Concrete Steps To Improve The Nonproliferation Regime
Carnegie
Concrete Steps
PAPERS
to Improve the
Nonproliferation
Regime
Pierre Goldschmidt
Those who think the nonpro-
liferation regime is failing, or
agree that it is too valuable
to let fail, would generally
agree on steps that could be
taken to strengthen it.
Nonproliferation Program
Number 100 n April 2009
© 2009 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. All rights reserved.
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About the Author
Pierre Goldschmidt is a nonresident senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment
for International Peace. Goldschmidt is also a member of the Board of Directors
for the Association Vinçotte Nuclear (AVN). AVN is a fully independent
Belgian nonprofit organization providing advice and technical support services
in nuclear safety, security, and radiation protection.
Goldschmidt was the deputy director general, head of the Department of
Safeguards, at the International Atomic Energy Agency from 1999 to June 2005.
The Department of Safeguards is responsible for verifying that nuclear material
placed under safeguards is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear ex-
plosive devices and that there is no undeclared nuclear material or activities in
non–nuclear-weapon states party to the NPT.
Before the IAEA, Goldschmidt served for twelve years as director general
of SYNATOM, the company responsible for the fuel supply and spent fuel
management of seven Belgian nuclear plants. For six years Goldschmidt was a
member of the Directoire of EURODIF, the large French uranium enrichment
company. In November 2005, Goldschmidt became Doctor Honoris Causa of
the University of Brussels. Among a number of cultural and scientific awards,
Goldschmidt received the 2008 Joseph A. Burton Forum Award of the American
Physical Society.
Goldschmidt has headed numerous European and international committees,
serving as chairman of the Uranium Institute in London and chairman of the
Advisory Committee of the EURATOM Supply Agency.
Contents
Summary
1
Introduction
3
Exercising Fully Existing IAEA Verification Authority
5
Requiring Special Inspections
6
Obtaining and Verifying Early Design Information
8
Detecting and Exposing Noncompliance
10
Uncovering Undeclared Nuclear Trade and Activities
10
Exposing Noncompliance
11
Prevention and Deterrence
13
Dealing Preventively With Noncompliance
14
Dealing Preventively With NPT Withdrawal
16
Securing Irreversible Safeguards
16
Conclusion
17
Notes
19
Annexes
23
Summary
Today’s nuclear nonproliferation regime is increasingly challenged by states
that exploit ambiguity in rules and rifts in the international community to
pursue nuclear weapon capabilities without fear of reprisal. At present, lax and
inconsistent compliance practices threaten nonproliferation efforts by giving
some states more leeway for evading rules than should be tolerable in an effec-
tive nonproliferation regime.
Observers differ on the political feasibility of persuading the world to adopt
the necessary nonproliferation measures and comply with them. Pessimists be-
lieve that the necessary consensus will not be created—in the International
Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) Board of Governors, in the Nuclear Suppliers
Group, among parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons (NPT) or in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC).
Optimists refuse to give up trying. Yet all who think the nonproliferation re-
gime is failing, or who agree that it is too valuable to let fail, would generally
agree on steps that could be taken to strengthen it.
This paper offers specific policy recommendations in three areas.
First is the necessity for the IAEA to fully exercise its existing verification
authority. In particular, the Agency should reassert and enforce its right to
make “special inspections” at undeclared locations in non–nuclear-weapon
states and its right to obtain and verify design information as soon as a state
decides to construct a new nuclear facility.
Second, the IAEA should take steps to ensure that cases of noncompliance
with safeguards agreements are detected and reported rapidly to the IAEA
Board of Governors and thereafter to the UNSC. The Board should therefore
adopt two resolutions, the first requiring member states to provide more infor-
mation on past and future transfers of nuclear material and equipment, and the
second recognizing that previous failures and breaches committed by South
Korea and Egypt constituted cases of noncompliance with their safeguards
agreements. This latter step, without seeking any punitive action, would reas-
sert the fairness and universality of procedures for reporting noncompliance as
envisioned in the IAEA Statute.
The third and most important category of measures is necessary to help
prevent future proliferation crises. This category includes securing the irrevers-
ibility of safeguards on nuclear material and facilities even if a state withdraws
from the NPT, and adopting generic, legally binding Security Council resolu-
tions that would improve the response to cases of prolonged noncompliance
and NPT withdrawal.
1
2 | Concrete Steps to Improve the Nonproliferation Regime
In addition, this paper makes the following recommendations:
• The IAEA Board of Governors should adopt a resolution determining that
the information and access to specified locations made available by Syria are
not adequate for the Agency to fulfil its responsibilities and requesting the
Director General to undertake without delay the necessary “special inspec-
tions” in Syria, as provided under its safeguards agreement.
• The Board of Governors should adopt a resolution requiring all IAEA mem-
ber states to provide, on a quarterly basis, certain information that would
improve the IAEA’s ability to uncover undeclared nuclear activities.
• The Board of Governors should adopt a resolution requiring that all sensi-
tive nuclear fuel cycle facilities under safeguards be covered by a “66-type”
safeguards agreement with the IAEA, which, contrary to a comprehensive
safeguards agreement (CSA),1 would not lapse if the state were to withdraw
from the Non-Proliferation Treaty.
The paper also recommends that the IAEA Secretariat be required by the
Board of Governors to:
• Name, both in its annual report and in the published section of its annual
Safeguards Implementation Report (SIR), those states with significant nu-
clear activities that have not yet signed or ratified an Additional Protocol.2
• Report more explicitly in the restricted section of the SIR on the difficulties
encountered by the Agency in implementing its verification activities, and
any finding that might raise proliferation concerns, including the names of
states not fully cooperating with the Agency.
• Provide an evaluation of the effectiveness and necessary independence of
State Systems of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material (SSAC),
starting with those states that have previously been found to be in breach of
their safeguards obligations.
This paper does not suggest how to produce the political will to motivate
the IAEA Secretariat and Board of Governors, and the UN Security Council,
to adopt these practical measures. Rather, it seeks to counter the view that the
nonproliferation regime is terminally weak and could not be made more ef-
fective. The feasible steps recommended here would significantly strengthen
the nonproliferation regime without requiring modification of the NPT or
comprehensive safeguards agreements. They are straightforward procedural
changes that would make a real difference in protecting against proliferation,
if key governments decided to make this a priority.
Pierre Goldschmidt | 3
Introduction
The withdrawal of North Korea from the NPT in 2003 and the enduring crisis
over Iran’s noncompliance with its nuclear nonproliferation obligations have
led many officials and observers to conclude that the nonproliferation regime
is doomed to failure. Some say that the regime worked exceptionally well for
three decades, which is a great achievement, but has been eroded to the point
of collapse by the tides of history. Others say that treaty-based nonprolifera-
tion was always a fool’s errand, and the folly is finally being exposed. Such
pessimism is premature, dangerous, and potentially self-fulfilling. Moreover,
by castigating the “nonproliferation regime” or “inspections,” the pessimists
deflect attention from where the real problem lies: the weak political will and
shortsighted nuclear policies of key states.
The greater the number of states possessing nuclear weapons, the greater
the risk that one day, by design or accident, they will be used by a state or a
nonstate actor with catastrophic consequences. The international community
must therefore reject the recent tendency to accept the idea that, sooner or
later, more countries will possess nuclear weapons, and that we can do nothing
to stop it.
Those who think the nonproliferation regime is failing and those who think
it is too valuable to let fail would generally agree on steps that could be taken
to strengthen it. They differ more on the political feasibility of persuading the
world to adopt necessary steps and comply with them. This points to the heart
of the challenge: to motivate the governments—whose cooperation is needed
to strengthen nonproliferation rules and their enforcement—to determine a
reasonable “price” for their cooperation. The present paper does not attempt to
say how to produce the political will to cooperate. Rather, it provides detailed
examples of feasible steps that would significantly strengthen the nonprolif-
eration regime without requiring modification of the NPT or comprehensive
safeguards agreements: straightforward procedural changes that would make a
real difference in protecting against proliferation, if key governments decided
this was a priority.
There are practical steps that can be taken to “dissuade” and “deter” non–
nuclear-weapon states from seeking nuclear weapons, if the international com-
munity—particularly the nuclear-weapon states—make this a higher priority
other than in words.
“Dissuasion” entails persuading a state (both the leaders and the people)
that it is not in that state’s best interest to acquire a nuclear weapons capability.
Dissuasion can mainly, if not exclusively, be achieved through bilateral and
multilateral negotiations that seek, first of all, to provide appropriate security
| Concrete Steps to Improve the Nonproliferation Regime
guarantees. The most remarkable achievement in recent years has been the
success of secret diplomacy in convincing Libya’s leadership that abandoning
its weapons of mass destruction and missile programs actually would increase
the country’s security and improve its economic development. As with Libya,
to be most effective, efforts at persuasion should be undertaken well in advance
of any anticipated crisis to be most effective.
“Deterrence” plays its role when a non–nuclear-weapon state cannot be per-
suaded that acquiring a nuclear weapons capability is not in its best interest.
It is essential for any such state to know that any undeclared nuclear weap-
ons program has a high probability of early detection and that negative con-
sequences are not simply possible but unavoidable, unless the noncompliant
state fully and proactively cooperates with the IAEA. Unfortunately, neither of
these two deterrents (early detection, unavoidable consequences) is credibly in
place today, making it essential to take the practical steps necessary to improve
the situation.
The head of the IAEA, Mohamed ElBaradei, recently insisted that it is
necessary to “give the International Atomic Energy Agency sufficient legal au-
thority […] to ensure that non–nuclear-weapon states use nuclear energy ex-
clusively for peaceful purposes. The IAEA and the Security Council together
must be able to effectively deter, detect and respond to possible proliferation
cheats.”3 The question is: how does one achieve these goals in practice? This
analysis recommends urgent action by the IAEA and the Security Council
before the next proliferation crisis takes place.
The recommended actions fall into three categories. First is the necessity for
the IAEA to fully exercise its existing verification authority, in particular by
reasserting and enforcing its right to make “special inspections” at undeclared
locations in non–nuclear-weapon states and its right to obtain and verify de-
sign information as soon as the decision is made to construct a nuclear plant.
Second, it is crucial that cases of noncompliance with safeguards agreements
be detected and reported rapidly to the IAEA Board of Governors and thereaf-
ter to the Security Council. The Board should therefore adopt two resolutions,
the first requiring member states to provide more information on past and fu-
ture transfers of nuclear material and equipment, and a second unequivocally
recognizing that previous failures and breaches committed by South Korea
and Egypt constituted cases of noncompliance with their safeguards agree-
ments. The third and most important category of measures is necessary to help
prevent future proliferation crises. This category includes securing the irrevers-
ibility of safeguards on nuclear material and facilities, even if a state withdraws
from the NPT, and adopting generic, legally binding UNSC resolutions that
would improve the response to cases of prolonged noncompliance and NPT
withdrawal.
Pierre Goldschmidt | 5
Exercising Fully Existing IAEA Verification Authority
The International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards system is being imple-
mented more effectively and efficiently than ever before.
Traditionally, the Agency focused on accounting for nuclear materials fa-
cility by facility in a state. This work was done only at declared facilities and
was largely an audit. Over the last ten years, however, the Agency has stepped
back and developed an analytical approach that asks not simply whether the
declared numbers add up, but also, “What’s going on in this state’s nuclear
program? Is everything really consistent?”
At the heart of this approach is the production and periodic update of
State Evaluation Reports (SERs) and corresponding action plans. SERs com-
bine the results of inspections in the field and environmental swipes with
analyses of open-source information and satellite imagery. Reports analyze the
history of all anomalies and inconsistencies recorded during previous inspec-
tions. They examine whether a state’s research and development program is
internally consistent, corresponds with stated purposes, and points to a com-
mitment to use nuclear technology exclusively for peaceful purposes. The SERs
analyze export and import notifications regarding relevant nuclear material
and equipment, and other information available to the IAEA. Every SER also
includes a section that examines the most likely diversion scenarios, should the
state under review seek to undertake undeclared nuclear activities for military
purposes. These SERs are among the most confidential documents used by the
IAEA Secretariat.
In parallel with these developments, the IAEA has replaced almost all ana-
logue video cameras with digital surveillance cameras and is replacing older
electronic seals with new sealing systems.
Progress is also being made in the use of more advanced equipment, such
as ground penetration radars and infrared imaging methods, to improve the
Agency’s ability to verify that complex facilities conform to their official design.
New high-resolution panchromatic satellite imagery and all-weather monitor-
ing capabilities are now available to the Agency.
To be sure, there are still problems inherent in ensuring that even small
amounts of nuclear material—a few kilograms among tons—are not diverted
without timely warning, but the trend in the technical capability of the safe-
guards system is positive. Still, some states continue to resist the remote trans-
mission of safeguards data to IAEA headquarters or the adoption of updated
safeguards approaches for fuel cycle facilities.
One of the biggest problems, however, is that the IAEA has failed to exercise
fully the verification authority it already has. Additionally, the international
community has failed to strengthen the Agency’s authority without delay in
| Concrete Steps to Improve the Nonproliferation Regime
precisely the situations where it is most necessary, i.e., when a state has been
found to be in noncompliance with its safeguards undertakings or is suspected
of concealing nuclear material or activities.
Concerning the failure to fully use the IAEA’s existing verification author-
ity, two recent examples are worth analyzing:
• Syria’s repeated refusal to allow the IAEA to visit a number of locations that
could be related to undeclared nuclear activities, and the Board’s unwilling-
ness to require a “special inspection” as foreseen in Syria’s safeguards agree-
ment.
• Iran’s unilateral decision not to provide to the IAEA early design informa-
tion on new facilities and access to some of those under construction, and
the Board’s reluctance to declare that this constitutes noncompliance.
Requiring Special Inspections
The IAEA has the legal authority, under comprehensive safeguards agreements
(CSA) “to conduct special inspections insofar as these relate to the verifica-
tion of the existence or non-existence of undeclared activities.”4 As then-IAEA
Director General Hans Blix stated in January 1992, the Agency has “the au-
thority, under the Statute and under comprehensive safeguards agreements
concluded with it, to request special inspections at undeclared sites.”5
In February 1992, the Board reaffirmed the Agency’s right to undertake
special inspections, when necessary and appropriate, as described in com-
prehensive safeguards agreements, and to ensure that all nuclear materials in
peaceful nuclear activities are under safeguards.
The IAEA’s record of invoking special inspections is minimal. It has done
so twice. Once in 1992 at Romania’s request, and, again, in 1993 to investigate
inaccuracies in North Korea’s initial report. North Korea refused, leading the
IAEA to report the noncompliance to the Security Council.6
In November 2008, a report to the IAEA Board of Governors on the imple-
mentation of safeguards in Syria7 indicated that Syria denied the Agency access
requested in early May 2008 to three locations as well as to relevant documen-
tation and information. This noncooperation prevented the Agency from car-
rying out without delay its verification activities, including the determination
of the origin of the manmade natural uranium particles found at the Dair
Alzour site bombed by Israel in September 2007. Moreover, the report explains
that “analysis of satellite imagery taken of these locations indicates that landscaping
activities and the removal of large containers took place shortly after the Agency’s
request for access,” raising suspicion of large-scale concealment activities.
A new report on Syria, released on February 19, 2009,8 acknowledges that
Syria continues to deny the access required by the Agency, that no progress
Pierre Goldschmidt | 7
has been made by the Agency in determining whether the building destroyed
at the Dair Alzour site was a nuclear facility under construction, nor in deter-
mining the origin of anthropogenic uranium particles “of a type not included in
Syria’s declared inventory of nuclear material.”
Syria’s safeguards agreement provides that the Agency may make special
inspections “if the Agency considers that information made available by the State
[…] is not adequate for the Agency to fulfil its responsibilities under the Agreement.”
It also provides that the Board may decide that an action by the state is essen-
tial and urgent and that the Board shall be able to call upon the state to take
the required action without delay.
By not requiring a special inspection, the IAEA is undermining the future
use of this fundamental verification tool and is unnecessarily eroding confi-
dence in the effectiveness of Agency safeguards.
When a state repeatedly refuses Agency access to a suspected location, it
is not enough to have the Director General urge the state to provide more
transparency and to voluntarily allow visits to these locations. If the only con-
sequence is that the Director General reports at each Board meeting that no
progress has been made, this will encourage any noncompliant state to adopt
similar obstructive tactics, preventing the IAEA from implementing effective
safeguards verifications.
As James Acton has noted, “Syria is the textbook definition of a case in
which a special inspection is merited. If the IAEA fails to ask for one, it will
hand future states suspected of non-compliance an extraordinary powerful
precedent to use in opposing a special inspection request.”9
Recommendations
The IAEA Board of Governors should adopt a resolution
• Determining, as foreseen in Article 73 of Syria’s Safeguards Agreement, that
the information made available by Syria “is not adequate for the Agency to
fulfil its responsibilities under the Agreement”;
• Expressing serious concern about Syria’s repeated refusal to provide the
Agency with the requested information, documentation, and access to spec-
ified locations;
• Expressing further concern about the reported landscaping activities and
the removal of large containers, which took place shortly after the Agency’s
request for access, as well as concern about the presence, in environmental
samples taken from the Dair Alzour site, of a significant number of anthro-
pogenic uranium particles of a type not included in Syria’s declared inven-
tory of nuclear material;
| Concrete Steps to Improve the Nonproliferation Regime
• Deciding, under Article 18 of Syria’s Safeguards Agreement, that action by
Syria is essential and urgent;
• Requesting the Director General to undertake without delay the necessary
special inspections in Syria.
Obtaining and Verifying Early Design Information
A little-noticed but most important provision of comprehensive safeguards
agreements is the obligation for the state to provide the IAEA with design
information on all existing as well as new nuclear facilities, as specified in the
“Subsidiary Arrangements.”
Safeguards agreements provide that “The Agency and the State shall make
Subsidiary Arrangements which shall specify in detail, to the extent necessary to
permit the Agency to fulfil its responsibilities under the Agreement in an effective
and efficient manner, how the procedures laid down in the Agreement are to be
applied” (§39). In addition, “Subsidiary Arrangements shall enter into force at the
same time as, or as soon as possible after, the entry into force of the Agreement.”
The 1976 version of the Subsidiary Arrangements General Part “Code 3.1”
stipulates that the state should provide the Agency a completed design infor-
mation questionnaire for new facilities “normally no later than 180 days before
the facility is scheduled to receive nuclear material for the first time.” After the
discovery of Iraq’s undeclared nuclear program in 1991, it became clear and
was acknowledged by the IAEA that “Experience has shown that the provision of
design information is needed much earlier.”10 Therefore, the Secretariat recom-
mended, inter alia, that parties to a CSA should “provide the Agency with com-
pleted Design Information Questionnaires for new facilities based on preliminary
construction plans as early as possible, and in any event not later than 180 days
prior to the start of construction.”
In February 1992, the Board endorsed these recommendations and “requested
the Secretariat and all parties to comprehensive safeguards agreements to adopt,
where appropriate, the related Subsidiary Arrangements.”
In February 2003, Iran became the last state with significant nuclear activi-
ties to adopt the revised Code 3.1 on the provision of early design information.
This was done by an exchange of letters between Iran and the IAEA, which
is the standard procedure. However, on March 29, 2007, Iran informed the
Agency that it had “suspended” the implementation of the new Code 3.1 and
reverted to the 1976 version. The Agency immediately asked Iran to reconsider
its decision, explaining that “In accordance with Article 39 of Iran’s Safeguards
Agreement, agreed Subsidiary Arrangements cannot be modified unilaterally.”11
Since then, the Director General has reported six times (August and
November 2007 and February, May, September, and November 2008) that
“there has been no progress on this issue.” This sentence did not appear anywhere
in the February 2009 report, which reiterated, however, for the third time,
Pierre Goldschmidt | 9
that in December 2007, the Agency requested preliminary design information
for the nuclear power plant that Iran is to build in Darkhovin. Iran has not
provided it.
To make things even worse and contrary to Article 48 of its safeguards
agreement and past practice, Iran refused to allow the Agency to carry out in
October 2008 the scheduled Design Information Verification (DIV) at the
heavy water research reactor (IR-40) under construction in Arak. The Agency
reiterated that its “right to carry out DIV is a continuing right.” Iran repeated
its refusal in February 2009. This refusal “could adversely impact the Agency’s
ability to carry out effective safeguards at that facility, and has made it difficult for
the Agency to report further on the construction of the reactor, as requested by the
Security Council.”12
This is not a small issue that the international community can let fade
away with time because of weariness and lack of progress. Quite the contrary:
the obligation to provide “design information as specified in the Subsidiary
Arrangements General Part” is an integral part of CSAs. If a state unilaterally
decides to “suspend” its implementation, this constitutes a breach of the safe-
guards agreement.
The fact is that without the obligation to provide early design informa-
tion, Iran could construct an undeclared enrichment facility and hot cells suit-
able for reprocessing activities without having to inform the Agency until six
months before introducing nuclear material.
Member States should be reminded that in May 2005 in a report to the
Board on “Strengthening Safeguards Implementation in States with Small
Quantities Protocols,” the Director General stated that “in order to draw the
required safeguards conclusions for States with CSAs, the Agency needs, inter alia,
the authority: (a) to require the early submission of facility design information
in accordance with the Board’s 1992 interpretation.…”13 In September 2005,
the Board decided that, henceforth, it would approve only Small Quantities
Protocols based on a revised standardized text that includes the obligation to
provide early design information as mentioned above.14 How could the Board,
today, permit without reaction a noncompliant state with significant nuclear
activities to be exempted from this obligation?
Recommendations
The Board should adopt a resolution declaring that Iran’s multiple and con-
tinuous breaches of Article 48 of its safeguards agreement and of Code 3.1 of
its Subsidiary Arrangements General Part constitute a case of noncompliance
under Article XII.C of the IAEA Statute.
The purpose of such a resolution is not to increase penalties on Iran but to
avoid establishing the wrong precedent.15
10 | Concrete Steps to Improve the Nonproliferation Regime
Detecting and Exposing Noncompliance
To better deter non–nuclear-weapon states from engaging in a nuclear weap-
ons program, it is essential for any such state to know that undeclared nuclear
activities have a high probability of early detection and that any case of non-
compliance with their safeguards undertakings will be promptly reported to
the IAEA Board of Governors. It is therefore necessary that the Agency be
fully and systematically informed about international transfers of nuclear ma-
terial and equipment as well as illicit procurement attempts and activities. It
is also necessary, in order not to lower the standard for compliance, that the
Board unequivocally recognize that previous failures and breaches commit-
ted by South Korea and Egypt constituted cases of noncompliance with their
safeguards agreements.
Uncovering Undeclared Nuclear Trade and Activities
As far back as May 1992, the IAEA Secretariat had recommended that the
Board of Governors call on Member States to report, on a quarterly basis, all
exports and imports of equipment and non-nuclear material listed in an attach-
ment corresponding to what is today Annex II of the Additional Protocol (AP).
It is very unfortunate that this universal reporting system was not endorsed by
the Board of Governors when the recommendation was made in 1992.
The Secretariat, in August 2006, also recommended that Member States
provide information on their past nuclear activities. As experience has demon-
strated (in particular in Iran), it is important for the Agency not only to be sys-
tematically informed, by both exporting and recipient states, of future transfers
of the items listed in Annex II of the AP, but also to be informed of all such
transfers that have taken place at least since the recipient state joined the NPT.
As recommended by the Secretariat, the Board of Governors should also “re-
quest all States to provide to the Agency relevant information on exports of specified
equipment and non-nuclear material, procurement enquiries, export denials, and
relevant information from commercial suppliers in order to improve the Agency’s
ability to detect possible undeclared nuclear activities.”16
For the same reason, the Board of Governors should also require all Member
States to provide, on a quarterly basis, information regarding each import of speci-
fied equipment and non-nuclear material listed in Annex II of the AP. Providing
such information is presently not obligatory and, even under the terms of the
AP, requires a specific request from the Agency to a particular state.
Recommendations
The Board of Governors should approve and publish a list of information that
Member States are expected to communicate to the Agency in accordance
with Article VIII.A. of the IAEA Statute that states, “Each member should
make available such information as would, in the judgment of the member, be
helpful to the Agency.”
Pierre Goldschmidt | 11
In the meantime, and as a first step, the IAEA Director General should issue
an Information Circular to all Member States, drawing their attention to the
fact that providing such information is most valuable for the Agency to fulfill
its mandate and that the Secretariat expects all Member States to do so on a
quarterly basis.
Exposing Noncompliance
Experience with North Korea and Iran has demonstrated that noncompli-
ance must be addressed promptly and effectively. Iran has sought to exploit
inconsistencies in how the IAEA reports violations, including its own case and
that of Libya, as well as the less worrying but still significant cases of South
Korea and Egypt. Clarifying the technical and statutory basis by which the
IAEA exposes noncompliance is one immediate way the nonproliferation re-
gime can be strengthened.
According to Article XII.C of the IAEA Statute, reporting a state to the
Security Council for noncompliance with its safeguards undertakings can be
seen as a process comprising the following steps, the last three of which can be
taken in sequence or simultaneously:
1. Agency inspectors report any noncompliance to the Director General
through the head of the Department of Safeguards.
2. The Director General transmits the report to the Board of Governors.
3. The Board makes a formal finding of noncompliance.
4. The Board calls upon the state in question “to remedy forthwith any non-
compliance which it finds to have occurred.”
5. The Board reports the noncompliance to all members and to the Security
Council and General Assembly of the United Nations.
Since 2003, the IAEA Secretariat has reported specific cases of noncompli-
ance with safeguards agreements by Iran, Libya, South Korea, and Egypt to
the Board (step 2). The actions taken by the Board in each case were not con-
sistent and, if they go uncorrected, will create unfortunate precedents.
Whether or not the word “noncompliance” is used in the report transmit-
ted to the Board in step 2 is irrelevant, as demonstrated by the case of Libya,
which admitted to working on an undeclared nuclear weapons program for
many years. This was an indisputable case of noncompliance with Libya’s NPT
and safeguards undertakings. However, in the Director General’s report to the
Board in February 2004, the word “noncompliance” was not used; rather, it
was stated that “Libya was in breach of its obligation to comply with the provi-
sions of the Safeguards Agreement,” which is synonymous.17 Certainly to be
“in breach of one’s obligations to comply” and to be in “noncompliance” is a
distinction without a difference.
12 | Concrete Steps to Improve the Nonproliferation Regime
The same language was used in the Director General’s November 2003
report on Iran. The report stated that “in the past, Iran has concealed many
aspects of its nuclear activities, with resultant breaches of its obligation to com-
ply with the provisions of the Safeguards Agreement,” which “has given rise to
serious concerns.”18
Instead of referring to “breaches of its obligation to comply” as the reports
for Iran and Libya did, the reports on South Korea in November 200419 and
Egypt in February 200520 use the following language:
“The ROK [Republic of Korea] conducted experiments and activities involving
uranium conversion, uranium enrichment and plutonium separation, which it
failed to report to the Agency in accordance with its obligation under its Safeguards
Agreement”; these failures were “a matter of serious concern.”
In the case of Egypt, “the Agency has identified a number of failures by Egypt
to report to the Agency in accordance with its obligations under its Safeguards
Agreement”; and “the repeated failures by Egypt to report nuclear material and
facilities to the Agency in a timely manner are a matter of concern.” (emphasis
added)
The question has therefore been raised about what exactly constitutes non-
compliance under Article XII.C of the IAEA Statute. Clearly a failure to de-
clare nuclear material and activities that should be subject to IAEA safeguards
cannot be considered a small, technical reporting mistake.21 If such failures
have taken place over an extended period of time or were deliberately con-
cealed, or both, they must be categorized as noncompliance. If these activities
had a plausible military purpose or involved military organizations, then they
are of even greater concern. The same is true if the noncompliant state does not
fully and proactively cooperate with the IAEA to remedy the situation.
As demonstrated in a previous analysis,22 the failures and breaches commit-
ted by South Korea and Egypt, which were reported to the Board in 2004 and
2005, respectively, should be unequivocally recognized to constitute cases of
noncompliance with their comprehensive safeguards agreements and, as such,
should be reported to the UN Security Council in accordance with Article
XII.C of the IAEA Statute.23 Such reports, by not recommending any further
action or any sanction, would demonstrate that when states cooperate with the
IAEA in ceasing and clarifying their problematic actions, the proper reporting
procedures need not be controversial or troublemaking.
Recommendations
The Board should adopt a resolution acknowledging that the failure by South
Korea to declare a number of experiments and activities involving nuclear ma-
terial, as reported to the Board in November 2004, constitutes noncompliance
with its safeguards agreement (in the context of Article XII.C of the Statute).
Such a resolution also could commend South Korea for its subsequent coopera-
tion with the Agency in providing access to information, documents, persons,
Pierre Goldschmidt | 13
and locations, and welcome the fact that the Agency has concluded that all
nuclear material in South Korea remained in peaceful activities. The IAEA
Board should request the Director General to report this resolution and all
reports and the Chairman’s conclusions relating to South Korea to the Security
Council for information purposes only.24
Similarly, the Board should adopt a resolution acknowledging that Egypt’s
failure to report a number of nuclear materials and activities, as reported to the
Board in February 2005, constitutes noncompliance with its safeguards agree-
ment (in the context of Article XII.C of the Statute), and commend Egypt for
its cooperation with the Agency. The resolution should underline the necessity
for Egypt to sign and ratify the Additional Protocol promptly25 and, in the
meantime, to fully implement its provisions on a voluntary basis, at least until
such time the IAEA Secretariat has concluded that Egypt’s declarations are
correct and complete.26 The Board resolution should also request the Director
General to report the resolution and all reports and the Chairman’s conclu-
sions relating to Egypt to the Security Council for information purposes only
and to provide an updated report on its verification findings in Egypt.
To be clear, the purpose of such actions should not be to seek any punitive
measures or anything more than conformity to the IAEA statutory require-
ment. This would establish an important and correct precedent, thereby avoid-
ing any impression that the implementation of the IAEA Statute is selective.
Failure to adopt such a resolution would result in a dangerous precedent that
lowers the standards for compliance with the CSA and could seriously under-
mine the credibility of the safeguards regime.
Finally, the Board should request the Secretariat to report more explicitly
on borderline cases in the annual Safeguards Implementation Report, with
the names of the states concerned and a description of the difficulties faced in
implementing its verification activities or any finding that may potentially raise
proliferation concerns. Experience has shown that disclosure in this report of
the names of states that are not fully cooperating with the Secretariat has often
had a positive effect.27 This practice should be continued and expanded. It
would allow the Board, if it deems necessary, to request more information from
the Secretariat on any specific case of possible proliferation concern.
Prevention and Deterrence
Ensuring enforcement is a major component of deterrence. If a state has been
found to be in noncompliance with its safeguards undertakings and refuses to
promptly, fully, and proactively cooperate with the Agency, it must trigger a
number of well-defined and credible consequences agreed to by the Security
Council. Actions are also necessary to assure the international community that
if a state withdraws from the NPT, all nuclear material delivered to that state
while and because it was a party to the treaty will irreversibly remain under IAEA
safeguards and not be used for military purposes. These actions should include
1 | Concrete Steps to Improve the Nonproliferation Regime
adopting two generic, legally binding UNSC resolutions that would improve the
response to cases of prolonged noncompliance and to NPT withdrawal.
Dealing Preventively With Noncompliance
Mohamed ElBaradei has recommended that the IAEA and the UN Security
Council work together to, “effectively deter, detect and respond to possible
proliferation cheats.”28
Experience has taught us, in particular in the cases of North Korea and Iran,
that when a state is found to have been in noncompliance with its safeguards
agreements (or in breach of its obligation to comply with its safeguards agree-
ments, which is synonymous) and does not show full transparency and coop-
eration in resolving questions and/or inconsistencies with regard to its nuclear
program (both past and present), the Agency will temporarily need expanded
verification authority. This expanded authority needs to go beyond that granted
under a comprehensive safeguards agreement and the additional protocol.
Greater authority will be necessary in these circumstances to provide in a timely
manner an adequate level of assurance that there are no undeclared nuclear
material and activities in that state and that no previously undeclared nuclear
activities have been undertaken in furtherance of any military purpose.
This is clearly reflected in the IAEA’s report of September 2005 on Iran,
where it is stated29:
In view of the fact that the Agency is not yet in a position to clarify some im-
portant outstanding issues after two and a half years of intensive inspections
and investigation, Iran’s full transparency is indispensable and overdue. Given
Iran’s past concealment efforts over many years, such transparency measures
should extend beyond the formal requirements of the Safeguards Agreement and
Additional Protocol and include access to individuals, documentation related
to procurement, dual use equipment, certain military owned workshops and
research and development locations. Without such transparency measures, the
Agency’s ability […] to verify the correctness and completeness of the state-
ments made by Iran will be restricted. (emphasis added)
The problem is that these additional “transparency measures” have not been
defined in any precise way and when they are requested under an IAEA Board
resolution (as was the case on February 4, 200630), they are not legally binding
on the noncompliant state, unless backed by the Security Council.31
These broader access rights must not exclude military sites, since it would
be likely for the military (or related actors) to be involved in nuclear activi-
ties associated with a weapons program, should one exist.32 At the same time,
military sites may contain sensitive information that would not be relevant to
the Agency’s investigation. Therefore the Agency’s activities on such sites may
need to be conducted under “managed access” conditions, which protect such
information while allowing the Agency to reach its objective.
Pierre Goldschmidt | 15
Denial of, or unwarranted delays in, access should be reported by the
Director General to the Board of Governors and, as appropriate, to the Security
Council.
To give the IAEA the verification tools it needs in cases of noncompli-
ance, the UNSC should adopt a generic resolution (under Chapter VII of
the Charter),33 stating independently of any specific case, if a state is found
by the IAEA to be in noncompliance with its comprehensive safeguards
agreement in accordance with Article XII.C of the IAEA Statute, upon request
by the Agency, the UNSC would automatically adopt a specific resolution under
Chapter VII requiring that state to grant to the Agency extended access rights.
These rights, which are defined in the Temporary Complementary Protocol
(TCP) annexed to the draft UNSC resolution in Annex I, would be used to
resolve outstanding issues. These rights would be terminated as soon as the
Agency’s Secretariat and the Board of Governors have drawn the conclusion
that there are no undeclared nuclear material and activities in the state and that
its declarations to the IAEA are correct and complete.
Under the multi-stage process foreseen in the above UNSC generic resolu-
tion,34 if the Director General of the IAEA were unable to report within 60
days of the adoption of the state-specific resolution that the noncompliant
state is fully implementing the TCP, the UNSC shall adopt a second specific
resolution requiring the state to immediately suspend all uranium and pluto-
nium conversion and enrichment-related activities as well as all reprocessing-
related activities.
If the noncompliant state further refused to fully implement the relevant
UNSC resolutions, the Security Council shall adopt a third Chapter VII res-
olution calling on all states to forthwith suspend the supply of any military
equipment and cooperation with the noncompliant state as long as it remains
in noncompliance with Security Council and IAEA resolutions. It is indeed
logical and legitimate for the Security Council to agree a priori that in these cir-
cumstances all military cooperation with that state would be suspended. This
should constitute a strong disincentive for states to defy legally binding UNSC
resolutions, but would in no way impact the well-being of their people.
Recommendation
As exemplified by the cases of North Korea and Iran, one of the greatest dif-
ficulties in deterring states from violating their nonproliferation undertakings
and from ignoring legally binding UNSC resolutions is their hope that for
geopolitical or economic reasons at least one of the five veto-wielding members
of the UNSC will oppose the adoption of effective sanctions.
To guarantee a timely UNSC reaction in case of noncompliance with com-
prehensive safeguards agreements and to increase the likelihood of negative
1 | Concrete Steps to Improve the Nonproliferation Regime
consequences if the state does not comply with UNSC and IAEA resolutions,
the Security Council should adopt a generic resolution, under Chapter VII of
the UN Charter, based on the model contained in Annex I.35
Dealing Preventively With NPT Withdrawal
A particularly threatening case for international peace and security is the with-
drawal from the NPT of a non–nuclear-weapon state that has been found by
the IAEA to be in noncompliance with its safeguards agreement. As has been
stressed on many occasions, the great benefit that the NPT brings to the in-
ternational community would be dangerously eroded if countries violating
their safeguards agreements or the treaty felt free to withdraw from it, develop
nuclear weapons, and enjoy the fruits of their violation with impunity.
To address this issue the Security Council should adopt (under Chapter
VII of the UN Charter) another generic and legally binding resolution, stating
that if a state withdraws from the NPT (an undisputed right under its Article
X.1) after being found by the IAEA to be in noncompliance with its safeguards
undertakings, then such withdrawal constitutes a threat to international peace
and security, as defined under Article 39 of the UN Charter. This generic reso-
lution (see Annex II) should also provide that under these circumstances, all
materials and equipment made available to such a state or resulting from the
assistance provided to it under a comprehensive safeguards agreement would
have to be forthwith frozen and as soon as possible removed from that state
under IAEA supervision and remain under the Agency’s safeguards.
Recommendations
In order to better deter a state found to be in noncompliance with its compre-
hensive safeguards agreements from thereafter giving notice of its withdrawal
from the NPT and to guarantee a timely and effective Security Council reaction
in such a case, the Security Council should adopt a generic resolution, under
Chapter VII of the UN Charter, based on the model contained in Annex II.
Securing Irreversible Safeguards
One of the greatest weaknesses of the model CSA is its Article 26, which stipu-
lates that the Agreement is to “remain in force as long as the State is party to the
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.” Nothing is said about
what would happen if the state withdraws from the NPT in conformity with
its Article X.1, or if the CSA should become inoperative for any reason.
It would be logical to forbid a withdrawing state the free use—possibly for
military purposes—of material and equipment delivered while and because
it was a party to the NPT. It is therefore highly important to guarantee that
such material and equipment remain under IAEA safeguards, even if a state
withdraws from the NPT or otherwise unilaterally terminates any safeguards
agreement.
Pierre Goldschmidt | 17
Recommendations
To address this problem, the IAEA Board of Governors and the General
Conference should adopt resolutions stating that it should become a norm
that all sensitive nuclear fuel cycle facilities, such as enrichment and reprocessing
plants under safeguards, including in states with a CSA in force, be covered
also by what is known as a “66-type” safeguards agreement. Contrary to a
CSA, 66-type safeguards do not lapse if the state withdraws from the NPT.
Such a 66-type safeguards agreement would, by its terms, only become opera-
tive if a state withdrew from the NPT or if the CSA became inoperative for
any reason.
The Nuclear Suppliers Group should adopt this requirement as an export
condition, starting with all material and equipment related to sensitive nucle-
ar fuel cycle facilities. The governments of the Netherlands, Germany, Japan,
Brazil, and Argentina should lead by example and conclude with the IAEA such
66-type safeguards agreements for their enrichment and reprocessing facilities.
Conclusion
IAEA safeguards play a key role in the international community’s attempts
to ensure that nuclear energy is used in non–nuclear-weapon states for exclu-
sively peaceful purposes. By deterring states from seeking nuclear weapons,
safeguards have the capability of preventing proliferation. Deterrence can only
be effective however if states believe that noncompliance has a high chance of
being detected and if it carries consequences.
Over the last ten years the IAEA has made great strides in enhancing the
effectiveness of safeguards. In parallel to a host of technical improvements, the
internal culture of the Department of Safeguards has changed radically: in-
spectors are increasingly thinking of themselves less like accountants and more
like detectives. The next step should be for the Agency to use its existing legal
authority to the full. In particular, it should make use of its right to conduct
special inspections at undeclared locations when states are otherwise denying
access. The Agency should also require states to provide data—particularly
about exports and imports—that would help it fulfil efficiently its mandate.
Recently the obligation of states to provide early design information about
new facilities and the Agency’s right to verify it have been challenged by Iran’s
refusal to comply with its undertakings. Where that occurs, it should be rec-
ognized for what it is: noncompliance. The Agency should not be complaisant
toward states that are violating their obligations.
That said, the weakest link in the nonproliferation regime today is not the
performance of the IAEA but that of the international community in respond-
ing to noncompliance. The burden here falls largely on the IAEA Board of
Governors and the UN Security Council. In recent years, nonproliferation
crises, particularly in North Korea and Iran, have been a cause for paralysis as
1 | Concrete Steps to Improve the Nonproliferation Regime
states have disagreed strongly over a course of action. Before the next crisis oc-
curs generic procedures for responding to noncompliance should be discussed
and agreed upon. With a “veil of ignorance” about which states might be in-
volved, such discussions should be easier and less acrimonious than in the heat
of a crisis. Moreover, agreement upon a set of standard responses to be applied
even-handedly to any state found in noncompliance—regardless of its allies—
would significantly enhance the credibility of the nonproliferation regime.
Against this background, a necessary first step is for the Board of Governors
to acknowledge where it has acted inconsistently in the past. Recognizing that
South Korea and Egypt were in noncompliance with their safeguards under-
takings respectively in 2004 and 2005 would not be intended to lead to any pu-
nitive measures against either state but would correct damaging precedents.
Beyond this, the Security Council should develop a series of generic resolu-
tions that would set out a “roadmap” for responding to noncompliance. In
investigating safeguards violations, the IAEA needs, for some limited period
of time, enhanced authority to conduct inspections in the state concerned.
Moreover, there must be consequences, such as a ban on conducting sensitive
fuel cycle activities and the cessation of military cooperation, for any state that
refuses to cooperate with an IAEA investigation after having been found in
noncompliance.
Finally, considering the North Korean precedent of 2003, it is necessary to
plan for the possibility of another state withdrawing from the NPT. One im-
portant step would be for the Board of Governors to urge all states with enrich-
ment or reprocessing facilities to conclude “back-up” safeguards agreements
that would not terminate in case of NPT withdrawal. Most critical would be
for the Security Council to adopt a resolution deciding that the withdrawal of
a noncompliant state from the NPT would be considered a threat to interna-
tional peace and security.
If adopted, the concrete measures recommended here would significantly
strengthen the nonproliferation regime and make a real difference in protect-
ing against nuclear proliferation. It depends now on key governments to make
this a priority.
Notes
1 IAEA INFCIRC/153 (corrected).
2 IAEA INFCIRC/540 (corrected).
3 “A Recipe for Survival,” International Herald Tribune, February 16, 2009.
4 IAEA, “Strengthening of Agency Safeguards: Special Inspections,” November 12, 1991,
GOV/2554 Attachment 1, para. 4.
5 IAEA, Excerpts from statements made by the Director General under the agenda
item “Strengthening of Agency Safeguards” at the Board’s December 1991 meetings,
January 22, 1992, GOV/INF/646, Attachment 1, para. 139.
6 Fiona Simpson, “IAEA Special Inspections After Israel’s Raid on Syria,” Bulletin of
the Atomic Scientists, February 10, 2008.
7 IAEA GOV/2008/60, http://www.carnegieendowment.org/static/npp/reports/
gov2008-60.pdf.
8 IAEA GOV/2009/9, http://www.carnegieendowment.org/static/npp/reports/
gov2009-9.pdf.
9 James Acton et al., “The IAEA Should Call for a Special Inspection in Syria,”
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Proliferation Analysis, February 26,
2009, http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=2279
1&prog=zgp&proj=znpp.
10 IAEA GOV/2554/Attachment 2/Rev. 2, para. 1.
11 IAEA GOV/2007/22 para. 14, http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/
Board/2007/gov2007-22.pdf.
12 IAEA GOV/2009/8 para. 8, http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/
Board/2009/gov2009-8.pdf.
13 IAEA, GOV/2005/33.
14 Regrettably in June 2005 the Board hastily authorized the Director General to
conclude a Small Quantities Protocol (SQP) safeguards agreement with Saudi Arabia
without requesting the incorporation of the new provisions recommended in May
2005 to the Board. Saudi Arabia’s old version of the SQP came into force unamended
on January 13, 2009.
19
20 | Concrete Steps to Improve the Nonproliferation Regime
15 It is not enough to state, as the head of IAEA’s Office of Legal Affairs recently
did (http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/2218/iaea-legal-adviser-on-arak-
darkhovin#comment), that “Iran’s refusal to grant the Agency access to carry out DIV
is inconsistent with its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement” without con-
cluding that it does constitute “noncompliance.” This is clearly a signal to potential
cheaters that even if a state does not comply with binding agreements signed with the
Agency, there will be no consequences.
16 IAEA Secretariat’s Note 45, August 2006.
17 IAEA, “Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement of the Socialist People’s
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya,” Report by the Director General, February 20, 2004,
GOV/2004/12, http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2004/
gov2004-12.pdf.
18 IAEA, “Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic
of Iran,” Report by the Director General, November 10, 2003, GOV/2003/75,
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2003/gov2003-75.pdf.
19 IAEA, GOV/2004/84, http://www.carnegieendowment.org/static/npp/reports/
gov2004-84.pdf.
20 IAEA, GOV/2005/9, http://www.carnegieendowment.org/static/npp/reports/
gov2005-9.pdf.
21 Including the failure to provide early design information as agreed with the IAEA in
the General Part of Subsidiary Arrangements of CSAs.
22 Pierre Goldschmidt, “Exposing Nuclear Non-compliance,” Survival, vol. 51 no. 1,
February/March 2009, http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/goldschmidt_
survival20090201.pdf.
23 A more detailed analysis of these two cases can be found in the paper referred to in the
above footnote.
24 The Secretariat concluded that all nuclear material in South Korea remained in
peaceful activities after “the Agency was able to clarify all issues relating to past
undeclared activities.” IAEA, “Safeguards Statement for 2007,” para. 33. How the
Secretariat reached this important conclusion after the failures and breaches reported
to the Board in November 2004 (IAEA, “Implementation of the NPT Safeguards
Agreement in the Republic of Korea,” GOV/2004/84), is described in Appendix I
of the Safeguard Implementation Report for 2007. The latter is, unfortunately, not
publicly available and should be made part of the reports transmitted to the Security
Council.
25 In a resolution adopted on October 4, 2008, the IAEA General Conference “Requests
all concerned States and other Parties to safeguards agreements, including nuclear-
weapon States, that have not yet done so to promptly sign additional protocols
and to bring them into force as soon as possible, in conformity with their national
legislation,” http://www.iaea.org/About/Policy/GC/GC52/GC52Resolutions/English/
gc52res-13_en.pdf.
Pierre Goldschmidt | 21
26 Egypt should consider the merit of spontaneously agreeing to implement on a volun-
tary basis the Additional Protocol until such time as the Secretariat has concluded that
Egypt’s declarations are correct and complete and that there is no undeclared nuclear
material and activities in Egypt. Such a commitment, while not departing from
Egypt’s principal decision not to sign and ratify at this stage the Additional Protocol,
would make it clear that its principal decision is in no way intended to prevent the
Agency from drawing the necessary conclusion mentioned above, thereby distancing
itself further from Iran’s behavior.
27 For instance, the Safeguard Implementation Report for 2000 reported that, by the end
of that year, all states with facilities containing safeguarded nuclear material, except
five which were named, had agreed to provide early design information on new
facilities. One year later all had done so except Iran, which adapted its Subsidiary
Arrangements accordingly in February 2003. The SIR for 2002 named four states that
had not ratified their Additional Protocol more than five years after signature. Three
of them did so within one year of the review of the report by the Board.
28 See footnote 3.
29 IAEA GOV/2005/67 para. 50, http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/
Board/2005/gov2005-67.pdf.
30 IAEA GOV/2006/14, http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2006/
gov2006-14.pdf.
31 By affirming that “Iran shall without further delay take the steps required” by the
Board in GOV/2006/14, the UNSC Resolutions 1737, 1747 and 1803 provided a
legal mandate for transparency measures but did not further spell them out.
32 As mentioned in the Report of the Commission of Eminent Persons on the Future
of the Agency: “The IAEA’s existing authorities should be interpreted to give the
Agency the responsibility to inspect for indicators of nuclear weaponization
activities” (GOV/2008/22, page 19).
33 Such as resolution 1373 (September 28, 2001) concerning acts of international ter-
rorism, and resolution 1540 (April 28, 2004) concerning the acquisition of nuclear,
chemical, or biological weapons and their means of delivery by nonstate actors.
34 As further detailed in Pierre Goldschmidt, “IAEA Safeguards: Dealing Preventively
With Non-compliance,” July 12, 2008, http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/
Goldschmidt_Dealing_Preventively_7-12-08.pdf.
35 If the generic resolution proposed in Annex I had been adopted before 2003, it
is most likely that the IAEA Board of Governors would have reported Iran’s non-
compliance to the UNSC in November 2003 instead of February 2006, since full
cooperation with the Agency and the suspension of sensitive fuel cycle activities would
not have been a bargaining chip. At that time Iran had no operating UF6 conversion
plant, no operating centrifuge plant at Natanz, and was apparently ready to negotiate
a broad cooperation agreement with Western countries.
Annex I
Draft UN Security Council Resolution
on Noncompliance
The Security Council,
Affirming that proliferation of nuclear, [chemical and biological] weapons,
as well as their means of delivery, constitutes a threat to international peace
and security;
Reaffirming, in this context, the Statement of its President adopted at the
Council’s meeting at the level of Heads of State and Government on January
31, 1992 (S/23500), including the need for all Member States to fulfill their
obligations in relation to arms control and disarmament and to prevent prolif-
eration in all its aspects of all weapons of mass destruction;
Recalling also that the Statement underlined the need for all Member States to
resolve peacefully in accordance with the Charter any problems in that context
threatening or disrupting the maintenance of regional and global stability;
Affirming its resolve to take appropriate and effective actions against any
threat to international peace and security caused by the proliferation of nuclear,
[chemical and biological] weapons and their means of delivery, in confor-
mity with its primary responsibilities, as provided for in the United Nations
Charter;
Affirming its support for the multilateral treaties whose aim is to eliminate
or prevent the proliferation of nuclear, [chemical or biological] weapons and
the importance for all States parties to these treaties to implement them fully
in order to promote international stability;
Affirming that prevention of proliferation of nuclear, [chemical and biologi-
cal] weapons should not hamper international cooperation in materials, equip-
ment and technology for peaceful purposes while goals of peaceful utilization
should not be used as a cover for proliferation;
Recognizing further the urgent need for all States to take additional effective
measures to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, [chemical or biological] weap-
ons and their means of delivery;
Affirming its commitment to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons, and recalling the right of States Party, in conformity with Article I
and II of that Treaty, to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy
for peaceful purpose without discrimination;
23
2 | Concrete Steps to Improve the Nonproliferation Regime
Recalling that the IAEA General Conference in its resolution GC(49)/
RES/13 of 30 September 2005 noted that “the Agency’s capability to detect
undeclared nuclear material and activities should be increased,” and stressed
“the continuing need for the Agency’s safeguards system to be equipped to
respond to new challenges within its mandate”;
Determined to facilitate an effective response to global threats in the area of
nuclear proliferation.
Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations:
1. Decides that if a State is reported by the IAEA to be in noncompliance with
its NPT Safeguards Agreement(s), the Security Council shall forthwith
adopt a specific resolution, under Article 41 of the Charter of the United
Nations:
a. deciding that, upon request by the IAEA, the State in noncompli-
ance shall provide the IAEA immediate access to locations, facili-
ties, individuals, documents, and equipment as defined in the Model
Temporary Complementary Protocol (TCP) attached in Annex to
this resolution and any other access right specifically requested by the
IAEA. The TCP shall remain in force until such time as the IAEA has
drawn the conclusion that the State declarations under its Safeguards
Agreements are correct and complete and that there is no undeclared
nuclear material and activities in the State;
b. requesting the Director General of the IAEA to report within 60 days
of the adoption of the specific resolution, and thereafter on a quarterly
basis, on whether the State is fully implementing the provisions of its
Safeguards Agreement(s) and the TCP and is fully and proactively
cooperating with the IAEA;
2. Decides that if the Director General of the IAEA is unable to report within
the timeframe defined in sub-paragraph 1.b, or at any time thereafter, that
the State in noncompliance is fully implementing the provision of sub-para-
graph 1.a. above, the Security Council shall forthwith adopt a specific reso-
lution under Article 41 of the Charter:
a. requiring the State to immediately suspend all uranium and pluto-
nium conversion and enrichment related activities and all reprocess-
ing related activities, including theoretical and applied research and
development and suspend any other activity specifically requested by
the IAEA or the Security Council until such time as the IAEA has
drawn the conclusion that the State declarations under its Safeguards
Agreements (including the TCP) are correct and complete and that
there is no undeclared nuclear material and activities in the State;
Pierre Goldschmidt | 25
b. requesting the Director General of the IAEA to report within 60 days
of the adoption of this specific resolution on whether the State has
fully complied with the provision of sub-paragraph 2.a.
3. Decides that if the reports referred to in sub-paragraphs 1.b and 2.b show
that the State in noncompliance with its NPT Safeguards Agreement does
not fully comply with the provision of sub-paragraphs 1.a and 2.a, the
Security Council shall adopt a specific resolution under Article 41 of the
UN Charter deciding that all States shall forthwith suspend the supply of
any military equipment and cooperation with the noncompliant State as
long as it remains in noncompliance with Security Council resolutions.
Pierre Goldschmidt | 27
ANNEX to the Draft UN Security Council
Resolution on Noncompliance
MODEL TEMPORARY COMPLEMENTARY PROTOCOL
FOR THE APPLICATION OF IAEA SAFEGUARDS IN A
NONCOMPLIANT STATE
Foreword
This document is a model complementary Protocol designed for States having
been found by the Agency Board of Governors to be in noncompliance with
Safeguards Agreement(s) concluded with the Agency, in order to enable the
Agency to verify in a timely manner the absence of undeclared nuclear mate-
rial, equipment and activities in such State, to verify the correctness and com-
pleteness of the declarations made by the State to the Agency (including those
requested under this Protocol), and to determine whether or not previously
undeclared nuclear material and activities have been undertaken in further-
ance of a nuclear weapons program.
As requested by the Board of Governors and/or the UN Security Council
the Director General shall use this Model Temporary Complementary Protocol
as the minimum standard for verification activities that are to be implemented
by States found to be in noncompliance with their Safeguards Agreement(s)
in accordance with Article XII.C of the IAEA Statute. The provisions of this
Protocol are consistent with Article XII.A.6 of the Statute.
2 | Concrete Steps to Improve the Nonproliferation Regime
CONTENTS
Articles
Preamble
-
Relationship Between the Protocol
and the Safeguards Agreement
1
Provision of Information
2–3
Complementary Access
4–10
Designation of Agency Inspectors
and Nomination of Experts
11
Visas
12
Subsidiary Arrangements
13
Communication Systems, Regional Offices,
and Transportation
14
Protection of Confidential Information
15
Annexes
16
Entry into Force and Termination
17
Definitions
18
ANNEX I
List of activities referred to in Article 2.a.(iv) of the Protocol
ANNEX II
List of specified equipment and non-nuclear material for the report-
ing of exports and imports according to Article 2.a.(ix)
NB.: This is Annex II of INFCIRC/540 corr. amended to conform to the
list in Annex B of INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 1 or any subsequent amend-
ment.
Pierre Goldschmidt | 29
MODEL TEMPORARY COMPLEMENTARY PROTOCOL
FOR THE APPLICATION OF IAEA SAFEGUARDS IN A
NONCOMPLIANT STATE
Preamble
WHEREAS ……… (hereinafter referred to as “………”) is a party to
(an) Agreement(s) between ……… and the International Atomic Energy
Agency (hereinafter referred to as the “Agency”) for the application of safe-
guards [full title of the Agreement(s) to be inserted] (hereinafter referred to as
the “Safeguards Agreement(s)”), which entered into force on ………;
WHEREAS, in accordance with Article XII.C of the Agency’s Statute,
……… has been found by the Agency to be in noncompliance∗ with its
Safeguards Agreement(s) and the Board of Governors has reported the non-
compliance to the UN Security Council;
AWARE OF the desire of the international community to further enhance
nuclear nonproliferation by strengthening the effectiveness and improving the
efficiency of the Agency’s safeguards system, in particular when a state has been
found to be in noncompliance with its Safeguards Agreement(s);
RECALLING that the Agency must take into account in the implementa-
tion of safeguards the need to: respect health, safety, physical protection and
other security provisions in force and the rights of individuals; and take every
precaution to protect commercial, technological and industrial secrets as well
as other confidential information coming to its knowledge;
CONSIDERING that, in order for the Agency to verify in a timely manner
the absence of undeclared nuclear material and equipment (including equip-
ment and non-nuclear material listed in Annex II) and activities (including
those specified in Annex I) in ………, and the correctness and completeness of
……… declarations, the provisions of this Protocol constitute the minimum
required;
CONSIDERING UN Security Council Resolution […] making manda-
tory for ……… to provide the Agency, temporarily, the verification authority
defined in this Protocol;
NOW THEREFORE the following shall apply in ………:
* “In noncompliance” and “in breach of its obligation to comply” are to be considered as
synonymous expressions for the purpose of this Protocol.
30 | Concrete Steps to Improve the Nonproliferation Regime
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE PROTOCOL
AND THE SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT
Article 1
The provisions of the Safeguards Agreement shall apply to this Protocol to
the extent that they are relevant to and compatible with the provisions of this
Protocol. In case of conflict between the provisions of the Safeguards Agreement
and those of this Protocol, the provisions of this Protocol shall apply.
PROVISION OF INFORMATION
Article 2
a. ……… shall provide the Agency with a declaration containing:
(i) A general description of and information specifying the location of
nuclear fuel cycle-related research and development activities1 involving
and not involving nuclear material carried out anywhere that are (or
have been) funded, specifically authorized or controlled by, or carried
out on behalf of, ……….
(ii) Information identified by the Agency on the basis of expected gains
in effectiveness or efficiency, on operational activities of safeguards
relevance at facilities and at locations outside facilities where nuclear
material is customarily used.
(iii) A general description of each building on each site, including its use
and, if not apparent from that description, its contents. The descrip-
tion shall include a map of the site.
(iv) A description of the scale of operations for each location engaged in
the activities specified in Annex I to this Protocol.
(v) Information specifying the location, operational status and the esti-
mated annual production capacity of uranium mines and concentra-
tion plants and thorium concentration plants, and the current annual
production of such mines and concentration plants for ……… as a
whole as well as their cumulative production. ……… shall provide,
upon request by the Agency, the current annual production of an in-
dividual mine or concentration plant.
The provision of this information does not require detailed nuclear
material accountancy.
(vi) Information regarding source material which has not reached the
composition and purity suitable for fuel fabrication or for being isoto-
pically enriched, as follows:
1 Terms in italics have specialized meanings, which are defined in Article 18 below.
Pierre Goldschmidt | 31
(a) The quantities, the chemical composition, the use or intended use
of such material, whether in nuclear or non-nuclear use, for each
location in ……… at which the material is present in quantities
exceeding ten metric tons of uranium and/or twenty metric tons
of thorium, and for other locations with quantities of more than
one metric ton, the aggregate for ……… as a whole if the aggregate
exceeds ten metric tons of uranium or twenty metric tons of tho-
rium. The provision of this information does not require detailed
nuclear material accountancy;
(b) The quantities, the chemical composition and the destination of
each export out of ………, of such material for specifically non-
nuclear purposes in quantities exceeding:
(1) Ten metric tons of uranium, or for successive exports of urani-
um from ……… to the same State, each of less than ten metric
tons, but exceeding a total of ten metric tons for the year;
(2) Twenty metric tons of thorium, or for successive exports of tho-
rium from ……… to the same State, each of less than twenty
metric tons, but exceeding a total of twenty metric tons for the
year;
(c) The quantities, chemical composition, current location and use
or intended use of each import into ……… of such material for
specifically non-nuclear purposes in quantities exceeding:
(1) Ten metric tons of uranium, or for successive imports of ura-
nium into ……… each of less than ten metric tons, but ex-
ceeding a total of ten metric tons for the year;
(2) Twenty metric tons of thorium, or for successive imports of
thorium into ……… each of less than twenty metric tons, but
exceeding a total of twenty metric tons for the year;
it being understood that there is no requirement to provide informa-
tion on such material intended for a non-nuclear use once it is in its
non-nuclear end-use form.
(vii) (a) Information regarding the quantities, uses and locations of nuclear
material exempted from safeguards pursuant to [paragraph 37 of
INFCIRC/153];2
(b) Information regarding the quantities (which may be in the form of
estimates) and uses at each location, of nuclear material exempted
from safeguards pursuant to
2 The reference to the corresponding provision of the relevant Safeguards Agreement
should be inserted where bracketed references to INFCIRC/153 are made.
32 | Concrete Steps to Improve the Nonproliferation Regime
[Paragraph 36(b) of INFCIRC/153] but not yet in a non-nuclear
end-use form, in quantities exceeding those set out in [paragraph
37 of INFCIRC/153]. The provision of this information does not
require detailed nuclear material accountancy;
(c) Information regarding the quantities, uses and locations of nuclear
material that have previously been exempted from safeguards but
on which safeguards must be re-applied pursuant to [paragraph 38
of INFCIRC/153] because it is to be processed or stored together
with safeguarded nuclear material or used in nuclear activities.
(viii) Information regarding the location or further processing of interme-
diate or high-level waste containing plutonium, high enriched uranium
or uranium-233 on which safeguards have been terminated pursuant
to [paragraph 11 of INFCIRC/153]. For the purpose of this para-
graph, “further processing” does not include repackaging of the waste
or its further conditioning not involving the separation of elements,
for storage or disposal.
(ix) The following information regarding specified equipment and non-
nuclear material listed in Annex II as well as separated Np, Am and
Po-210:
(a) For each export out of ……… of such equipment and material: the
identity, quantity, location of intended use in the receiving State
and date or, as appropriate, expected date, of export;
(b) For each import into ……… of such equipment and material: the
identity of the supplier, the quantity delivered, the location and
date of import, and the present location;
(c) For all such equipment and material imported into ………,
……… shall provide to the Agency within 30 days of the entry
into force of this Protocol a list of all imports including the iden-
tity of the supplier, the quantity delivered, the location and date of
import, and their present location.
(d) For all such equipment and material that have been domestically
produced ……… shall provide to the Agency within 30 days of
the entry into force of this Protocol a list with the identity of the
producer, the quantities produced, the location and date of pro-
duction, and their present location.
(x) General plans for the succeeding ten-year period relevant to the de-
velopment of the nuclear fuel cycle (including planned nuclear fuel
cycle-related research and development activities) when approved by the
appropriate authorities in ……….
Pierre Goldschmidt | 33
(xi) Information regarding the disposition of equipment listed in Annex II
and components from closed-down and decommissioned facilities and
locations outside facilities.
b. ……… shall provide the Agency with the following information:
(i) A general description of and information specifying the location and
the identity of the persons and/or entities carrying out or having car-
ried out nuclear fuel cycle-related research and development activities
involving and not involving nuclear material carried out anywhere in
……… but which are not funded, specifically authorized or controlled
by, or carried out on behalf of, ………;
(ii) A general description of activities and the identity of the persons and/
or entities carrying out such activities, at locations identified by the
Agency outside a site which the Agency considers might be function-
ally related to the activities of that site. The provision of this informa-
tion is subject to a specific request by the Agency. It shall be provided
in consultation with the Agency and in a timely fashion not exceeding
15 days from the request;
(iii) Design information as soon as the decision to construct or to autho-
rize construction of a new facility has been taken;
(iv) A comprehensive and accurate declaration of all documents, materials,
activities, dual-use equipments (listed in INFCIRC/254/Rev. 7/Part
2) and facilities acquired, received or produced in ……… related to
the design, manufacturing and weaponization of nuclear weapons and
their delivery systems, including a detailed account of the type, quan-
tity, location, origin and date of acquisition of each item.
c. Upon request by the Agency, ……… shall provide amplifications or clari-
fications of any information it has provided under this Article, in so far as
relevant for the Agency to complete its evaluation process.
d. Upon request by the Agency, ……… shall provide information on activities
carried out at specific locations identified by the Agency as relevant to draw
its conclusions or to conduct its evaluation process.
Article 3
a. ……… shall provide to the Agency the information identified in Article
2.a.(i), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi)(a), (vii) and (x) and Article 2.b.(i), (iii) within 60
days of the entry into force of this Protocol.
b. ……… shall provide to the Agency quarterly updates of the information re-
ferred to in paragraph a. above for the period covering the previous calendar
quarter. If there has been no change to the information previously provided,
……… shall so indicate.
3 | Concrete Steps to Improve the Nonproliferation Regime
c. ……… shall provide to the Agency, by 15 May of each year, the information
identified in Article 2.a.(vi)(b) and (c) for the period covering the previous
calendar year.
d. ……… shall provide to the Agency quarterly updates of the information
identified in Article 2.a.(ix). This information shall be provided within 30
days of the end of each quarter.
e. ……… shall provide to the Agency the information identified in Article
2.a.(viii) 180 days before further processing is carried out and, by 15 May
of each year, information on changes in location for the period covering the
previous calendar year.
f. ……… shall provide to the Agency the information identified in Article
2.a.(ii) within 5 days of the request.
g. ……… shall provide to the Agency the information in Article 2.a.(ix)(b) on
a quarterly basis. This information shall be provided within thirty days of
the end of each quarter.
h. …….. shall provide to the Agency the information requested pursuant to
Article 2.c and 2.d within 24 hours of the request.
i. ……… shall provide the information identified in Article 2.a.(i),(iv), (ix)(c)
and 2.b.(i) for the period since ……… became a party to the NPT.
COMPLEMENTARY ACCESS
Article 4
The following shall apply in connection with the implementation of comple-
mentary access under Article 5 of this Protocol:
a. The Agency shall have access to:
(i) Any location referred to in Article 5.a. (i), (ii), (iv) and in Article 5.c in
order to assure the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activi-
ties; and to any person and document referred to in Article 5.a.(v) and
(vi);
(ii) Any location referred to in Article 5.b. or c. to resolve a question relat-
ing to the correctness and completeness of the information provided
pursuant to Article 2 or to resolve an inconsistency relating to that
information;
(iii) Any location referred to in Article 5.a.(iii) to the extent necessary for
the Agency to confirm, for safeguards purposes, ………’s declaration
of the decommissioned status of a facility or of a location outside facili-
ties where nuclear material was customarily used.
Pierre Goldschmidt | 35
b. (i) Except as provided in paragraph (ii) below, ……… shall provide the
Agency access to the locations, persons and documents referred to
in Article 5 within 24 hours of the advanced notice of access by the
Agency;
(ii) For access to any place, person or document on a site that is sought in
conjunction with design information verification visits or ad hoc or
routine inspections on that site, the period of advance notice shall,
if the Agency so requests, be at least two hours but, in exceptional
circumstances, it may be less than two hours.
c. Advance notice shall be in writing and shall specify the reasons for access
and the activities to be carried out during such access.
d. In the case of a question or inconsistency, the Agency shall provide ………
with an opportunity to clarify and facilitate the resolution of the ques-
tion or inconsistency within 48 hours of the request, unless otherwise agreed
with the Agency. Such an opportunity will be provided before a request for
access, unless the Agency considers that delay in access would prejudice the
purpose for which the access is sought. In any event, the Agency shall not
draw any conclusions about the question or inconsistency until ……… has
been provided with such an opportunity.
e. Access to any location, person or document shall only take place
during regular working hours unless the Agency considers that delays on
access would prejudice the purpose for which access is sought.
f. ……… shall have the right to have Agency inspectors accompanied during
their access by representatives of ………, provided that the inspectors shall
not thereby be delayed or otherwise impeded in the exercise of their func-
tions.
g. Access requested by the Agency during official holiday periods will not be
delayed by more than 24 hours.
h. Should access not be granted within the timeframe requested and the
Agency considers that delay in access has prejudiced the purpose for which
access was sought, the Agency’s Board of Governors will be informed with-
out delay.
Article 5
……… shall provide the Agency with access at all times to:
a. (i) Any place on a site;
(ii) Any location identified by ……… under Article 2.a.(i), 2.a.(iv)-(ix),
2.b. or by the Agency under Article 2.d.;
3 | Concrete Steps to Improve the Nonproliferation Regime
(iii) Any decommissioned facility or decommissioned location outside facilities
where nuclear material was customarily used;
(iv) Any location where dismantled equipment specified in Annex II of
this Protocol and previously located in closed-down or decommissioned
facilities and in closed-down or decommissioned location outside facilities
are stored or disposed of;
(v) Any person who by reason of his occupation deals with materials,
equipment, or facilities which are required by the IAEA Statute to be
safeguarded as necessary to determine whether there is compliance
with the undertakings against use in furtherance of any military pur-
pose. Access to such person shall be at its usual occupation location or
at such other location requested by the Agency;
(vi) Any data and original document requested by the Agency at the loca-
tion where they are normally used or stored. The Agency will have
the right to make copies and take photos thereof, and to temporarily
remove original documents if necessary for forensic analysis.
b. Any location identified by ……… other than those referred to in paragraph
a.(i)-(iv) above, provided that if ……… is unable to provide such access,
……… shall make every reasonable effort to satisfy Agency requirements,
without delay, through other means.
c. Any location specified by the Agency, other than locations referred to in
paragraphs a. and b. above, in order to verify the absence of undeclared
nuclear material, equipment and activities.
Article 6
When implementing Article 5, the Agency may carry out the following activi-
ties as appropriate:
Visual observation; item counting of nuclear material; non-destructive mea-
surements and sampling; collection of environmental samples; utilization of
radiation detection and measurement devices; examination of records relevant
to the quantities, origin and disposition of the material; examination of safe-
guards relevant production and shipping records; photography, photocopy,
video and voice recording; location positioning measurement; application of
seals and other identifying and tamper indicating devices and other measures
deemed necessary by the Agency which are technically feasible.
Pierre Goldschmidt | 37
Article 7
a. Upon request by ………, the Agency and ……… shall make arrange-
ments for managed access under this Protocol in order to prevent the dis-
semination of proliferation sensitive information, to meet safety or physical
protection requirements, or to protect proprietary or commercially sensi-
tive information. Such arrangements shall not delay or preclude the Agency
from conducting activities necessary to provide credible assurance of the
absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities at the location in ques-
tion, including the resolution of a question relating to the correctness and
completeness of the information referred to in Article 2 or of an inconsis-
tency relating to that information.
b. ……… may, when providing the information referred to in Article 2, in-
form the Agency of the places at a site or location at which managed access
may be applicable.
c. Pending the entry into force of any necessary Subsidiary Arrangements,
……… may have recourse to managed access consistent with the provisions
of paragraph a. above.
Article 8
Nothing in this Protocol shall preclude ……… from offering the Agency ac-
cess to locations in addition to those referred to in Articles 5 and 9 or from
requesting the Agency to conduct verification activities at a particular location.
The Agency shall, without delay, make every reasonable effort to act upon such
a request.
Article 9
……… shall provide the Agency with access to locations specified by the
Agency to carry out wide-area environmental sampling, provided that if ………
is unable to provide such access for reasons acceptable to the Agency it shall
make every reasonable effort to satisfy Agency requirements within 48 hours
at alternative locations.
Article 10
The Agency shall inform ……… of:
a. The activities carried out under this Protocol, including those in respect of
any questions or inconsistencies the Agency had brought to the attention of
………, within sixty days of the activities being carried out by the Agency.
3 | Concrete Steps to Improve the Nonproliferation Regime
b. The results of activities in respect of any questions or inconsistencies the
Agency had brought to the attention of ………, as soon as possible but in
any case within 30 days of the results being established by the Agency.
c. The conclusions it has drawn from its activities under this Protocol. The
conclusions shall be provided annually.
DESIGNATION OF AGENCY INSPECTORS
AND NOMINATION OF EXPERTS
Article 11
a. (i) The Director General shall notify ……… of the Board’s approval of
any Agency official as a safeguards inspector. Unless ……… advises
the Director General of its substantiated objection to the designation
of such an official as an inspector for ……… within fifteen days of
receipt of notification of the Board’s approval, the inspector so notified
to ……… shall be considered designated to ………;
(ii) The Director General shall notify ……… of the nomination of ex-
perts (including interpreters) who may be required to accompany
Agency inspectors. Unless ……….. advises the Director General of
its substantiated objection to the nomination of such an official as an
expert for ……… within fifteen days of receipt of notification, the ex-
pert so notified to ……… shall be considered nominated to ………;
(iii) The Director General, acting in response to a request by ……… shall
immediately inform ……… whether the requested withdrawal of the
designation of any official as an inspector or nomination as an expert
for ……… is accepted, taking into account the effectiveness and ef-
ficiency of the Agency’s verification activities in ……….
b. A notification referred to in paragraph a. above shall be deemed to be re-
ceived by ……… seven days after the date of the transmission by registered
mail of the notification by the Agency to ……… or within 24 hours of
handing it out against signature to its permanent mission in Vienna as the
case may be.
VISAS
Article 12
……… shall, within fifteen days of the receipt of a request therefor, provide
the designated inspector or the nominated expert specified in the request with
appropriate multiple entry/exit and/or transit visas, where required, to enable
the inspector or expert to enter and remain on the territory of ……… for the
purpose of carrying out his/her functions. Any visas required shall be valid for
Pierre Goldschmidt | 39
at least one year and shall be automatically renewed, at least one month before
their expiration date, as required to cover the duration of the inspector’s desig-
nation or expert’s nomination period to ……….
SUBSIDIARY ARRANGEMENTS
Article 13
a. Where ……… or the Agency indicates that it is necessary to specify in
Subsidiary Arrangements how measures laid down in this Protocol are to be
applied, ……… and the Agency shall agree on such Subsidiary Arrangements
within fifteen days of the entry into force of this Protocol or, where the
indication of the need for such Subsidiary Arrangements is made after
the entry into force of this Protocol, within fifteen days of the date of such
indication.
b. Pending the entry into force of any necessary Subsidiary Arrangements, the
Agency shall be entitled to apply the measures laid down in this Protocol.
c. Subsidiary Arrangements agreed between ……… and the Agency are an in-
tegral part of this Protocol and will be submitted to the Board of Governors
for information.
COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS, REGIONAL
OFFICE AND TRANSPORTATION
Article 14
a. ……… shall permit and protect free communications by the Agency
for official purposes between Agency inspectors in ……… and Agency
Headquarters and/or Regional Offices, including attended and unattended
transmission of information generated by Agency containment and/or sur-
veillance or measurement devices. The Agency shall have the right to make
use of internationally established systems of direct communications, includ-
ing satellite systems and other forms of telecommunication, not in use in
……… At the request of ……… or the Agency, details of the implementa-
tion of this paragraph with respect to the attended or unattended transmis-
sion of information generated by Agency containment and/or surveillance
or measurement devices shall be specified in the Subsidiary Arrangements.
b. Communication and transmission of information as provided for in para-
graph a. above shall take due account of the need to protect proprietary or
commercially sensitive information or design information which ………
regards as being of particular sensitivity.
c. …….. shall permit the Agency to open Regional Offices and the permanent
presence of designated inspectors and nominated experts.
0 | Concrete Steps to Improve the Nonproliferation Regime
d. ……… shall permit designated inspectors and nominated experts to have
their own transportation means and to circulate freely to and between any
location where access is authorized under this Protocol.
PROTECTION OF CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION
Article 15
a. The Agency shall maintain a stringent regime to ensure effective protection
against disclosure of commercial, technological and industrial secrets and
other confidential information coming to its knowledge, including such in-
formation coming to the Agency’s knowledge in the implementation of this
Protocol.
b. The regime referred to in paragraph a. above shall include, among others,
provisions relating to:
(i) General principles and associated measures for the handling of confi-
dential information;
(ii) Conditions of staff employment relating to the protection of confiden-
tial information;
(iii) Procedures in cases of breaches or alleged breaches of confidentiality.
c. The regime referred to in paragraph a. above shall be approved and periodi-
cally reviewed by the Board.
ANNEXES
Article 16
a. The Annexes to this Protocol shall be an integral part thereof. Except for the
purposes of amendment of the Annexes, the term “Protocol” as used in this
instrument means the Protocol and the Annexes together.
b. The list of activities specified in Annex I, and the list of equipment and
material specified in Annex II, as applicable to ………, may be amended by
the Board upon the advice of the Director General. Any such amendment
shall take effect fifteen days after its adoption by the Board.
ENTRY INTO FORCE AND TERMINATION
Article 17
a. This Protocol shall enter into force on the date on which the Agency re-
ceives from ……… written notification that ………’s statutory and/or con-
stitutional requirements for entry into force have been met.
Pierre Goldschmidt | 1
OR3
upon signature by the representatives of ……… and the Agency.
OR
upon the adoption of a resolution by the UN Security Council under
Chapter VII of the UN Charter instructing ……… to implement the pro-
visions of this Protocol.
b. ……… may, at any date before this Protocol enters into force, declare that
it will apply this Protocol provisionally.
c. The Director General shall promptly inform all Member States of the
Agency of any declaration of provisional application of, and of the entry
into force of, this Protocol.
d. This Protocol shall remain in force until the IAEA Board of Governors con-
cludes that the issues requiring the entry into force of this Protocol and any
issues resulting from its implementation have been resolved, that there is no
undeclared nuclear material, equipment (including those listed in Annex II),
facilities, and activities (including those listed in Annex I to this Protocol) in
………, and that ………’s declarations are correct and complete.
DEFINITIONS
Article 18
For the purpose of this Protocol:
a. Nuclear fuel cycle-related research and development activities means those ac-
tivities which are specifically related to any process or system development
aspect of any of the following:
• conversion of nuclear material,
• enrichment of nuclear material,
• nuclear fuel fabrication,
• reactors,
• critical facilities,
• reprocessing of nuclear fuel,
• processing (not including repackaging or conditioning not involving
the separation of elements, for storage or disposal) of intermediate or
high-level waste containing plutonium, high enriched uranium or
uranium-233,
3 The choice of alternative depends on the preference of the State concerned according
to its internal legal requirements.
2 | Concrete Steps to Improve the Nonproliferation Regime
but not including activities related to theoretical or basic scientific re-
search or to research and development on industrial radioisotope ap-
plications, medical, hydrological and agricultural applications, health
and environmental effects and improved maintenance.
b. Site means that area delimited by ……… in the relevant design information
for a facility, including a closed-down facility, and in the relevant informa-
tion on a location outside facilities where nuclear material is customarily used,
including a closed-down location outside facilities where nuclear material was
customarily used (this is limited to locations with hot cells or where activi-
ties related to conversion, enrichment, fuel fabrication or reprocessing were
carried out). It shall also include all installations, co-located with the facility
or location, for the provision or use of essential services, including: hot cells
for processing irradiated materials not containing nuclear material; instal-
lations for the treatment, storage and disposal of waste; and buildings as-
sociated with specified activities identified by ……… under Article 2.a.(iv)
above.
c. Decommissioned facility or decommissioned location outside facilities means an
installation or location at which residual structures and equipment essential
for its use have been removed or rendered inoperable so that it is not used to
store and can no longer be used to handle, process or utilize nuclear mate-
rial.
d. Closed-down facility or closed-down location outside facilities means an instal-
lation or location where operations have been stopped and the nuclear mate-
rial removed but which has not been decommissioned.
e. High enriched uranium means uranium containing 20 percent or more of
the isotope uranium-235.
f. Location-specific environmental sampling means the collection of environ-
mental samples (e.g., air, water, vegetation, soil, smears) at, and in the im-
mediate vicinity of, a location specified by the Agency for the purpose of
assisting the Agency to draw conclusions about the absence of undeclared
nuclear material or nuclear activities at the specified location.
g. Wide-area environmental sampling means the collection of environmental
samples (e.g., air, water, vegetation, soil, smears) at a set of locations speci-
fied by the Agency for the purpose of assisting the Agency to draw conclu-
sions about the absence of undeclared nuclear material, non-nuclear material
and equipment listed in Annex II, or nuclear-related activities over a wide
area.
h. Nuclear material means any source or any special fissionable material as de-
fined in Article XX of the Statute. The term source material shall not be in-
terpreted as applying to ore or ore residue. Any determination by the Board
Pierre Goldschmidt | 3
under Article XX of the Statute of the Agency after the entry into force of
this Protocol which adds to the materials considered to be source material or
special fissionable material shall have effect under this Protocol only upon
acceptance by ……….
i. Facility means:
(i) A reactor, a critical facility, a conversion plant, a fabrication plant, a
reprocessing plant, an isotope separation plant or a separate storage
installation; or
(ii) Any location where nuclear material in amounts greater than one ef-
fective kilogram is customarily used.
j. Location outside facilities means any installation or location, which is not a
facility, where nuclear material is customarily used or stored in amounts of
one effective kilogram or less.
ANNEX I
LIST OF ACTIVITIES REFERRED TO IN ARTICLE 2.a (iv)
OF THE PROTOCOL
To be added
ANNEX II
LIST OF SPECIFIED EQUIPMENT AND NON-NUCLEAR
MATERIAL FOR THE REPORTING OF EXPORTS AND
IMPORTS ACCORDING TO ARTICLE 2.a. (ix)
To be added
| Concrete Steps to Improve the Nonproliferation Regime
Annex II
Draft UN Security Council Resolution
on NPT Withdrawal
The Security Council,
Affirming that proliferation of nuclear, [chemical and biological] weapons,
as well as their means of delivery, constitutes a threat to international peace
and security,
Reaffirming, in this context, the Statement of its President adopted at the
Council’s meeting at the level of Heads of State and Government on January
31, 1992 (S/23500), including the need for all Member States to fulfil their
obligations in relation to arms control and disarmament and to prevent prolif-
eration in all its aspects of all weapons of mass destruction,
Recalling also that the Statement underlined the need for all Member States
to resolve peacefully in accordance with the Charter any problems in that con-
text threatening or disrupting the maintenance of regional and global stability,
Affirming its resolve to take appropriate and effective actions against any
threat to international peace and security caused by the proliferation of nuclear,
[chemical and biological] weapons and their means of delivery, in confor-
mity with its primary responsibilities, as provided for in the United Nations
Charter,
Affirming its support for the multilateral treaties whose aim is to eliminate
or prevent the proliferation of nuclear, [chemical or biological] weapons and
the importance for all States parties to these treaties to implement them fully
in order to promote international stability,
Affirming that prevention of proliferation of nuclear, [chemical and biologi-
cal] weapons should not hamper international cooperation in materials, equip-
ment and technology for peaceful purposes while goals of peaceful utilization
should not be used as a cover for proliferation,
Recognizing further the urgent need for all States to take additional effective
measures to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, [chemical or biological] weap-
ons and their means of delivery,
Affirming that any State party to the NPT has the right to withdraw from
the Treaty in accordance with its Article X.1,
Recognizing the threat posed to international peace and security by a state
withdrawing from the NPT after having been found by the IAEA in noncom-
pliance with its NPT Safeguards Agreements,
Affirming that withdrawal from a Treaty does not absolve a State of any
violation of that Treaty as committed while the State was still a party to the
Treaty,
Pierre Goldschmidt | 5
Affirming the principle that any material, equipment and facility subject to
IAEA safeguards must irreversibly remain under IAEA safeguards,
Determined to facilitate an effective response to global threats in the area of
nuclear non-proliferation,
Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,
1. Decides that if a State is reported by the IAEA to be in noncompliance [in
the context of Article XII.C. of the IAEA Statute] with its NPT Safeguards
Agreement and thereafter notify its withdrawal from the NPT under its
Article X.1, before the IAEA has concluded that the State declarations [un-
der its Safeguards Agreement] are correct and complete and that there is no
undeclared nuclear material and activities in that State, this notification of
withdrawal constitutes a threat to international peace and security under
Article 39 of the Charter of the United Nations.
2. Decides that if a State notifies its withdrawal from the NPT under Article
X.1 of the Treaty, the Security Council shall forthwith adopt a specific
resolution under Article 41 of the Charter, requiring that any materials
and equipment made available to the withdrawing State, or resulting from
the assistance provided to that State, under a Comprehensive Safeguards
Agreement (INFCIRC/153-Corrected) with the IAEA, shall immediately
be sealed by the IAEA and as soon as technically possible, be removed from
that State under IAEA supervision, and thereafter remain under IAEA
Safeguards.
3. Decides that in the circumstances defined under point 2 above the Director
General of the IAEA shall report quarterly to the Security Council on the
implementation of this decision until all relevant material and equipment
have been removed from the withdrawing State.
4. Decides that if the reports referred to in point 3 above show that the with-
drawing State does not fully comply with the provision of point 2, the
Security Council shall adopt a specific resolution under Article 41 of the
UN Charter deciding that all States shall forthwith suspend the supply of
any military equipment to, and cooperation with, the noncompliant State as
long as it remains in noncompliance with Security Council resolutions.
5. Decides that, if the IAEA informs the Security Council that action by a
State makes it impossible for the IAEA to implement the provisions of a
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement concluded with the IAEA, such ac-
tion shall be considered, for the purpose of this resolution, as equivalent to
a notification of withdrawal from the NPT.
About the Carnegie Endowment
The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace is a private, nonprofit or-
ganization dedicated to advancing cooperation between nations and promot-
ing active international engagement by the United States. Founded in 1910,
Carnegie is nonpartisan and dedicated to achieving practical results. Through
research, publishing, convening and, on occasion, creating new institutions
and international networks, Endowment associates shape fresh policy ap-
proaches. Their interests span geographic regions and the relations between
governments, business, international organizations, and civil society, focusing
on the economic, political, and technological forces driving global change.
Building on the successful establishment of the Carnegie Moscow Center,
the Endowment has added operations in Beijing, Beirut, and Brussels to its
existing offices in Washington and Moscow, pioneering the idea that a think
tank whose mission is to contribute to global security, stability, and prosperity
requires a permanent international presence and a multinational outlook at the
core of its operations.
The Carnegie Endowment’s Nonproliferation Program is a leading global
clearing house of information on nuclear nonproliferation issues and publisher
of Proliferation News, a bi-weekly e-newsletter read around the world, an exten-
sive website, and factual publications, including the acclaimed reference book,
Deadly Arsenals.
The program is also a leading source of analysis and policy prescriptions
and a major convener of international officials and experts. In Washington,
Moscow, Brussels, New Delhi, and increasingly in Beijing, the program hosts
public and private seminars, speeches, and workshops, where leading officials
and experts seek to overcome obstacles to reducing the danger of nuclear war.
The program works publicly and behind-the-scenes in active Track II diplo-
macy to promote solutions to challenges such as the Iranian nuclear case,
U.S.–Russian threat reduction cooperation, new approaches to managing
the nuclear fuel cycle, and the future of nuclear disarmament. The program’s
Universal Compliance: A Strategy for Nuclear Security provides an overall strate-
gic framework for strengthening a rule-based system for containing, and over
time, eliminating nuclear threats.
7
Carnegie Papers
Carnegie Papers present new research by Endowment associates and their collabora-
tors from other institutions. The series includes new time-sensitive research and key
excerpts from larger works in progress. Comments from readers are most welcome;
please send an e-mail to pubs@CarnegieEndowment.org.
2009
Concrete Steps to Improve the Nonproliferation Regime (P. Goldschmidt)
Stepping Back From Democratic Pessimism (T. Carothers)
200
Islamists in Politics: The Dynamics of Participation (M. Ottaway and A. Hamzawy)
Saudi Arabia’s “Soft” Counterterrorism Strategy: Prevention, Rehabilitation, and Aftercare (C. Boucek)
Can Trade Policy Support the Next Global Climate Agreement? Analyzing the International Trade
and Environment Regimes (M. Lay)
The Russian World: Changing Meanings and Strategies (V. Tishkov)
The New Arab Diplomacy: Not With the U.S. and Not Against the U.S. (M. Ottaway and M. Herzallah)
Party for Justice and Development in Morocco: Participation and Its Discontents (A. Hamzawy)
International Labor Migration in a Globalizing Economy (R. Lucas)
Islam in Uzbekistan: Religious Education and State Ideology (M. B. Olcott, D. Ziyaeva)
Assessing Secretary of State Rice’s Reform of U.S. Foreign Assistance (G. F. Hyman)
The Draft Party Platform of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood: Foray Into Political
Integration or Retreat Into Old Positions? (N. J. Brown, A. Hamzawy)
2007
Incumbent Regimes and the “King’s Dilemma” in the Arab World: Promise and
Threat of Managed Reform (M. Ottaway and M. Dunne)
Implementing UN Security Council Resolution 1540: A Division of Labor Strategy (M. Heupel)
Demilitarizing Algeria (H. Roberts)
Fighting on Two Fronts: Secular Parties in the Arab World (M. Ottaway and A. Hamzawy)
Sufism in Central Asia: A Force for Moderation or a Cause of Politicization? (M. B. Olcott)
China’s Economic Prospects 2006–2020 (J. He, S. Li, and S. Polaski)
A Face of Islam: Muhammad-Sodiq Muhammad-Yusuf (M. B. Olcott)
Requiem for Palestinian Reform: Clear Lessons from a Troubled Record (N. J. Brown)
Evaluating Political Reform in Yemen (S. Phillips)
Pushing toward Party Politics? Kuwait’s Islamic Constitutional Movement (N. J. Brown)
Protecting Intellectual Property Rights in Chinese Courts: An Analysis of Recent
Patent Judgments (M. Y. Gechlik)
Roots of Radical Islam in Central Asia (M. B. Olcott)
For a complete list of Carnegie Papers, go to www.CarnegieEndowment.org/pubs.
Document Outline
- Summary
- Introduction
- Exercising Fully Existing IAEA Verification Authority
- Requiring Special Inspections
- Obtaining and Verifying Early Design Information
- Detecting and Exposing Noncompliance
- Uncovering Undeclared Nuclear Trade and Activities
- Exposing Noncompliance
- Prevention and Deterrence
- Dealing Preventively With Noncompliance
- Dealing Preventively With NPT Withdrawal
- Securing Irreversible Safeguards
- Conclusion
- Annex I
- Annex II
