis anyway.”
Les sons Learned/TTP: The OMT is the di rect link to the THTs. If the OMT is not avail able
to con duct their du ties dur ing a 24-hour pe riod, it will hin der THT op er a tions. The OMT
should pro vide min i mal man ning through out the night, to at least re ceive and col lect
in for ma tion, which would fa cil i tate anal y sis when the primary shift arrived.
Doctrine, Organizations, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel and
Facilities (DOTMLPF) Implications: (Training.) Units must continually emphasize the
importance of the OMT relationship with THTs during training to enhance the collection of
information, and facilitate information analysis.
***
Issue: Afghanistan — Intelligence Contingency Funds (ICFs).
Ob ser va tion: ICF op er a tions ceased when there was a change in the ICF cus to dian.
Dis cus sion: While we were in Af ghan i stan, the THTs did not have ac cess to ICF, which
hin dered some mis sions. Some teams were get ting by with hand ing out items from their
in cen tive locker, but they too were in jeop ardy of los ing some sources due to no ICF. The
rea son be hind this was to tally bu reau cratic. All funds were frozen to con duct a change of the
ICF cus to dian. ICF that was al ready is sued to the THTs was pulled back to ac count for it. The
funds were al ready me tic u lously tracked at the THT level, which made it un nec es sary to do this.
So, when the cus to dian de cided to pull the funds, he in ad ver tently stopped some HUMINT
operations.
Les sons Learned/TTP: We should rep li cate the use of ICF at the JRTC, and pro vide units
with TTP on ICF use and man age ment.
Doctrine, Organizations, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel and
Facilities (DOTMLPF) Implications: (Training.) Recommend the use of ICF at training
centers; provide units with TTP on ICF use and management.
***
Issue: Iraq — Intelligence, Long-Range Surveillance (LRS).
Ob ser va tion: The “S” is for se cu rity. Of the 30 LRS teams avail able to Corps, only frac tions
were em ployed in a doc trinal manner.
Dis cus sion: Un for tu nately, as in Bosnia and the ini tial Kosovo mis sion, LRS teams were
uti lized as se cu rity de tach ments for head quar ters el e ments (prae to rian guard?) and as es corts for
MI as sets. If LRS el e ments were not at tached to MI units, who would pro vide se cu rity for the
MI assets?
Les sons Learned/TTP: The mis sion plan ning timeline for LRS op er a tions is lengthy and
re quires more de tail and fo cus than con ven tional ma neu ver op er a tions. Cou pled with the
in creased speed and flu id ity of the mod ern bat tle field, col lec tion man ag ers be come more
chal lenged with LRS as set plan ning and man age ment. Not that it can’t be done, LRS
em ploy ment on the high in ten sity, mech a nized bat tle field, has to be flex i ble with a firm grasp
of the ma neu ver plan. This fail ure to grasp the corps ma neu ver plan is why LRS as sets were
not fully uti lized dur ing OIF. LRS mis sions were planned, but the speed and suc cess of the
corps ma neu ver forces were not taken into con sid er ation. So, by team in ser tion time,
ma neu ver forces were al ready on top of the team’s ob jec tive. Mis sion scratched. With the
con stant mis sion scratches, LRS el e ments be came se cu rity de tails; no plan ning, as sets
em ployed.
Doctrine, Organizations, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel and
Facilities (DOTMLPF) Implications: (Training, Leadership.) In the planning phase of
MDMP (mission analysis), units must effectively incorporate available assets (integrate,
synchronize) such as the LRS, according to doctrine to maximize mission accomplishment.
Failure to employ available assets according to doctrine is a result of poor planning.
Targeting
Issue: Iraq — Targeting and Primary Intelligence Requirements (PIRs).
Ob ser va tion: Our sys tem of tar get ing 72 hours out was ad versely af fected by Iraqi ma neu ver.
Dis cus sion: The is sue is larger than just PIR. The rules of en gage ment (ROE), PIR, and the use
of pre ci sion mu ni tions all worked in con cert to lessen the ef fec tive ness of the 72-hour tar get ing
cy cle. The Iraqis ma neu vered units for ward to en gage Al lied forces in a leap frog fash ion. As
these move ments oc curred, the staffs and com mand ers ad justed PIR and the tar get ing pro cess.
How ever, the speed that the Iraqi forces closed with each other caused them to move in side of
our tar get ing cy cle. Tar get fold ers used for Iraqi unit “A” 72 hours ago were no lon ger rel e vant
at the 48 hours mark be cause of a change in their dis po si tion and Iraqi unit “B” now be came a
pri or ity. This caused con fu sion with col lec tion man ag ers, who had to change tasks to col lec tors,
de velop new PIR and pro duce new tar get fold ers. The prob lem now is that the com mander does
not have 72 hours be fore the new Iraqi unit “B” is within the di rect fire range of the ground
com po nent. In re al ity, he might have 24 hours left. Units were un able to pro duce two com plete
tar get sets with grids due to con straints of time.
Les sons Learned/TTP: The U.S. Air Force re quires a 72-hour win dow to pre pare crews and
equip ment for mis sions. Sev enty-two hours be comes too much of a time con straint, es pe cially
at the speed mod ern land forces move. With cur rent in tel li gence sys tems able to pin point
tar gets fast, a sys tem or method has to be de vel oped to elim i nate the time con straints.
Doctrine, Organizations, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel and
Facilities (DOTMLPF) Implications:
• Doctrine, Training. Joint doctrine must be re-evaluated to address solution sets to
overcome the current shortcomings of the lag time between target identification and the
time it takes to deliver munitions on target. More joint training opportunities must be
available to the U.S. Army and USAF units (such as the emerging Joint Training Center
concept) to work on executing doctrinal concepts in a training environment prior to
deploying to real-world operations.
• Material. Targeting, PIR development and handling must move beyond human handling
systems to achieve the speed necessary. That means develop and field a Joint targeting
hardware and software system that kicks out associated PIR automatically to sample
available databases automatically and develop target folders. In other words, use available
technology to streamline and eliminate collection management processes that are human
centric, and provide inherently slow decision-making.
***
Issue: Iraq — Targeting, Rules of Engagement.
Ob ser va tion: Lim ited col lat eral dam age re quire ments. At the start of OIF, a re quire ment was
es tab lished not to tar get aban doned Iraqi ve hi cles. These aban doned ve hi cles made bat tle
dam age as sess ment (BDA) more dif fi cult.
Dis cus sion: Iraqis aban don ing these ve hi cles, then later reoccupying them com pli cated the is sue
fur ther. The idea be hind the guid ance was to have a base of ve hi cles to re form an Iraqi Army
af ter the war. It is un clear whether these aban doned and reoccupied ve hi cles were en gaged in
later ac tions or were driven off and used for fu ture mis sions against co ali tion troops.
Les sons Learned/TTP: Pre ci sion fires al low for very se lec tive tar get ing, but per haps this was
too se lec tive for both the dan gers the reoccupied ve hi cles posed and the in crease in dif fi culty
in de ter min ing BDA.
Doctrine, Organizations, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel and
Facilities (DOTMLPF) Implications: (Training.) BDA must be continually re-evaluated to
ensure maximizing mission effectiveness.
***
Issue: Iraq — Targeting, Target Identification.
Ob ser va tion: Both Iraqi and al lied re bel forces used sim i lar equip ment.
Dis cus sion: This pro vided a unique chal lenge to BDA cells and ma neu ver units (shoot ers). The
in creased use of Un manned Ae rial Ve hi cles (UAVs) helped im prove the com mon op er at ing
pic ture for the cam paign, but mea sures were not worked out so that elec tro-op ti cal (EO) sen sors,
such as the UAV, could al low op er a tors to dis tin guish be tween the two sets of ve hi cles.
Les sons Learned/TTP: Di rect and in di rect fire con trol mea sures need to take al lied ve hi cles
into ac count as the United States con tin ues to de velop and field EO sen sors and use them in
tar get ing.
Doctrine, Organizations, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel and
Facilities (DOTMLPF) Implications: (Doctrine.) Joint and coalition doctrine must address
fire control measures to ensure allied vehicles are identified to reduce the possibility of
fratricide.
***
Issue: Iraq — Targeting, Special Operations Forces (SOF) Restricted Fire Area Disclosure.
Ob ser va tion: With the in creased use of sen sors dur ing OIF, SOF were more vis i ble to the
con ven tional force com mand ers than in pre vi ous wars.
Dis cus sion: There is a long-stand ing un will ing ness for SOF and LRS to dis close their unit
lo ca tions. This oc curs be cause these units place a pre mium on op er a tional se cu rity (OPSEC) and
stealth to ac com plish their mis sions. Un for tu nately, the con ven tional ground and air
com mand ers now have sen sors that see fur ther and with a higher de gree of ac cu racy. In sev eral
cases, SOF units were “ob served” ei ther elec tron i cally or oth er wise and their po si tions were
un ver i fi able by SOF com mand ers for one rea son or an other. This caused com mand ers to slow
the sen sor to shooter link to try and con firm the ob served units’ iden tity in the ab sence of di rect
and in di rect fire con trol mea sures.
Les sons Learned/TTP: As the con ven tional force con tin ues to field more so phis ti cated and
ac cu rate sen sors, the SOF com mu nity will have to de velop meth ods for de-con flict ing di rect
and in di rect fire con trol mea sures. Con ven tional Army units op er at ing at the JRTC with LRS
have found a way to fix this prob lem by hav ing li ai son of fi cers (LNOs) at the ma neu ver
bri gade and di vi sions.
Doctrine, Organizations, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel and
Facilities (DOTMLPF) Implications: (Doctrine, Training.) SOF/Conventional Force
Integration is paramount in today’s COE, and in Operations OEF and OIF. The SOF community
is currently working on producing and staffing through CALL a SOF/Conventional Force
Integration Handbook. SOF trends are now being included at JRTC, beginning with the 2d and
3d Quarters, FY 03. Doctrine must be updated to reflect the current warfighting relationship
between SOF and conventional forces.
***
Issue: Iraq — High Payoff Targets (HPTs).
Ob ser va tion: Proper des ig na tion of HPTs fa cil i tates sen sor and shooter mis sion suc cess.
Dis cus sion: While the tar get ing cy cle suf fered some is sues, one pos i tive is sue was the
des ig na tion of HPTs and the dis sem i na tion of HPTs to sen sors and shoot ers. When the tar get ing
pro cess de vel oped trou ble, op er a tors of sen sors, such as the UAV, had enough guid ance to keep
them op er a tional and re port ing. By dis sem i nat ing these HPTs to weap ons sys tems (shoot ers),
the op er a tors then had enough guid ance to aid them when they were con fronted with nu mer ous
tar gets.
Les sons Learned/TTP: Com mand ers must in clude HPTs as part of their guid ance even if it
is their in tent to kill ev ery thing. More of ten than not, the sys tem’s op er a tor does not know
what the HPTs or the pri or i ties are.
Doctrine, Organizations, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel and
Facilities (DOTMLPF) Implications: (Training.) During MDMP (mission analysis), HPTs
must be properly designated to better facilitate sensor and shooter mission success.
***
Issue: Afghanistan Counter-Mortar Predictive Analysis.
Ob ser va tion: The di vi sion ap plied both the pre dic tive anal y sis con cepts and a sig nif i cant
num ber of the pre dic tive anal y sis tools taught at JRTC in their coun ter-mor tar fights against
Taliban/Al Qaeda at tack ers near the Pa ki stani bor der.
Dis cus sion: The ma neu ver and fire sup port staffs and key lead ers of 1/82 used the coun ter-fire
les sons and con cepts learned from their two ro ta tions in lo cat ing, track ing, pre dict ing, and
at tack ing their in di rect fire threat. The mor tar threat against the main base camps near the large
towns had sub sided be fore the bri gade’s ar rival, and had mi grated to ward the out posts and
pa trols along the Pa ki stani bor der, and had ac tu ally sub sided for sev eral months be cause of
ef fec tive op er a tions by friendly war lords, the Cen tral In tel li gence Agency (CIA), Joint Spe cial
Op er a tions Task Force (JSOTF), and the Pa ki stanis. Dis mounted, rocket, and mor tar at tacks of
the pa trol base on the bor der at Shkin in March/April 2003 prompted de ploy ment of ad di tional
bri gade ISR as sets to the pa trol base lo cated there to in clude the Q-36 ra dar. The bri gade
ap plied pre dic tive anal y sis to their SIGINT and ra dar ac qui si tions over a short pe riod, and
ef fec tively ap plied sup pres sive ma neu ver and air pa trols that forced the en emy to shift from
ac cu rate mor tar fire at short range to much less ac cu rate lon ger range rocket fire from less
ad van ta geous fir ing po si tions across the bor der. The pres ence of the Q-36 and sev eral it er a tions
of rapid, ac cu rate pa trol re ac tion to ra dar or SIGINT ac qui si tions is cred ited with the suc cess.
While pol i tics as so ci ated with the bor der have com pli cated an ef fec tive le thal re sponse to the
rocket fire, the BDE has ir re fut able, eas ily un der stood ev i dence of the vi o la tions for use in
ad dress ing the Pa ki stani government.
Les sons Learned/TTP: Con tinue to use the coun ter-mor tar fight as a key teach ing point for
ma neu ver, fires, and in tel li gence per son nel at JRTC. Main tain a fo cus on pre dic tive anal y sis
in all of our coun ter-in sur gency phase train ing.
Doctrine, Organizations, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel and
Facilities (DOTMLPF) Implications: (Training.) Emphasize the counter-mortar fight for
maneuver, fires and intelligence personnel at the training centers. Maintain attention on
predictive analysis in the counter-insurgency phase of training.
***
Issue: Afghanistan — Use of Indirect Fires as an Information Operations (IO) Tool.
Ob ser va tion: The Task Force (TF) pe ri od i cally used in di rect fires as an IO tool to in flu ence
vil lage pop u la tions as part of the open ing phase of cor don and search op er a tions in vil lages
dom i nated by anti-co ali tion forces, and pop u lated by ci vil ians hos tile to co ali tion pres ence.
Dur ing the es tab lish ment of the cor don, the bat tal ion oc ca sion ally fired a bat tery three-vol ley
(point-det o nat ing fuse) fire mis sion at a one-ki lo me ter stand off from the tar get vil lage as a
fire power dem on stra tion. The in tent of the dem on stra tion was to in flu ence the lo cal pop u la tion
and any anti-co ali tion forces in the vil lage to lay down arms and of fer no re sis tance to the
op er a tion.
While there appears to have been no target audience analysis to determine the probable
effectiveness of this tactic on any of the target villages, or post-operative assessment by target
practice tracers (TPTs), the unit asserts that it had been effective in practice. They also assert
that it has had the positive and unexpected effect of driving the terrorists from the villages and
into the arms of the cordon forces prior to the commencement of search operations on more than
one occasion as they have attempted to flee. This eased the search task and likely reduced
casualties on all sides.
Dis cus sion: When con ducted as a re sult of qual ity anal y sis of short- and long-term im pact of
the ac tion on the broader TF IO goal for that tar get vil lage and prov ince, and its mil i tary ef fi cacy
and util ity at the time of ex e cu tion, this can be a use ful TTP. Clear un der stand ing of our
dom i nant mil i tary ca pa bil i ties and fu til ity of re sis tance to them by hos tile pop u la tions and
anti-co ali tion forces is an im por tant IO end-state that sup ports achieve ment of the larger
ma neu ver end-state. Ap pli ca tion of this TTP as a blan ket tem plate with out this de tailed
sup port ing anal y sis could prove ex tremely coun ter pro duc tive to achiev ing the IO and ma neu ver
end-states. A vari a tion of this tac tic was suc cess fully ex e cuted dur ing a re cent SBCT ro ta tion,
but was not based on any anal y sis of ef fi cacy or im pact. The an a lyt i cal pro cess in volved in the
ap pli ca tion of this TTP is the same ROE ap pli ca tion, mil i tary ne ces sity, IO plan ning pro cess that
should al ready be tak ing place in a well-planned SOSO. The same ba sic ques tions asked for
prior use of le thal fires in side a pop u lated area should be asked for this type of dem on stra tion
fires also.
Lessons Learned/TTP:
• If a mission rehearsal exercise (MRE) becomes a reality, consider integration of this as
part of a recommended TTP during cordon and search operations.
• Discuss this TTP and supporting analysis as part of the leader training program (LTP).
This discussion should be part of a larger discussion of indirect fires ROE application
and IO planning and analysis.
Doctrine, Organizations, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel and
Facilities (DOTMLPF) Implications: (Training.) Adapt TTP recommended in above
paragraph.
Fire Support
Issue: Afghanistan — Army Airspace Command and Control (A2C2) - Coordinating
Altitude, Indirect Fire De-confliction with USAF Aircraft.
Ob ser va tion: The bri gade (BDE) fire sup port of fi cer (FSO) in formed us that the close air
sup port (CAS) spe cial in struc tions (SPINS) for OEF set a de-facto co or di na tion al ti tude for
USAF air craft area of re spon si bil ity (AOR)-wide of 10,000-ft MSL (Mean Sea Level). The
com bined arms op er a tions cen ter (CAOC) fur ther di rected (and CJTF sup ported) that this
co or di nat ing al ti tude equated to a Fire Sup port Co or di na tion Mea sure (FSCM) for in di rect fire
as sets. All fixed-wing op er a tions be low 10,000 MSL must be cleared through the ap pro pri ate
ma neu ver head quar ters; all in di rect fires (in clud ing 60mm), which pen e trate the 10,000-ft MSL
line, must be cleared through the ap pro pri ate USAF el e ment. If an en listed ter mi nal at tack
con trol ler (ETAC) was pres ent with the ma neu ver el e ment fir ing the in di rect, he es sen tially
con ducted a net call on the ul tra high fre quency (UHF) CAS fre quency and cleared the tra jec tory
and im pact area of CAS di rectly with the pi lots in the vi cin ity of his AO or his con trol ling
tac ti cal air con trol party (TACP) head quar ters. If an ETAC was not pres ent, the ma neu ver
com mander had to call to his bat tal ion (BN) head quar ters and have the TACP rep re sen ta tive
clear the fires with the USAF. Most op er a tions were con ducted be tween 7,000- and
12,000-MSL, there fore re quir ing better than 90 per cent of the fire mis sions to be cleared through
the USAF.
This TTP appears to have been adopted and approved during initial air and SOF operations prior
to conventional force insertion, and prior to the presence of significant indirect fires assets.
CAS aircraft density was extremely low throughout the AOR, as were the density of fire
missions. There were perhaps two CAS aircraft airborne at any given time in what equates to a
three-state area in the United States.
The net impact on actual operations in Afghanistan was not clear (the unit was unable to offer an
example where this TTP had impinged on operations), but the potential for significant
operational impact is great.
Dis cus sion: The es tab lish ment of a re quire ment to clear com pany/bat tal ion/bri gade fires through
USAF chan nels is ex tremely prob lem atic, and not sup ported by cur rent doc trine. Given the
den sity of air craft, it is also un nec es sary. The use of an ar bi trary coun try-wide stan dard
co or di nat ing al ti tude based on MSL in stead of Above Ground Level (AGL) is coun ter-in tu itive
and ex ces sive in a coun try with as great an al ti tude vari ance as Af ghan i stan. Use of this TTP
adds un nec es sary co or di na tion points into the clear ance of fires pro ce dures. It in creases the
prob a bil ity of slow de liv ery of fires, which would in crease risk and fric tion for ground
op er a tions.
Establishment of correct unit boundaries for operations, use of a 10,000-ft AGL coordinating
altitude for fixed-wing aircraft, and lastly proper planning and use of informal Airspace
Coordination Measures by fire support elements (FSEs) at battalion and company levels are the
proper solution. For Army purposes, this coordinating altitude restriction need only apply over
Army-owned land (a small percentage of the country), thus freeing the USAF to operate at
lower, more effective altitudes elsewhere.
Lessons Learned/TTP:
• Do not adopt or replicate the current OEF CAS SPINS clearance of fires methodology.
• Mentor rotational leaders on the proper TTP for de-confliction of air and indirect fire.
• Recommend Fire Support (FS) Division and Air Warrior II examine the complete
current OEF SPINS and offer recommendations back to the field on corrections and
improvements.
Doctrine, Organizations, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel and
Facilities (DOTMLPF) Implications: (Training.) Adapt recommendations in above
paragraph.
***
Issue: Afghanistan — 1) A2C2 - BDE Command and Control (C2) Aircraft Restricted
Operations Zone (ROZ) Placement During Operations Prevents Delivery of Indirect Fire.
2) BDE C2 Aircraft Clearing all Fires in What were Fundamentally Company or Battalion
Operations.
Ob ser va tion: Nu mer ous ma neu ver and fires per son nel from com pany through BDE level said
that the com mand group’s TTP of plac ing the C2 air craft di rectly over the top of a fight, with an
at ten dant multi-ki lo me ter ROZ had pre vented them from plan ning or ex e cut ing in di rect fire or
CAS in nu mer ous op er a tions. The com pany and bat tal ion lead ers in volved in these op er a tions
stated that they fully de sired to ap ply fires in most of these mis sions, but were pre vented from
do ing so by the ROZ. When ap proached with the is sue by se nior lead ers, the com mand group
re fused to al ter the TTP, with out ex pla na tion.
The vast majority of missions were company missions, planned (and theoretically) commanded
and controlled by battalion.The BDE command group had apparently inserted itself in greater
than an advisory/facilitative role in many of these operations, especially in the realm of call for
fire and clearance of fires processing. The C2 aircraft was not present for all such missions, and
when present, normally stays on station for the duration of the fuel load, not the mission
duration. The significant engine/rotor noise, and static interference common to C2 aircraft
resulted in significant delays (3-5 minutes) in requesting and clearing fires through the C2
aircraft on most operations. When the aircraft had been unavailable because of maintenance, or
broken station due to refueling requirements mid-mission or crew rest, the battalions were
permitted to control their own clearance and coordination from the ground, without incident.
Dis cus sion: Place ment of the ROZ and the ad di tional level of C2 caused con fu sion, given the
self-rec og ni tion by BLUFOR of the im pact of this type of con trol meth od ol ogy and A2C2 on
their abil ity to de liver fires ef fec tively.
Initial development of the ROZ TTP is representative of the lack of attention to detail,
knowledge of A2C2 doctrine, and experience with fires/air operations we see nearly every
rotation at JRTC. Only one of the last 18 rotations has generated an A2C2 plan, which it never
enforced. The typical impact of this is many close calls in execution, and two to three helicopter
fratricides per rotation. The TTP for A2C2 which permit aggressive simultaneous delivery of
fires and aviation are simple and effective, but are almost never trained at Home Station to
standard.
Employment of the brigade command team on a C2 aircraft as an additional C2 (emphasis on
con trol) node on what is fun da men tally a com pany mis sion is coun ter pro duc tive un less it is
pro vid ing some value-added ser vice that the bat tal ion is un able to pro vide for it. By all
ac counts, this was not the case with most of its op er a tions in TF Devil. As in South Viet nam, the
pres ence of se nior lead ers or staffs in a he li cop ter over a com pany fight is prob lem atic. When
they can serve as fa cil i ta tors to help meet the needs of ground com mand ers and re lieve some of
the pres sure, they are a wel come ad di tion to any fight. As sist ing in com mu ni ca tions re lay as
needed, re quest ing ad di tional head quar ters as sets, and pro vid ing ad di tional SA are all wel come
tasks an air borne plat form can pro vide. In ter ven tion in a fight by a com mander and staff two
times re moved from an ae rial platform whose placement inhibits a combined-arms fight is not.
Lessons Learned/TTP:
• Do not adopt either the C2 or A2C2 TTP demonstrated by the TF.
• We have already submitted a SOSO/counterinsurgency A2C2 article addressing
correctives for this exact set of issues to the Field Artillery Journal and the Aviation
magazine.
• Include A2C2 for SOSO/counterinsurgency as a block of instruction for maneuver and
fires leaders at LTP.
• Continue to aggressively assess aviation assets when they clearly violate Risk Estimate
Distances (REDs) and over-fly firing units in the force-on-force box.
• Continue to enhance the realism and combined-arms nature of the JRTC live-fire
training scenario.
Doctrine, Organizations, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel and
Facilities (DOTMLPF) Implications: (Training.) Adapt recommendations in above
paragraph.
***
Issue: Afghanistan (and Iraq) Communications and Coordination in SOSO When
Subordinate Elements are Well Beyond Frequency Modulation (FM) and Landline
Communications.
Ob ser va tion: The av er age dis tance be tween bases of op er a tion in the di vi sion sec tor was 90
ki lo me ters. Line-of-sight ra dios were nearly use less in day-to day op er a tions ex cept for
intra-pla toon and intra-com pany op er a tions. The bri gade and bat tal ion tac ti cal op er a tion cen ters
(TOCs) de pended on a lim ited num ber of sat el lite com mu ni ca tion (SATCOM) ra dios, as well as
mo bile sub scriber equip ment (MSE) en abled tele phones and lo cal area net work (LAN)
con nec tions down to the bat tal ion level. LAN-se cure chat rooms be came the de fault pri mary
com mu ni ca tions and co or di na tion tool for the staffs. Most ma jor staff sec tions, at each
com mand level from the Com bined Forces Land Com po nent Com mand (CFLCC) to the
bat tal ion main tains a “chat room” avail able to all Se cret Internet Pro to col Router Net work
(SIPR) sub scrib ers in which they post Sig nif i cant Ac tiv i ties (SIGACTS) and per form
co or di na tion tasks. Each staff sec tion main tained one com puter with a semi-ded i cated op er a tor
as their “ra dio-tele phone op er a tor (RTO)” com puter, on which they open, in min i mized form, the
chat rooms they need to track to stay abreast of SIGACTs at their higher and lower head quar ters,
and re lated BOS. As with ra dio com mu ni ca tions, there are re quired “sta tions” and a “net con trol
sta tion (NCS)” iden ti fied for each net. For ex am ple, the BDE FSEs RTO had at least four chat
rooms open on his screen. They were the Bat tle Cap tain chat room, the CJTF Fires chat room,
the CJTF air sup port op er a tions cen ter (ASOC) chat room, and the CJSOTF chat room. The BDE
FSE was an ac tive par tic i pant on the CJTF fires and di vi sion chat rooms, and an
ob server/co or di na tor on the ASOC and CJSOTF chat rooms. In ad di tion, the CJTF and di vi sion
chat rooms were used for clear ance of fires across unit bound aries above the bat tal ion level, or
into the nu mer ous CJTF-owned ar eas in sup port of the ex tremely long con voys and air-as sault
op er a tions.
Dis cus sion: With a trained, at ten tive RTO or bat tle cap tain ob serv ing and main tain ing the
sys tem, this ap pears to be an ef fec tive TTP for mod er ate to low tempo SASO op er a tions typ i fied
by the on go ing fight in OEF. SBCT had all of the tools in place to ex e cute this TTP in sup port of
its non-con tig u ous op er a tions, but never ex e cuted.
Les sons Learned/TTP: In the event of a ro ta tion with sig nif i cant non-con tig u ous play,
rec om mend we of fer the TTP to BLUFOR as an op tion to en hance its SA and ex e cu tion
ca pa bil i ties when other means are un avail able. We may want to con sider ad vis ing units to
at tempt this type of TTP dur ing nor mal-dis tance ro ta tions as a way of shar ing non-crit i cal
in for ma tion rap idly, ac cu rately, and sim ply across the bri gade. While clear ance of fire in this
man ner is clearly un de sir able in our sce nario, re duced “trans la tion” time and er rors by RTOs
is a clear side ben e fit.
Doctrine, Organizations, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel and
Facilities (DOTMLPF) Implications: (Training.) Adapt recommendations in above
paragraph.
***
Issue: Afghanistan — Company-level Combined Arms Firebase Operations.
Ob ser va tion: The di vi sion op er ated a com bined-arms firebase at Shkin in one AOR that ran
along the south east ern bor der with Pa ki stan. The firebase was sit u ated at high al ti tude in what
was es sen tially a block ing po si tion along some key lines of drift for Taliban/Al Qaeda forces
at tempt ing to in fil trate from Pa ki stan. The po si tion was ini tially a sim ple com pany pa trol base,
but was en hanced with 120mm mor tars, a Q-36, and 4x105mm tubes in re sponse to an in creas ing
in di rect fire and dis mounted as sault threat to the base it self and its dis mounted pa trols in Spring
2003. The bat tery (-) fired sev eral mis sions as pre-planned sup pres sion fires in sup port of
pla toon op er a tions, and fired a suc cess ful mis sion in di rect sup port of a pla toon con tact with a
Chechen am bush party on the Pa ki stani bor der.The bat tery op er ated in a de-facto op er a tional
con trol (OPCON) sta tus, with a very close re la tion ship hav ing de vel oped be tween the bat tery
and col lo cated com pany. All pa trols had fire-plans, and were “fol lowed” by a com bi na tion of
mor tar and ar til lery tubes laid on pri or ity tar gets from start to fin ish. The Q-36 was ori ented on a
search az i muth to al low it to con tinue to col lect on mor tar and rocket fir ing points along the
Pa ki stan bor der.
Dis cus sion: The op er a tion of com bined pa trol/fire-bases pro vides sig nif i cant pay offs for both
the ma neu ver and fir ing units. From a se cu rity stand point, the depth of man power, lead er ship,
and ex pe ri ence in such a base pays huge div i dends. Each unit gains from the other’s sig nif i cant
di rect-fire fire power, and can com mit more man power to its pri mary in di rect fire de liv ery or
pa trol ling tasks on a nor mal ba sis be cause the load is shared be tween two fairly size able units.
Dur ing short surge pe ri ods, when a larger per cent age of one unit is re quired to per form a pri mary
task, the other can eas ily cover the base force pro tec tion tasks. The close as so ci a tion be tween
de liv ery unit and its “cus tomer” adds sig nif i cantly to the speed and qual ity of af ter-ac tion re view
(AAR) feed back and TTP de vel op ment be tween the two. Im proved in ter face be tween the
com pany mor tars and the fir ing bat tery will yield im proved fire di rec tion and gun nery skills.
Lessons Learned/TTP:
• In the event of an AFOR MRE, urge the player unit to maintain the combined
fire-base/patrol-base concept, and consider expanding the use of the TTP to other
applicable locations. To do this, we will need to replicate (as near as possible) the great
distances in the actual AOR to generate the requirement to place some firing units
under the operational control of maneuver (i.e., base separation being much greater
than the maximum range of the indirect fire systems).
• During the movement-to-contact (MTC) portion of standard rotations, we may want to
advise BLUFOR to consider use of this concept for its synergistic effects when
warranted by mission, enemy, terrain, troops, time available and civilians (METT-TC).
Doctrine, Organizations, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel and
Facilities (DOTMLPF) Implications: (Training.) Adapt recommendations in above
paragraph.
Observation
Issue: Afghanistan – Civil Affairs (CA)/Psychological Operations (PSYOP) Team Mission
Preparation and Execution ISO Kandahar Airfield (KAF) AOR Missions.
Ob ser va tion: Sev eral snap shot looks at the BDE’s CA/PSYOP mis sion ex e cu tion in sup port of
their KAF AOR re vealed some is sues. The BDE’s sup port ing CAT-B and TPD had no
meth od ol ogy for prebriefing and de brief ing their teams which con duct mis sions in the KAF
AOR, and had no ha bit u ally as signed teams for this AOR. The ro ta tional na ture of the task ing of
teams, com bined with a poor pre-mis sion prep a ra tion pro cess, means that they have al most no
SA. This lack of SA means that they re-ask the same ques tions over and over of the same
per sons, and es tab lish a rep u ta tion as be ing in com pe tent or un-trust ing.
When I spoke with one village leader after the CA/PSYOP teams had finished talking with him,
he told me he assumed the Americans believed he was lying to them and had no trust in him
because they constantly re-asked the same question, apparently looking for him to screw up. He
said the impact of the discussion was to scare him, and it kept him from developing a rapport
with them. Nothing ever resulted from discussions with the Americans because they always
started over at square one. Poor SA and preparation kept the relationship from moving forward,
or a strong rapport being built. This limited the amount of casual intelligence gained and real
progress made.
Team preparation, mission planning, understanding of intent and ROE, relationship building, and
message delivery skills all needed work. Interpreter usage was extremely poor. The CA NCO,
who led the team’s efforts on the trip I accompanied, delivered the simple message of “We
Americans are here only to provide a safe and secure environment. We can’t help with food,
civic action projects, legal issues, or anything else of importance to you.” His tone and body
English projected discomfort, and lack of will to become decisively engaged and establish a
relationship, or to facilitate assistance for the village’s problems from those whose charter it was
to address them.
Dis cus sion: The bri gade con ducted a sep a rate tar get ing pro cess for the small AOR im me di ately
sur round ing its pri mary base at Kandahar Air field. A co-opted war lord ran this por tion of
Af ghan i stan, and ef fec tively se cured the air field from the out side and dom i nated this AOR. The
vil lage heads and other key com mu ni ca tors in the AOR an swered to him. The threat was thus
fairly low, and the pri mary in tent of the low level IO cam paign in these vil lages ap peared to be
in tel li gence col lec tion in sup port of force pro tec tion for the air field, al though the task/pur pose
was not clearly stated any where. There was a bri gade-tar get ing doc u ment used to task units to
per form their IO pa trols and vis its, but it was ge neric in de sign, and of lim ited tac ti cal value to
the user. While, from a force pro tec tion stand point, the crit i cal ity of the IO mis sion was min i mal
thanks to the sup port of the war lord, the unit was miss ing a sig nif i cant op por tu nity to en hance its
SA, and set the con di tions to main tain pop u lar sup port in the event re moval or minimization of
the war lord is nec es sary at some point in the fu ture – not an un likely event in the eth nic Pashtun
south. They also lost the abil ity to pos i tively im pact the lives of the lo cals from a hu man i tar ian
stand point, and set the con di tions for long-term sta bil ity and sup port in the re gion.
Contributing to the situation was the fact that both CA and PSYOP elements were Reserve
Component units who, based on detailed discussions with members of the teams, received only a
marginally effective pre-deployment training and mission preparation both at their Home Station
and at the Fort Bragg, North Carolina, mobilization site. Both teams were made up of extremely
talented individuals, and had a great ethos, but lacked the realistic training necessary to perform
at the “graduate” level. They were not funded at Home Station for critical language, bilateral
(BILAT)/regional/cultural training that is common for active duty Civil Affairs and PSYOP
Command (CAPOC) units. This critical training was not part of their post-mobilization training,
which they described as classroom refresher training of AIT tasks with no regional focus or
regionally relevant TTP. Simple situational training exercise (STX) lanes were offered which
were poorly resourced and again, offered no regional focus or regionally relevant TTP. Teams
were told that they would “learn the cultural stuff and TTP once they got there.”
Neither team had the benefit of a recent CTC rotation, and demonstrated shortcomings that we
commonly see and correct through teach/coach/mentor JRTC. Both by their own admission and
my observations, this had caused significant friction, and led to a less-than-optimal transition.
This poor quality of mission preparation was inexcusable given that the operation was over a
year and a half old, and the rotation plan for CAPOC was fairly well locked in.
Lessons Learned/TTP:
• Maintain the high quality of training for CAPOC forces currently conducted by the
JRTC Special Operations Training Detachment (SOTD) – those who get it benefit
massively.
• Consider a SOTD outreach to CAPOC to assist them in creating an effective Home
Station and mobilization station preparation program that addresses the true needs of
the rotational units.
• Until the potential establishment of Afghanistan forces (AFOR) and Iraqi forces
(IFOR) MREs, consider establishing a pre-deployment training and certification STX
program at JRTC for deploying CA and PSYOP teams, resourced using OEF/OIF funds
and manned with the assistance of CAPOC, to better prepare rotational CAPOC units
for the challenges they face in those operations. We have the resources and expertise to
best prepare these deserving units for these demanding missions.
Doctrine, Organizations, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel and
Facilities (DOTMLPF) Implications: (Training.) Adapt recommendations in above
paragraph.
