Arab Peace Initiative Final.indd

Joshua Teitelbaum
The Arab Peace Initiative:
A Primer and Future Prospects
הנידמו רוביצ יניינעל ימלשוריה זכרמה
Jerusalem Center for Public Aﬀairs

© 2009 Jerusalem Center for Public Aﬀairs
13 Tel-Hai St., Jerusalem, Israel
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Email: jcpa@netvision.net.il | www.jcpa.org
ISBN 978-965-218-071-1
Produc on Coordinator:
Odelia Zaguri
Graphic Design:
Gama Design
Pictures Credits:
AP Photo
Cover photo: Arab leaders pose at the Arab League Summit in Riyadh,
Saudi Arabia, March 28, 2007.
All photos are from AP and used with permission.

The Arab Peace Initiative:
A Primer and Future Prospects
Joshua Teitelbaum
• In the wake of the terrorist a acks on September 11, 2001, Saudi Arabia
was under intense scru ny since ﬁ een of the nineteen 9/11 hijackers had
proved to be Saudis. In February 2002, Crown Prince Abdullah of Saudi
Arabia gave an interview to New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman
in which he proposed to Israel “full withdrawal from all the occupied
territories, in accord with UN resolu ons, including in Jerusalem, for full
normaliza on of rela ons.”
• In a ﬂash, Abdullah had transformed the discourse: Instead of focusing on
Saudi involvement in terrorism, the Western press was now talking about
Saudi peacemaking. However, by the me the Abdullah trial balloon
reached the Arab summit in Beirut in March 2002, the ini a ve had been
modiﬁed and its terms hardened.
• “Full normaliza on” became “normal rela ons” (which s ll marks
signiﬁcant progress over the Arab League formula on in Khartoum
of 1967: “no peace, no recogni on, no nego a ons”). It called for an
Israeli withdrawal from all the territories to the lines of June 4, 1967,
in contradic on of UN Resolu on 242, and which would bring Syria to
the shores of the Sea of Galilee. It also enshrined a Pales nian “right of
return” to Israel.
• Several aspects of the Arab Peace Ini a ve represent signiﬁcant and
posi ve developments in the oﬃcial, collec ve Arab view of the future
of Israel in the Middle East. However, Israel should refrain from accep ng
the ini a ve as a basis for peace nego a ons because it contains
seriously objec onable elements. Israel should also reject the “all or
nothing” approach of the Saudis and the Arab League. Peacemaking is
the process of nego a on, not diktat.
3

• Peace would be best served by Israel going on the diploma c oﬀensive
and presen ng an ini a ve of its own, emphasizing the posi ve aspects
of the ini a ve, and including an invita on to Arab leaders to a mee ng
in Israel to discuss the ini a ve in its en rety.
Born in the a ermath of both the terrorist a acks of September 11, 2001,
and the Pales nian-Israeli war which had begun in late 2000 (commonly
known as the “second in fada”), the Arab Peace Ini a ve (API) of 2002
has moved front and center in Middle Eastern diplomacy. It is likely that
President Barack Obama and the Quartet (the U.S., EU, UN, and Russia)
may take up the API in some form. With that in mind, the Jerusalem Center
presents this study, with background, a contextual and textual analysis,
and a discussion of future prospects. It concludes with recommenda ons
for diplomacy.
Saudi Arabia, Crown Prince Abdullah, and 9/11:
From the New York Times to the Beirut Arab Summit
In early 2002, the United States was s ll reeling from the terrorist a acks
of September 11, 2001. In his State of the Union Address on January 29,
2002, President George W. Bush had called North Korea, Iraq, and Iran
the “axis of evil,” and the U.S. had liberated Afghanistan from the Taliban
following its invasion in October 2001, but had not yet invaded Iraq, which
it was to do in March 2003.
Saudi Arabia, never popular in the U.S., was under intense scru ny and
cri cism since ﬁ een of the nineteen 9/11 hijackers had proved to be
Saudis. In the Middle East, the Oslo process had broken down, and Israel
and the Pales nians were engaged in a kind of limited war. Pales nian
suicide bombing in Israel increased tremendously, and as a result Israel
stepped up its incursions into Oslo-designated Pales nian territory.
While percep ons in Riyadh are notoriously diﬃcult to fathom, it was
clear that by early 2002 the Saudis were caught between a rock and
4

The Arab Peace Initiative: A Primer and Future Prospects
a hard place. Its most signiﬁcant ally, the U.S., was enraged as details of
the connec ons between Saudi ci zens and al-Qaeda became clearer.1
Connec ons between members of the royal family and the expor ng of
religious fana cism were being revealed.2 On the other hand, there were
increasing indica ons that al-Qaeda, born in Saudi Arabia, was intent on
carrying out a acks within the kingdom. Homegrown radicals would not
look fondly upon Saudi eﬀorts at reconcilia on with the United States,
which had invaded one Muslim country and was threatening to invade
another. Other pro-American Arab leaders were concerned about rising
an -American sen ment at home, fueled by pictures of Arab-Israeli
violence broadcast daily over satellite television.
Before the terrorist a acks of September 11, 2001, violence between Israel
and the Pales nians since the collapse of the Oslo Accords in September
2000 had brought increasing pressure on the Bush administra on, notably
from Saudi Arabia, which was later to push the API. Pales nian casual es
in the Pales nian-Israeli war had grabbed the a en on of then-Crown
Prince Abdullah, who was afraid of the inﬂuence the constant barrage
of Pales nian vic ms was having on the Arab world. It made the Saudi
alliance with the U.S., awkward in the best of circumstances, even more
problema c.
Crown Prince Abdullah of Saudi Arabia had been running day-to-day
aﬀairs in the kingdom since about 1995, when King Fahd had fallen ill.
While o en thought to be more conserva ve, more pan-Arab and less
pro-Western than his half-brother Fahd, Abdullah was proving himself
a cau ous reformer. He ini ated several na onal dialogues involving
various previously taboo subjects, such as the status of women, reform,
and rela ons between Shiites and Sunnis.
In August 2001 Abdullah had dispatched Ambassador Bandar bin Sultan
to deliver a harsh message to Bush and Na onal Security Adviser
Condoleezza Rice. Bush responded privately that he believed a solu on
would include a Pales nian state, but violence had to stop. Eventually,
on November 11, he publicly men oned a Pales nian state for the ﬁrst
me, in a speech to the UN General Assembly: “We are working toward
a day when two states, Israel and Pales ne, live peacefully together
5

The World Trade Center in New York on Sept. 11, 2001.
within secure and recognized borders as called for by the Security Council
resolu ons.”3 A er a mee ng with Bush in Washington in early February
2002, Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon told reporters that “at the end
of the peace process, I believe that a Pales nian state, of course, will be
– we’ll see a Pales nian state.”4 By June, U.S. policy had coalesced into
a “vision” for Israeli-Pales nian peace, based on two states and a new
Pales nian leadership.5
On February 6, 2002, Thomas Friedman, an inﬂuen al foreign aﬀairs
columnist for the New York Times, published an imaginary memorandum
from President George W. Bush to President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt,
6

The Arab Peace Initiative: A Primer and Future Prospects
Crown Prince Abdullah of Saudi Arabia, King Abdullah II of Jordan, Syria’s
President Bashar al-Assad, and “the rest of the Arab League.”
You have an Arab League summit set for March in Lebanon.
I suggest your summit issue one simple resolu on: “The 22
members of the Arab League say to Israel that in return for
a complete Israeli withdrawal to the June 4, 1967, lines – in
the West Bank, Gaza, Jerusalem and on the Golan Heights
– we oﬀer full recogni on of Israel, diploma c rela ons,
normalized trade and security guarantees. Full peace with
all 22 Arab states for full withdrawal.6
Less than a week later, Friedman was in Riyadh talking to Abdullah.
According to Friedman, the conversa on went like this:
“Have you broken into my desk?”
“No,” I said, wondering what he was talking about.
“The reason I ask is that this is exactly the idea I had in
mind – full withdrawal from all the occupied territories, in
accord with UN resolu ons, including in Jerusalem, for full
normaliza on of rela ons,” he said. “I have dra ed a speech
along those lines. My thinking was to deliver it before the
Arab summit and try to mobilize the en re Arab world
behind it. The speech is wri en, and it is in my desk. But I
changed my mind about delivering it when Sharon took the
violence, and the oppression, to an unprecedented level.”7
Abdullah’s response seems to have been double-edged. On the one hand,
he was responding to Friedman’s prompt, but on the other, he was taking
a jab at Sharon for measures the crown prince perceived as extreme,
but which Israel deemed necessary to defend Israel’s civilian popula on
against suicide bombings. Yet here was a leader of arguably the most
important Arab and Muslim country oﬀering Israel “full normaliza on of
rela ons,” although he was already threatening to withdraw it following
the violence in the West Bank and Gaza.
7

This was not the ﬁrst peace plan oﬀered by a Saudi crown prince through a
media outlet. In August 1981, in response to the Arab-consensus-breaking
Camp David Accords between Israel and Egypt, then-Crown Prince Fahd
oﬀered a similar plan via the Saudi Press Agency, whose point seven
seemed to recognize Israel – albeit not explicitly: “All states in the region
should be able to live in peace.” But by the me the plan reached the
Arab summit in Fez in September 1982, radical Arab countries has forced
several modiﬁca ons, including in point seven, which instead of oﬀering
a guarantee on the part of the Arab states that they would let Israel live in
peace, le this guarantee up to the UN.8 There was even less recogni on of
Israel implied. The Fahd Plan and the Abdullah Plan were released through
the media because they were trial balloons. And just as the Fahd Plan was
modiﬁed by the me it reached the Arab summit in Fez, so Abdullah’s was
to be modiﬁed – and hardened – by the me of the Arab Summit in Beirut
in March 2002.
Reactions: U.S., Israeli, Arab
Abdullah’s interview with Friedman caused quite a s r. The Abdullah Plan’s
presenta on, in an interview with a Western journalist, was unusual, if not
unprecedented, and it seems to have caught most everyone by surprise.
Abdullah was proving much savvier than many in the West had predicted.
He had read the situa on correctly, and in a ﬂash had transformed the
discourse: Instead of focusing on Saudi involvement in terrorism, the
Western press was now talking about Saudi peacemaking.
The ini al U.S. reac on was cau ous, with State Department spokesman
Richard Boucher terming it a “signiﬁcant and posi ve step.” A few days
later, Secretary of State Colin Powell called it an “important step,” but
cau oned that more details were needed. President Bush “praised”
the crown prince’s ideas, calling them a “hopeful note,” though not a
breakthrough.9 A few days later, Na onal Security Adviser Condoleezza
Rice became more speciﬁc: “We appreciate the fact that Prince Abdullah
was ready to publicly declare that the normaliza on of rela ons between
Arab countries and Israel is possible.” She essen ally rejected, however,
8

The Arab Peace Initiative: A Primer and Future Prospects
a quid pro quo in the form of a return to the pre-1967 borders, stressing
that borders should be the subject of nego a ons. But American interest
was certainly piqued, and Assistant Secretary of State William Burns was
dispatched to Riyadh to sound out the Saudis.10
In his conversa on with Friedman, Abdullah stated one principle: Full Israeli
withdrawal in exchange for “full normaliza on of rela ons.” For Israelis, full
withdrawal was a non-starter (and not in accord with UN Security Council
Resolu on 242), yet Israelis had proven themselves ready to nego ate
the depth of a withdrawal. But the key prize was “full normaliza on of
rela ons,” which implied more than just formal diploma c rela ons, but
actual acceptance, including tourism, and cultural and economic rela ons.
Coming from the person next in line for the Saudi throne, this was certainly
worth a listen.
Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres termed the ini a ve interes ng,
posi ve, new and fascina ng.11 President Moshe Katzav invited Abdullah
to Jerusalem to discuss his ini a ve, a move that one leading Saudi paper
decried as a “maneuver” and “cheap one-upmanship.”12 Prince Abdullah
himself ruled out visi ng Israel, and stated that neither the Israeli
president nor Prime Minister Sharon would be welcome in Riyadh.13
Sharon was more circumspect, only implying that he would be ready
to meet Saudi leaders to discuss the plan.14 The ini al U.S. and Israeli
reac ons were similar, but as me went on they diverged, with the U.S.
becoming more interested. Israel, on the other hand, was preoccupied
with a horriﬁc series of Pales nian suicide bombings plaguing the Jewish
state at that me.
Egypt, Jordan, and several Gulf countries expressed their immediate and
full support. The semi-oﬃcial Jordanian daily al-Ra’i was quick to note
that Jordan’s King Abdullah II had already been working on a similar
idea in concert with other Arab states.15 Importantly, Syria did not have
an immediate response. Since the Saudi idea was to have its ini a ve
endorsed at the upcoming Arab summit, it needed Syrian support.
Jordanian Foreign Minister Marwan Muasher was the point man in that
eﬀort.16 Lebanon, too, was hesitant, since it wondered what the plan
envisaged for Pales nian refugees living there. It was also the host country
9

for the summit. In late February, the Saudis began pu
ng pressure on
both Lebanon and Syria.
On March 5, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad arrived in Jeddah for talks
with Crown Prince Abdullah. Before heading to Saudi Arabia, Assad had
met on March 3 in Beirut with Lebanese President Emile Lahoud. While
avoiding explicit men on of the Saudi ini a ve, both stated that a solu on
to the conﬂict had to include all UN resolu ons, implicitly including General
Assembly Resolu on 194 of 1948, which called for Pales nian refugees to
be allowed to return to their homes (in Israel) or receive compensa on.17
This was not a part of Abdullah’s plan. While in Jeddah, Assad and the
crown prince were careful not to point out diﬀerences. The oﬃcial Saudi
Press Agency reported that Assad supported Abdullah’s “ideas,” and that
the talks were posi ve, successful, and that the two leaders concurred on
all subjects. Syria oﬃcially expressed its “sa sfac on” with the posi on of
Saudi Arabia.18
It appeared there was good reason for Syrian sa sfac on: Abdullah’s
plan seemed to be morphing under Syrian pressure as it headed towards
the Beirut summit later in the month. A Saudi oﬃcial, who declined to
be iden ﬁed, told Agence France-Presse that the Saudis had informed
Assad that Abdullah’s oﬀer included Resolu on 194. “This appeased Syria,
which gave its support to the ini a ve,” said the oﬃcial. Moreover, Arab
diplomats told AFP that Saudi Arabia had agreed to a Syrian request to
drop “complete normaliza on” with Israel in favor of “complete peace.”
According to the diplomats, the la er stressed government-to-government
rela ons rather than people-to-people es.19 Although API behind-the-
scenes man Marwan Muasher tried to put a posi ve light on pre-summit
talks, sta ng that the summit’s plan was “not a detailed laundry list, it is
a poli cal vision that deals with overall principles, land for peace, in a way
that appeals to Israeli public opinion, to the interna onal community,”20
the die was cast. As more meat was being put on the bones of Abdullah’s
ini a ve, it was becoming more and more unpalatable to Israel.
According to Muasher, in his mee ng with Syrian President Bashar al-Assad
in Aleppo on March 4, Assad did not feel comfortable with the term “full
normaliza on” that Abdullah had used, and wanted “normal rela ons”
10

The Arab Peace Initiative: A Primer and Future Prospects
Lebanese President Emile Lahoud, center, at an Arab League Summit in Beirut on March 27, 2002.
instead. Syrian Foreign Minister Faruq al-Shara, whom Muasher met later,
insisted on the formula on “full peace” instead of “full normaliza on.”
Assad also insisted on full Israeli withdrawal to the June 4, 1967, borders,
which would put Syria on the shores of the Sea of Galilee. Finally, he
insisted that the Pales nian “right of return” be explicitly men oned. Saudi
Foreign Minister Sa’ud al-Faysal warmed to having the word “agreed” in
the formula on on the refugees and adopted it (see below).21
During mee ngs with Arab ministers on March 24, Shara hardened his
posi on, expressing himself no longer sa sﬁed with “full peace,” and
preferring to replace that formula on with “normal peaceful rela ons.”
11

Prince Sa’ud agreed. The Lebanese con nued to present problems with
respect to the refugee issue. They did not accept that Resolu on 194 oﬀered
the possibility of compensa on, and were determined to have a speciﬁc
paragraph against Pales nian rese lement (in Arabic, taw n) in Lebanon.22
On the eve of the summit, the New York Times reported that the word
“normaliza on” had been eliminated from the ini a ve to be adopted.
Host country Lebanon lost no opportunity to push the issue of the return
of refugees. Foreign Minister Mahmoud Hamoud stated repeatedly
that Lebanon expected the “return of Pales nians to their homes and
proper es and not to naturalize them in the countries that host them.”23
In the event, a formula on was reached that took Lebanese concerns into
considera on, and it presents one of the main diﬃcul es in the API.
Textual and Contextual Analysis
Some scholars and pundits believe that parsing texts o en leads to losing
the meaning of the gesture. But as Muasher, one of the architects of the
API, writes in his book, The Arab Center, Arab leaders spent a long me
ﬁgh ng over the text. They obviously a ributed meaning to their words,
and therefore so should we.
Muasher gave a sense of what he was trying to achieve when discussing
what diﬀerent formula ons meant. “We are not talking only about the
end of belligerency, we are talking about rela ons,” he told the New York
Times. “There will be an overall declara on that everybody agrees to, but
you can’t expect every single Arab country to have the same rela ons
with Israel. Will every country have an exchange of theater groups, for
example? I don’t know; that is up to nego a on.”24
By the me the Arab Peace Ini a ve was announced at the Arab summit
in Beirut (March 27-28, 2002), it had undergone signiﬁcant changes,
primarily as a result of pressure from Syria and Lebanon as discussed
above. The API was approved unanimously.25 This is important, because
according to Ar cle Seven of the charter of the Arab League, resolu ons
are only binding on countries that voted for them.26
12

The Arab Peace Initiative: A Primer and Future Prospects
Two documents were issued at the end of the summit. The ﬁrst, known in
Arabic as the Beirut Declara on (I‘lan Bayrut) and read out by Lebanese
Foreign Minister Mahmoud Hammoud, contains what is commonly
referred to as the API. The second and less well-known document is the
summit’s Final Statement (al-Bayan al-Khitami).
Crown Prince Abdullah’s speech at the Summit on March 27 is also of
importance, since it included an unprecedented direct appeal to the Israeli
people:
Allow me at this point to directly address the Israeli people,
to say to them that the use of violence, for more than ﬁ y
years, has only resulted in more violence and destruc on,
and that the Israeli people are as far as they have ever
been from security and peace, notwithstanding military
superiority and despite eﬀorts to subdue and oppress.
Peace emanates from the heart and mind, and not from the
barrel of a cannon, or the exploding warhead of a missile.
The me has come for Israel to put its trust in peace
a er it has gambled on war for decades without success.
Israel, and the world, must understand that peace and the
reten on of the occupied Arab territories are incompa ble
and impossible to reconcile or achieve.
I would further say to the Israeli people that if their
government abandons the policy of force and oppression
and embraces true peace, we will not hesitate to accept the
right of the Israeli people to live in security with the people
of the region.27
13

The Text of the Arab Peace Initiative
The API consists of seven points, and is divided primarily into Arab and
Israeli obliga ons.
The Arab Peace Initiative
(The Beirut Declaration)
The Council of the League of Arab States at the Summit Level, at its 14th
Ordinary Session,
• Reaﬃrms the resolu on taken in June 1996 at the Cairo extraordinary
Arab summit that a just and comprehensive peace in the Middle East is
the strategic op on of the Arab countries, to be achieved in accordance
with interna onal legality, and which would require a comparable
commitment on the part of the Israeli government.
• Having listened to the statement made by his royal highness Prince
Abdullah Bin Abdulaziz, the crown prince of the Kingdom of Saudi
Arabia, in which his highness presented his ini a ve, calling for full Israeli
withdrawal from all the Arab territories occupied since June 1967, in
implementa on of Security Council Resolu ons 242 and 338, reaﬃrmed
by the Madrid Conference of 1991, and the land for peace principle,
and Israel’s acceptance of an independent Pales nian state, with East
Jerusalem as its capital, in return for the establishment of normal
rela ons in the context of a comprehensive peace with Israel.

[The establishment of “normal rela ons” (‘alaqat tabi‘iyya), although not
as strong as “normaliza on” or the “full normaliza on” of Crown Prince
Abdullah’s original ini a ve, marks signiﬁcant progress over earlier Arab
League formula ons, such as Fez and par cularly Khartoum of 1967,
which famously announced “no peace with Israel, no recogni on of
Israel, no nego a ons with it.”]
• Emana ng from the convic on of the Arab countries that a military
solu on to the conﬂict will not achieve peace or provide security for the
par es, the council:
14

The Arab Peace Initiative: A Primer and Future Prospects
1. Requests Israel to reconsider its policies and declare that a just peace is
its strategic op on as well.
2. Further calls upon Israel to aﬃrm:
a. Full Israeli withdrawal from all the territories occupied since 1967,
including the Syrian Golan Heights to the lines of June 4, 1967, as
well as the remaining occupied Lebanese territories in the south of
Lebanon.
[This formula on is at odds with Resolu on 242, which calls for
withdrawal from territories, not all the territories. By s pula ng that
the withdrawal on the Golan must be to the lines of June 4, 1967, the
API rejected the interna onal border, which had placed the en re
Sea of Galilee in Israeli hands, and eﬀec vely placed the Syrians on
the shore of the Sea of Galilee, Israel’s main water source. Israel’s
withdrawal from southern Lebanon in 2000 was cer ﬁed by the UN as
a withdrawal to the interna onal border.28]
b. Achievement of a just solu on to the Pales nian refugee problem to be
agreed upon in accordance with UN General Assembly Resolu on 194.
[This resolu on is commonly interpreted by the Arabs to enshrine
a Pales nian “right of return” to the homes from which they le or
were expelled following the Arabs’ rejec on of the 1947 UN par
on
of Pales ne into two states (UNGA Resolu on 181). Israel has always
rejected Resolu on 194 in principle, since it would undermine Israel’s
Jewish iden ty and, eventually, combined with an Arab Pales nian
state in the West Bank and Gaza, lead to two Pales nian states, not a
Jewish and a Pales nian one. In eﬀect, two states for one people, not
two states for two peoples. However, ostensibly, by s pula ng that the
solu on to the refugee problem would be “agreed upon,” Israel might
have some kind of input into the nature of the refugee solu on. Yet
even so, this s pula on is rendered inoperable by the s pula ons on
refugee rese lement in sec on 3(a).]
c. The acceptance of the establishment of a sovereign independent
Pales nian state on the Pales nian territories occupied since the 4th
15

of June 1967 in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, with East Jerusalem as
its capital.
3. Consequently, the Arab countries aﬃrm the following:
a. Consider the Arab-Israeli conﬂict ended, and enter into a peace
agreement with Israel, and provide security for all the states of the
region.
[This is the ﬁrst me the Arab states, as a collec ve, have stated that
pursuant to Israel fulﬁlling its obliga ons according to the API, they
would consider the Arab-Israeli conﬂict to have ended, without further
demands.29 Moreover, they promise to provide security for all the
states in the region, which includes Israel.]
b.
Establish normal rela ons with Israel in the context of this
comprehensive peace.
[Again, while short of Abdullah’s original “full normaliza on,” “normal
rela ons” represents signiﬁcant progress over past resolu ons. In
Arabic, the term normaliza on (tatbi‘) carries with it a connota on of
training or house-breaking animals, and in classical Arabic also “ﬁlth”
or “infec on.”30]
4. Assures the rejec on of all forms of Pales nian patria on which conﬂict
with the special circumstances of the Arab host countries.
[If there is a deal-killer in the API, it is this sec on. If the Arab countries
can reject “patria on” (Arabic taw n – read rese lement, but the oﬃcial
transla on is patria on) of refugees, then the refugees would have
nowhere to go but Israel. Israel, of course, would not agree to this, and
therefore this ar cle renders any agreement on the refugees as s pulated
in sec on 2(b) a logical impossibility. Muasher himself realized that the
inclusion of this clause would make it very diﬃcult for Israel to accept the
API.31 The Final Statement which accompanied the API was even stronger
on the refugee issue, explicitly demanding all of the Pales nians’ rights,
including “guaranteeing the right of return (ta’min haqq al-‘awda) for
the Pales nian refugees on the basis of the resolu ons of interna onal
legi macy and the principles of interna onal law including General
16

The Arab Peace Initiative: A Primer and Future Prospects
Assembly Resolu on 194,” and rejec ng any solu ons that involve
“rese ling [of the Pales nians] outside of their homes (tatwinihim kharij
diyarihim).”32]
5. Calls upon the government of Israel and all Israelis to accept this ini a ve
in order to safeguard the prospects for peace and stop the further
shedding of blood, enabling the Arab countries and Israel to live in peace
and good neighborliness and provide future genera ons with security,
stability, and prosperity.
[As Crown Prince Abdullah did in his speech at the summit, this ar cle
appeals for peace directly to the Israeli people, and promises them a
good future together with the Arab countries.]
6. Invites the interna onal community and all countries and organiza ons
to support this ini a ve.
7. Requests the chairman of the summit to form a special commi ee
composed of some of its concerned member states and the secretary
general of the League of Arab States to pursue the necessary contacts to
gain support for this ini a ve at all levels, par cularly from the United
Na ons, the Security Council, the United States of America, the Russian
Federa on, the Muslim states and the European Union.
Israel and Arab Reactions to the Arab Peace Initiative
The announcement of the API came on the heels of one of the most
horriﬁc terrorist acts carried out against Israel: the suicide bombing of
a Passover fes ve meal, or seder, in Netanya on March 27, which killed
twenty-eight. Israeli responses were colored by this event, but there was
s ll an eﬀort to stress the posi ve. Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres
responded to the API, saying the Saudi step was an important one, but it
had no chance while terrorism was s ll rampant. “We cannot, of course,
ignore the problema c aspects which arose at the Beirut summit and the
harsh rejec onist language used by some of the speakers.” Prime Minister
Sharon made similar statements, but at the same me announced
Opera on Defensive Shield,33 a counter-terrorist opera on which sent the
17

Israel Defense Forces into the West Bank and Gaza into areas previously
evacuated under the Oslo Accords in order to put a stop to Pales nian
terrorism directed by PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat.
To the Israeli response that the API had posi ve aspects but also some
quite nega ve ones, par cularly with respect to returning Pales nian
refugees, Saudi Foreign Minister Sa’ud al-Faysal replied, “This ini a ve is
an indivisible whole and consequently it is impossible to accept one part
of it and refuse another.” He added that the Arabs “now have a weapon
to put pressure on Israel on the interna onal scene and even on public
opinion in Israel.”34
Revived U.S. Diplomacy: The Roadmap
and the Bush-Sharon Exchange of Letters
The period between the announcement of the API and its revival in 2007
and 2008 was not devoid of diploma c ac vity. For much of this me,
Israel was engaged in quite successful counter-terrorist opera ons in
Gaza and the West Bank. Israel carried out a full and unilateral withdrawal
from the Gaza Strip in August 2005, and was contempla ng a similar but
less comprehensive withdrawal from the West Bank. This contempla on
ended with the Second Lebanon War in the summer of 2006 when it
became clear that a unilateral move in the West Bank would only bring
Israel’s popula on centers within missile range. The Hamas victory in
parliamentary elec ons in January 2006 also made it clear that Israel could
not hand over any territory. In June 2007, Hamas carried out a bloody
putsch against the Pales nian Authority in Gaza.
The API con nued to have a life, of sorts, through the ac vi es of the
Quartet’s “Roadmap,” issued in April 2003, which listed “the ini a ve
of Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah – endorsed by the Beirut Arab League
Summit,” as one of the bases for a ﬁnal se lement.35 Israel had many
concerns about the Roadmap, and detailed them to the U.S. Prominent
among these concerns was “the waiver of any right of return for
Pales nian refugees to the state of Israel.” The Israelis further insisted
18

The Arab Peace Initiative: A Primer and Future Prospects
on the removal of all references other than Resolu ons 242 and 338,
including references to UNSCR 1397,36 the Saudi Ini a ve, and the Arab
Ini a ve adopted in Beirut.37 In response, Washington issued a statement
saying that it shared Israel’s concerns, and said that the United States “will
address them fully and seriously in the implementa on of the Roadmap to
fulﬁll the President’s vision of June 24, 2002.”38 Once it had received these
assurances, Jerusalem accepted the steps set out in the Roadmap.39
In 2004, the Israeli posi on was substan ally strengthened by an exchange
of le ers between Prime Minister Sharon and President Bush. Following
the lack of progress in the Roadmap, and con nuing terror a acks, Israel
decided to embark on a unilateral path. In his le er to Bush, Sharon stated
that Israel would disengage from the Gaza Strip and from part of the West
Bank, while accelera ng the building of the security fence. Included in the
Bush reply was an acknowledgment that future borders in the West Bank
would have to take into considera on “exis ng major Israeli popula on
centers” established a er 1967, and that a return to the 1949 armis ce
lines was “unrealis c.”40 This Bush le er was in direct contradic on to the
API.
Much of the me since 9/11 has been dominated by concern over Iran’s
nuclear ambi ons. Iran con nued to expand its inﬂuence in the Middle
East by suppor ng Hamas in the Pales nian territories, Shiites in Iraq, and
Hizbullah in Lebanon. In the summer of 2006, Hizbullah crossed Israel’s
northern border and kidnapped two soldiers, an act which the Saudis
condemned,41 and which led to an Israeli a ack and invasion of Lebanon.
Concern on the part of the U.S., Israel, and some moderate Arab
leaders about a growing “Shiite Crescent” headed by Iran led the Bush
administra on to make another eﬀort to bring about Middle East peace.
Even though such an outcome was unlikely, it appeared that the idea
was that Tehran could be be er confronted if the ﬂames of the Israeli-
Pales nian conﬂict could be lowered. The Saudis shared these sen ments,
and were par cularly alarmed since Saudi Arabia competed with Iran
for inﬂuence in the Persian Gulf. It also had its own Shiite popula on
which was subject to Iranian inﬂuence, and its homegrown Sunni radicals
expected it to stand up to Iran.
19

This coalescing of Saudi and Israeli interests following the impressive
showing of Hizbullah in the Lebanon war in the summer of 2006 and the
elec on of Hamas in January 2006 brought renewed Israeli interest in the
API, and, consequently, secret mee ngs with Saudi oﬃcials. Reports on
these mee ngs began to ﬁlter out in September.42
Riding the wave of common interest, Israel sought to improve on the API
ahead of the Arab summit scheduled for Riyadh in March 2007. Foreign
Minister Tzipi Livni was par cularly vocal in this ma er. She expressed
her wish that the Arabs should know that there were parts of the plan
acceptable to Israel and parts that were not. According to Livni, there were
elements of the plan which contradicted the principle of two states. Instead
of returning to Israel, Pales nians should be able to go to a new state of
Pales ne.43 Prime Minister Olmert stated at a Cabinet mee ng: “We very
much hope that at the mee ng of Arab heads of state in Riyadh that the
posi ve elements that have found expression in the Saudi ini a ve will
be reaﬃrmed and that the chances of nego a ons between us and the
Pales nians will be strengthened.”44
The U.S. was also involved in the machina ons regarding the API in the
lead-up to the Riyadh summit, with both Saudi and Israeli oﬃcials visi ng
Washington in mid-March. Secretary of State Rice followed up with a visit
to the region. Her goal seems to have been to bring about some changes
in the API before the Riyadh summit, or at least some kind of concrete
follow-up that would make it more a rac ve. She told reporters: “It’s their
ini a ve. But I would hope that the ini a ve would be oﬀered again and
oﬀered in a way that suggests that there might be ac ve follow-up to the
ini a ve, not just to say, here’s an ini a ve.”45
An “ac ve follow-up” that would have certainly caused a sea change in the
Israeli a
tude towards the API was suggested by Thomas Friedman, the
journalist who ﬁrst brought the Saudi ini a ve to the public:
What the moribund Israeli-Pales nian talks need most today
is an emo onal breakthrough. Another Arab declara on,
just reaﬃrming the Abdullah ini a ve, won’t cut it. If
King Abdullah wants to lead – and he has the integrity
20

The Arab Peace Initiative: A Primer and Future Prospects
and credibility to do so – he needs to ﬂy from the Riyadh
summit to Jerusalem and deliver the oﬀer personally to the
Israeli people. That is what Egypt’s Anwar Sadat did when
he forged his breakthrough. If King Abdullah did the same,
he could end this conﬂict once and for all.
If the Saudi king just wants to score some points, he will
hold the Arab summit, re-issue the peace plan and go
home. If he wants to make history and make peace, he will
hold the Arab summit, re-issue the peace plan and deliver
it in person.46
Amidst con nuing reports of secret Israeli-Saudi mee ngs,47 Arab leaders
were giving conﬂic ng signals about possible changes in the API at the
Riyadh summit. Arab diplomats suggested oﬀ the record that the API could
be repackaged to make it more palatable to the Israelis,48 but these hopes
were soon dashed. Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Sa’ud al-Faysal told
reporters: “There will be no amendment to the Arab peace ini a ve. We
have said this 20 mes before in the past and this is the last me I will say
this.” Sa’ud said that Saudi Arabia had done all it could, and now the ball
was in Israel’s court. “If Israel refuses, that means it doesn’t want peace
and it places everything back into the hands of fate. They will be pu
ng
their future not in the hands of the peacemakers but in the hands of the
lords of war,” he said.49
Prime Minister Olmert tried to draw a dis nc on between the more
favorable plan originally put forth by Abdullah to Friedman and the API.
During a joint press conference with UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon
on March 26, 2007, he stated:
We examined the Saudi ini a ve. The Arab ini a ve is
not iden cal to the Saudi ini a ve. I am more in favor of
the Saudi ini a ve. I think that the Saudi ini a ve is very
interes ng, is very challenging and it certainly manifests
leadership quality and responsibility of King Abdullah of
Saudi Arabia, and if the Arab countries, moderate Arab
countries, will try to advance the process along the lines
21

of the Saudi ini a ve, I will look at it as a very posi ve
development.50
Olmert also speciﬁcally ruled out the return of refugees, an integral part
of the API.51
At least some in the Arab world realized the fu lity of this Arab demand.
Egyp an academic Mamoun Fandy urged the summit to remove the
refugee clause from the API since it gu ed the ini a ve from any chance
of implementa on. He cas gated the Arabs for historically placing the
refugee issue as an obstacle to any peace with Israel. Saudi columnist
Yusuf Nasir al-Suwaydan, wri ng in the Kuwai paper al-Siyasa, blamed
the Arab countries for failing to rese le the Pales nians, and termed the
“right of return” an illusion. One of his ar cles on the subject was en tled
“The Impossible Return,” and the other – “Rese lement is the Solu on”
(al-taw n huwa al-hall).52
The Riyadh Arab summit, held on March 28-29, 2007, ended with a
reaﬃrma on of the API, and called for “the Israeli government and Israelis
to seize the opportunity to accept the Arab peace ini a ve to resume
direct nego a ons and show seriousness on all tracks.”53 In response,
Israel was again keen to point out that it was interested in a dialogue with
the Arab states, but that the peace process had to be founded upon the
existence of “two na on-states, with each state addressing the na onal
aspira ons of its own people – Israel for the Jewish people and Pales ne
for the Pales nian people.”54
The two countries most threatened by Iran in the Middle East are Israel
and Saudi Arabia. Israel tried to play on this common concern by stressing
the posi ve aspects of the Saudi-ini ated API. A er the Riyadh summit, it
did this even more stridently. It pointed out the common interests Israel
had with Saudi Arabia and most of the other countries in heading oﬀ Iran,
Hizbullah, and Hamas. It described the API – almost always termed the
“Saudi-ini ated” Arab Peace Ini a ve – as a posi ve development and as
a vehicle for interac on with Israel. In an ar cle published in the Saudi-
owned al-Sharq al-Awsat, Livni expressed similar sen ments, emphasizing
at the same me that it could not be used to undermine the Jewish nature
22

The Arab Peace Initiative: A Primer and Future Prospects
Saudi King Abdullah bin Abd al-Aziz, center, speaks to Pales nian leader Mahmoud Abbas, le , as Prime Minister Ismail Haniyeh
of Hamas, right, looks on in Riyadh on March 27, 2007, prior to an Arab League Summit mee ng.
of the State of Israel.55 For Israel, the two-state strategy had become a way
of sa sfying Pales nian na onal aspira ons without turning Israel into a
Pales nian state as well, via the return of refugees.
By July 2007, it appeared that the Israeli eﬀorts to support the relaunch of
the API on its own terms had failed. The U.S. elec on season, which got
an early start, emphasized that any deals would have to take into account
a new White House occupant. The poli cal future of Israeli Prime Minister
Olmert seemed increasingly uncertain, as he faced inves ga ons over his
conduct in the Second Lebanon War and several criminal inquiries as well.
Moreover, the Saudis became increasingly concerned with the internal
23

Pales nian strife following the June coup by Hamas in the Gaza Strip,
and with eﬀorts to isolate Hamas since the Mecca Agreement the Saudis
nego ated between the PA and Hamas earlier in the year. According to
Israeli Foreign Ministry sources, the Saudis were also displeased with the
Israeli use of the term “Saudi Ini a ve” instead of Arab Peace Ini a ve.56
Annapolis: The Bush Administrations Last Push
Like the Clinton administra on in its waning moments, the Bush
administra on also sought Middle East peace as part of its legacy. But
unlike in the Clinton era, President Bush let his secretary of state take the
lead, and refrained from robust personal involvement. Even with Hamas
ascendant and Pales nian President Mahmud Abbas nearly powerless in
the West Bank, the Bush administra on pushed forward. To be sure, with
near failure in Iraq, and with a nuclear-armed Iran looming on the horizon,
an eﬀort to lower the ﬂames in the Arab-Israeli conﬂict and thereby
facilitate a grand coali on of Israel, Turkey, and moderate Arab states
against Iran may have seemed worth a try.
To this end, Bush announced a new peace ini a ve in mid-July 2007.
The idea was to strengthen Abbas, draw in the Arab states to normalize
rela ons with Israel, and create a de-facto alliance against Iran. Bush called
for an “interna onal mee ng” in the fall to discuss Middle East peace.57
The Saudis were wary of the mee ng. They indicated that they might
a end if it dealt substan vely with the issues. A State Department oﬃcial
termed the Saudi response a “forward-leaning” answer.58 In the end, the
Saudis did agree to a end. “We are not going for handshakes or a display
of emo ons,” said Sa’ud al-Faysal. “We are there only to reach a peace
which safeguards Arab interests and safeguards the Pales nian, Syrian
and Lebanese lands. If (the Israelis) are serious, they will be met with
seriousness by the Arab side. If they are not, there are no swords hanging
over our necks forcing us to agree to whatever is oﬀered.”59
At a brieﬁng for reporters, al-Faysal demonstrated how far apart the Israelis
and the Arabs were on the refugee issue: “I mean, here’s an issue where
24

The Arab Peace Initiative: A Primer and Future Prospects
people not from Pales ne come to Pales ne, occupied land in Pales ne
that happened to have people living there, and now they want to consider
these people illegal in a purely Jewish homeland.”60 Al-Faysal even used
the term “right of return” during a closed session of the conference,
according to an Israeli oﬃcial.61
At the conference, held on November 27, it was clear that the Saudis
and the Israelis were speaking past each other. For the Saudis, the
conference was about reaching progress on ﬁnal status issues, not about
normaliza on or recogni on of Israel. Prime Minister Olmert made a plea
for normaliza on. With respect to the API, he said:
I am familiar with the Arab peace ini a ve, which was born
in Riyadh, aﬃrmed in Beirut and recently reaﬃrmed by you
in Riyadh. I value this ini a ve, acknowledge its importance
and highly appreciate its contribu on. I have no doubt
that it will be referred to in the course of the nego a ons
between us and the Pales nian leadership.62
He was rebuﬀed by the Saudi Ambassador to the U.S., ‘Adil al-Jubayr, who
maintained that “normaliza on happens a er there is peace. The Arab
Peace Ini a ve is very speciﬁc as to what it requires and it’s very speciﬁc
as to what the payoﬀ will be. You do not get the fruits of peace before you
make peace.”63 During the closed session, Livni asked the representa ves
of the sixteen Arab states present: “Why doesn’t anyone want to shake
my hand? Why doesn’t anyone want to be seen speaking with me?” The
Dutch Minister for European Aﬀairs, Frans Timmermans, who was present,
observed, “She was saying, ‘Stop trea ng me as a pariah.’ They shun her
like she is Count Dracula’s younger sister.”64
An observer might have been tempted to say that the API was buried at
Annapolis at the end of 2007. But the signiﬁcance of the plan, the fact that
it was a reversal of Khartoum, and the fact that all the Arab states had
agreed to it con nued to make it a rac ve both to Israel and the Saudis.
Former head of Saudi intelligence Prince Turki al-Faysal told Reuters that
if Israel accepted the plan, “one can imagine not just economic, poli cal
and diploma c rela ons between Arabs and Israelis but also issues of
25

educa on, scien ﬁc research, comba ng mutual threats to the inhabitants
of this vast geographic area.”65 Olmert, in an interview with al-Sharq
al-Awsat, stressed that he considered the Arab Peace Ini a ve to be a
realis c component of the founda ons of peace (‘unsuran waqiyy‘an min
usus al-salam) along with Security Council Resolu ons 242, 338, and the
Roadmap.”66 President Shimon Peres, on several occasions in late 2008,
expressed posi ve sen ments about the API. For example, at the opening
of the Knesset’s winter session,
The Arab Peace Ini a ve of 2002 put an end to the unity of
the Arab League states around the policy of Khartoum, that
is to say, no to recogni on, no to nego a ons, no to peace.
Now the answer of the Arabs is yes! Yes to peace with Israel!
There is no ignoring the posi ve change even if we do not
accept all of the phrasing in the Arab Ini a ve.67
In November 2008, Saudi King Abdullah called a UN conference on interfaith
rela ons. This was another occasion for the revival of the moribund API.
That the interna onal community answered his call demonstrated the
power of the oil giant, ironic when Saudi Arabia is known to be one of
the most intolerant of socie es regarding religions other than Islam. Even
Shiite Islam o en comes under a ack from Saudi Wahhabi clerics.68 In
his speech to the conference, Peres again stressed the posi ve aspects
of the API, and this me turned directly to Abdullah, depar ng from his
prepared text: “Your Majesty, the king of Saudi Arabia. I was listening to
your message. I wish that your voice will become the prevailing voice of
the whole region, of all people. It’s right. It’s needed. It’s promising.”
Peres told reporters a erwards, “the king’s ini a ve created a U-turn in
the policies of the Middle East, because un l quite recently the formal Arab
posi on was…based on three ‘No’s’…no recogni on, no nego a on, no
peace with Israel.” Peres also called the Saudi leader a voice of “frankness”
and “understanding.”69
During much of this me, Prime Minister Olmert, who remained under
a cloud of suspicion and would eventually resign the premiership,
and Abbas, who controlled li le of the West Bank, were engaged in
26

The Arab Peace Initiative: A Primer and Future Prospects
nego a ons. Abbas’ term was up on January 9, 2009 (it was eventually
extended), and the administra on wished to shore up Abbas against
Hamas. During the months of November and December, adver sements
containing the text of the API were placed in the New York Times, the
Washington Post, the Guardian, and in Israeli newspapers in Hebrew
in a well-orchestrated publicity campaign. These ads were placed by
the Nego a ons Aﬀairs Department of the PLO. Addi onal Hebrew
ads included the endorsements of prominent Israelis calling on the
government to examine the API, and explained the Ini a ve in a manner
that would appeal to Israelis, emphasizing an end to the conﬂict and that
a solu on to the refugee problem would require Israeli agreement.70 The
publica on of the ads s mulated a debate in the Israeli press about how
much progress the API represented. In the Hebrew transla on of the API,
the proponents translated the word taw n (patria on, or rese lement) as
izruah (naturaliza on), which is a considerably so er term. The impression
was that they were trying to so -peddle the API by avoiding the diﬃcult
ques ons.71
Future Prospects
There is no doubt that there are several aspects of the API which represent
signiﬁcant and posi ve developments in the oﬃcial, collec ve Arab view
of the posi on and future of Israel in the Middle East. First and foremost,
it is an oﬀer to end the conﬂict. When compared to the famous “Three
Noes” of Khartoum, there can be no doubt about it.
For this reason alone, Israel should present those aspects in a posi ve light
and as important issues in any discussion of Arab-Israeli peace. It should
refrain from accep ng the API as a basis for peace nego a ons, because
it contains seriously objec onable elements, as discussed above. Israel
should also reject the “all or nothing” approach of the Saudis and the Arab
League. Peacemaking is the process of nego a on, not diktat.
It is likely, par cularly a er Hamas broke the cease-ﬁre in Gaza in December
2008, leading to a general conﬂagra on and an eventual Israeli incursion
into Gaza, that the new Obama administra on in Washington will make
27

a diploma c push involving the API. At an emergency Arab summit called
by Qatar in Doha on January 16, 2009 (and boyco ed by Egypt, Jordan,
and Saudi Arabia), Syrian President Assad said the API was “already
dead.”72 On January 19, Arab leaders met again in Kuwait for a previously
scheduled summit on Arab coopera on. While not withdrawing the API,
Saudi Arabia’s King Abdullah told the assembled leaders, “Israel must
understand that the choice between war and peace will not always stay
open and that the Arab peace ini a ve that is on the table today will not
remain there indeﬁnitely.” The same sen ments were repeated by Arab
League Secretary-General Amr Moussa.73
Other leading Saudis went further, threatening the interna onal community
and even the U.S.-Saudi rela onship. Foreign Minister Sa’ud al-Faysal,
speaking at the UN Security Council, warned the world community: “Either
the Security Council deals with our legi mate issues with seriousness and
responsibility based on these principles, or we will be forced to turn our
backs and consider what op ons present themselves.”74 In a widely quoted
ar cle in the Financial Times, former Saudi Ambassador to Washington
Turki al-Faysal sharply cau oned the new Obama administra on: “If the
U.S. wants to con nue playing a leadership role in the Middle East and
keep its strategic alliances intact – especially its ‘special rela onship’ with
Saudi Arabia – it will have to dras cally revise its policies vis-a-vis Israel
and Pales ne.”75
But President Obama has already indicated that his view is closer to the
Israeli posi on on the API. In an announcement at the State Department
appoin ng George Mitchell as Middle East peace envoy, he stated that
“the Arab peace ini a ve contains construc ve elements that could
help advance these [peace] eﬀorts. Now is the me for Arab states to
act on the ini a ve’s promise by suppor ng the Pales nian government
under President Abbas and Prime Minister Fayyad, taking steps towards
normalizing rela ons with Israel, and by standing up to extremism that
threatens us all.”76 He did not call for the wholesale adop on of the API
by Israel nor assume the take-it-or-leave-it a
tude Arab leaders evince.
Instead, he essen ally accepted the Israeli posi on that the API contained
“construc ve elements,” and, most signiﬁcantly, maintained that the
28

The Arab Peace Initiative: A Primer and Future Prospects
Arab states had to begin normaliza on with Israel, which the Arabs have
always said would have to wait un l Israel accepted the API in toto.
Obama’s posi on demonstrated a full and nuanced understanding of the
complexi es of the issues.
Obama should also not be bullied by Saudi threats. Perhaps old warhorses
like Turki and Sa’ud think the me is ripe to lean on a young, new president,
but they also know, in their heart of hearts, that despite being ﬂush with
cash, the House of Saud needs the U.S. much more than the U.S. needs the
House of Saud.
Taking the Initiative
Par cularly a er the Gaza opera on, which led to many civilian deaths
despite Israeli eﬀorts to avoid them, peace would be best served by Israel
going on the diploma c oﬀensive and presen ng an ini a ve of its own,
thus not leaving the API as the only game in town. This ini a ve could
emphasize the posi ve aspects of the API, and include an invita on to
Arab leaders to a mee ng in Israel to discuss the API in its en rety. It would
not serve peace for Israel to accept any of the nega ve aspects of the API
(refugees, return to 1967 lines) as a basis for discussion, but certainly they
can be discussed. In essence, Israel should call the Arabs’ bluﬀ.
As part of its diploma c oﬀensive, Israel needs to be par cularly clear to
the Arabs that they must disabuse themselves of the no on of Pales nian
refugee se lement in Israel. On the discursive level, one has to begin
talking not of return to their homes, as does Resolu on 194, but of return
to Pales ne, as deﬁned by the eventual Pales nian state to exist next to
Israel.
There is only so far that repackaging, complemen ng, and improving
atmosphere can go when the par es are so far apart. Any government
elected in Israel today cannot make an oﬀer acceptable to the Arabs and
s ll survive. It is equally unlikely that the weak Pales nian leadership,
whether it be Hamas or Fatah, would be able to make an oﬀer acceptable
to Israel and remain in power.
29

A hotel dining room in Netanya, Israel, where a Pales nian suicide bomber blew himself up among guests gathered for a Passover
Seder on March 27, 2002, killing 30 Israelis and injuring 140.
But regional threats, most notably in the form of Iran and Islamic
fundamentalism, s ll remain an area for coopera on between Israel and
the moderate Arab states that is not directly related to progress in the
Israeli-Pales nian conﬂict. This coopera on need not be in the public eye.
Moreover, it may be worth revisi ng some of the “normalizing” steps
taken in the wake of the Madrid Peace Conference of 1991, which involved
several aspects of regional coopera on in the form of mul lateral working
groups. (The Jerusalem Center is planning a future monograph on the
extent of normaliza on between Israel and the Arabs.) Depending on how
a reopening of the mul lateral mee ngs is conﬁgured, there is a possibility
30

The Arab Peace Initiative: A Primer and Future Prospects
that they would improve the general atmosphere and pave the way for
future agreements. A reopening of the mul laterals would be in line with
President Obama’s call for Arab states to begin normaliza on with Israel.
Finally, it is impera ve that the moderate Arab states use their good
oﬃces to encourage their Pales nian brethren to be more realis c about
what they can achieve. If the moderates are successful in this, it would go
a long way towards lowering the ﬂames of the Israeli-Pales nian conﬂict
and focus eﬀorts on the real threats to world peace.
* * *
Dr. Joshua Teitelbaum, Visi ng Senior Fellow at the Jerusalem Center for
Public Aﬀairs, is Senior Research Fellow, Moshe Dayan Center for Middle
Eastern and African Studies, Tel Aviv University. He is also Richard and
Rhoda Goldman Israeli Visi ng Associate Professor, Department of Poli cal
Science and the Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law,
as well as W. Glenn Campbell and Rita Ricardo-Campbell Na onal Fellow
at the Hoover Ins tu on, both at Stanford University. He wishes to thank
his assistant, Jonathan Fluger, for his percep ve comments and diligent
research.
31

Notes
1 In a late February 2002 poll, 44% of Americans said that Saudi Arabia was a
patron of terror. Washington Post, February 26, 2002.
2 See Dore Gold, Hatred’s Kingdom: How Saudi Arabia Supports the New Global
Terrorism (New York: Regnery, 2003).
3 New York Times, October 2, 2001, March 3, 2002; “President Bush Speaks to
United Na ons,” November 11, 2002, online at h p://www.whitehouse.gov/
news/releases/2001/11/20011110-3.html. Secretary of State Colin Powell
made similar remarks in a speech in Louisville, Kentucky, on November 19, text
online at h p://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2001/nov/20/afghanistan.israel.
4 New York Times, February 8, 2002. On March 12, the UN Security Council
passed Resolu on 1397, which aﬃrmed a “vision” of two states, and
welcomed “the contribu on of Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah.” Text online at
h p://www.state.gov/p/nea/rt/11134.htm.
5 “President Bush Calls for New Pales nian Leadership,” June 24, 2002, online
at h p://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/06/20020624-3.html.
6 New York Times, February 6, 2002. Marwan Muasher, who was at the me
Jordanian ambassador to the U.S., hints that Friedman got the idea from a
conversa on they had over breakfast on November 28, 2001, when Muasher
told Friedman about a similar idea King Hussein of Jordan had developed in
1998. See Marwan Muasher, The Arab Center: The Promise of Modera on
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008), p. 114.
7 New York Times, February 17, 2002.
8 For background and documents, see Colin Legum, et al. (eds.), Middle East
Contemporary Survey, Vol. V: 1980-81 (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1982),
and Colin Legum, et al. (eds.), Middle East Contemporary Survey, Vol. VI: 1981-
82 (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1984). In both cases, the crown princes were
ac ng to assert themselves on the world stage and move out from under
the shadow of the ruling monarch. In fact, it was reported that Minister of
Defense and Avia on, Prince Sultan bin Abd al-Aziz (now crown prince), was
deeply angered since he was not consulted (al-Quds al-Arabi, February 21,
2008). See also Nawaf Obaid, “The Israeli Flag in Riyadh?,” Washington Post,
March 2, 2002. Both were trying to improve rela ons with the U.S. In Fahd’s
case, the AWACS deal was having trouble in Congress; in Abdullah’s case, it
was 9/11.
32

The Arab Peace Initiative: A Primer and Future Prospects
9 Washington File, February 19, 2002; AFP, February 25, 26, 2002; New York
Times, February 22, 2002.
10 AFP, March 1, 2002; Washington Post, March 2, 2002.
11 Statement by Foreign Minister’s Bureau, February 19, 2002, published at
www.imra.org.il; AFP, February 25, 2002.
12 AFP, February 25, 26, 2002.
13 AFP, quo ng al-Hayat, February 28, 2002.
14 AFP, February 26, 2002; New York Times, February 27, 2002.
15 AFP, February 20, 2002; al-Ra’i, February 20, 2002.
16 AFP, February 28, 2002.
17 AFP, March 5, 2002.
18 SANA, March 5, 2002; AFP, March 5, 6, 2002; New York Times, March 6,
2002.
19 Al-Quds al-‘Arabi, March 13, 2002 (full normaliza on in Arabic is al-tatbi‘ al-
kamil; while comprehensive [or full] peace is al-salam al-shamil); AFP, March
6, 10, 2002.
20 New York Times, March 10, 2002.
21 Muasher, p. 119, 123.
22 Muasher, pp. 126-128.
23 New York Times, March 25, 2002.
24 New York Times, March 24, 2002.
25 See Nimrod Rafaeli, “Iraq-Saudi Arabia Rapprochement,” MEMRI Economic
Studies, No. 31, June 17, 2002, online at h p://www.memri.org/bin/ar cles.
cgi?Page=archives&Area=ea&ID=EA3102.
26 Charter of the League of Arab States, online in English at h p:
//avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/arableag.asp, and in Arabic at h p:
//www.arableagueonline.org/las/arabic/details_ar.jsp?art_id=133&level_
id=114.
27 “Speech by HRH Prince Abdullah bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud,” March 27, 2002,
Saudi Embassy, Washington, D.C., online at h p://www.saudiembassy.net/
2002News/Press/PressDetail.asp?cYear=2002&cIndex=32.
28 “Security Council Endorses Secretary-General’s Conclusion on Israeli
Withdrawal from Lebanon as of 16 June,” June 18, 2002, online at
h p://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2000/20000618.sc6878.doc.html.
33

29 Ilai Alon, “The Language of the Arab Peace Ini a ve,” in Kobi Michael
(ed.), The Arab Peace Ini a ve – An Historical Opportunity: Background,
Signiﬁcance, and Possible Courses of Ac on (Jerusalem: Jerusalem Ins tute
for Israel Studies, 2007), pp. 33-74, p. 26 cited (Hebrew).
30 Alon, p. 52.
31 Muasher, pp. 125, 128.
32 For the Arabic text of the Final Statement, see al-Quds al-‘Arabi, March
29, 2002. The word diyarihim was chosen because it is the precise Arabic
transla on of ar cle 11 of Resolu on 194. That ar cle resolved that
“refugees wishing to return to their homes (Arabic, diyarihim)…should be
permi ed to do so.” The oﬃcial Arabic transla on of Resolu on 194 is at h p:
//www.un.org/unrwa/arabic/Roll/Ru194.htm.
33 “Response of FM Peres to the Decisions of the Arab Summit in Beirut,”
March 28, 2002, online at h p://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/About+the+Ministry/
MFA+Spokesman/2002/Response+of+FM+Peres+to+the+decisions+of+the+A
rab.htm; “PM Sharon’s Address to the Knesset,” April 8, 2002, online at h p:
//www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Government/Speeches+by+Israeli+leaders/2002/
PM+Sharon-s+Address+to+the+Knesset+-+8-Apr-2002.htm.
34 AFP, March 28, 2002.
35 “A Performance-Based Roadmap to a Permanent Two-State Solu on to the
Israeli-Pales nian Conﬂict,” U.S. Department of State, April 30, 2003, online
at h p://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2003/20062.htm.
36 UNSCR 1397 was passed on March 12, 2002, called for two states, an end to
violence, and “welcomed” “the contribu on of Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah,”
online at h p://www.state.gov/p/nea/rt/11134.htm.
37 “Israel’s Response to the Roadmap,” May 25, 2003, online at h p://
www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace+Process/Reference+Documents/Israel+Respons
e+to+the+Roadmap+25-May-2003.htm.
38 “Statement by Secretary of State Colin L. Powell and Na onal Security Advisor
Condoleezza Rice,” May 23, 2003, online at h p://www.whitehouse.gov/
news/releases/2003/05/print/20030523.html.
39 “Government Mee ng about the Prime Minister’s Statement on the
Roadmap,” May 25, 2003, online at h p://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Government/
Communiques/2003/Goverment+mee ng+about+the+Prime+Minister-
s+state.htm.
34

The Arab Peace Initiative: A Primer and Future Prospects
40 “Exchange of Le ers between PM Sharon and President Bush,” April 14, 2004,
online at h p://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace+Process/Reference+Documents/
Exchange+of+le ers+Sharon-Bush+14-Apr-2004.htm.
41 The Saudi called the Hizbullah raid a “miscalculated adventure.” Boston Globe,
August 4, 2006.
42 The reports concerned mee ngs between Olmert and Saudi Na onal
Security Adviser Prince Bandar bin Sultan in Amman. BBC News, September
25, 2006, online at h p://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/5377552.stm;
Interna onal Herald Tribune, September 25, 2006; Ha’aretz (English edi on),
September 25, 2006, March 2, 2006; New York Times, September 26, 2006;
Times, December 3, 2006.
43 Ha’aretz (English edi on), March 2, 2007; New York Times, March 13, 2007.
44 “Cabinet Communique,” March 11, 2007, online at h p://www.mfa.gov.il/
MFA/Government/Communiques/2007/Cabinet+Communique+11-Mar-
2007.htm; AP, March 11, 2007; New York Times, March 12, 2007.
45 Ha’aretz (English edi on), March 12, 2007; “Press Roundtable Interview,”
March 25, 2007, online at h p://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2007/mar/
82158.htm; New York Times, March 25, 2007.
46 New York Times, March 23, 2007.
47 Arab sources told Ha’aretz that Bandar had met again with Olmert in March.
The mee ngs were denied by the Saudis, and the Israelis refused to comment.
Ha’aretz, March 25, 2007; “Prince Saud Denied Secret Mee ng between
Prince Bandar and Olmert. Saudi Embassy, Washington, D.C., March 26, 2007,
online at h p://www.saudiembassy.net/2007News/News/RelDetail.asp?cInd
ex=7015.
48 AP, March 26, 2007.
49 Reuters, March 25, 2007. Daily Telegraph, March 28, 2007.
50 “Joint Press Conference by Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and UN Secretary-
General Ban Ki-moon,” March 26, 2007, online at h p://www.mfa.gov.il/
MFA/Government/Speeches+by+Israeli+leaders/2007/Joint+Press+Confer
ence+by+PM+Olmert+and+UN+Secy-Gen+Ki-moon+26-Mar-2007.htm. See
Olmert’s similar remarks to the Jerusalem Post, March 29, 2007.
35

51 Jerusalem Post, March 30, 2007; New York Times, March 31, 2007.
52 Al-Sharq al-Awsat, March 26, 2007, translated in MEMRI, Special Dispatch
Series, No. 1525, March 29, 2007, online at h p://memri.net/bin/ar cles.cgi
?Page=subjects&Area=conﬂict&ID=SP152507/; al-Siyasa, March 5, 16, 2007,
translated in MEMRI, Special Dispatch Series, No. 1540, April 12, 2007, online
at h p://memri.org/bin/ar cles.cgi?Page=archives&Area=sd&ID=SP154007.
53 “Arab Summit Decisions,” Riyadh, March 29, 2007, online at h p://
www.mideastweb.org/arabsummit2007.htm.
54 “Israeli Statement on the Arab Summit in Riyadh,” March 29, 2007, online
at h p://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/About+the+Ministry/MFA+Spokesman/2007/
Israeli+statement+on+Arab+Summit+in+Riyadh+29-Mar-2007.htm.
55 “Behind the Headlines: Israel Recep ve to Moderate Arab Peace Plan,” Israel
Ministry of Foreign Aﬀairs, May 15, 2007, online at h p://www.mfa.gov.il/
MFA/About+the+Ministry/Behind+the+Headlines/Israel+recep ve+to+mode
rate+Arab+peace+plan+15-May-2007.htm; al-Sharq al-Awsat, June 18, 2007.
56 Reuters, July 4, 2007; Maariv, July 4, 2007, online at h p://www.nrg.co.il/
online/1/ART1/603/971.html. Egyp an Foreign Minister Ahmed Aboul Gheit
and his Jordanian counterpart Abdelelah Al-Kha b visited Israel on July 25 as
members of the Arab League Ini a ve Supervisory Commi ee.
57 “President Bush Discusses the Middle East,” July 16, 2007, online at h p:
//www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/07/20070716-7.html.
58 Washington Post, August 2, 2007. A “sweetener” in this regard came in the
form of a large arms deal with the U.S., valued at around $20 billion.
59 Arab News, November 27, 2007.
60 New York Times, November 27, 2007.
61 Jerusalem Post, November 28, 2007.
62 “Address by PM Olmert at the Annapolis Conference,” November 27, 2007,
online at h p://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Government/Speeches+by+Israeli+lea
ders/2007/Address+by+PM+Olmert+at+the+Annapolis+Conference+27-Nov-
2007.htm.
63 AFP, November 27, 2007.
64 Washington Post, November 27, 2007.
65 Reuters, January 20, 2008; Turki also published an op-ed in the Washington
Post calling on President-elect Barack Obama to adopt the API, December 26,
2008.
36

The Arab Peace Initiative: A Primer and Future Prospects
66 Al-Sharq al-Awsat, June 24, 2008.
67 “Address by President Peres at the Opening of the Knesset Winter Session,”
October 27, 2008, online at h p://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Government/Spee
ches+by+Israeli+leaders/2008/Address_President_Peres_Knesset_Winter_
Session_27-Oct-2008.htm.
68 U.S. Department of State, Country Report on Human Rights Prac ces, 2007:
Saudi Arabia, March 11, 2008, online at h p://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/
2007/100605.htm; Human Rights Watch, “UN: World Leaders Should Press
Saudis on Intolerance,” November 10, 2008, online at h p://www.hrw.org/
en/content/un-world-leaders-should-press-saudis-intolerance.
69 Washington Post, November 12, 2008.
70 www.yozmatshalom.com; h p://www.peace-security-council.com.
71 This point is made by Bruce Maddy-Weitzman, “A Pebble in the Peace Pond,”
Jerusalem Report, January 5, 2009.
72 New York Times, January 18, 2009; Jerusalem Post, January 18, 2009.
73 Al-Anba, al-Hayat, Arab News, January 20, 2009.
74 “Prince Saud Al-Faisal’s Statement to the UN Security Council regarding Gaza,”
January 6, 2009, online at h p://www.saudiembassy.or.jp/En/PressReleases/
2009/001-Jan/4.htm.
75 Financial Times, January 22, 2009.
76 Washington Post, January 22, 2009.
37

About the Jerusalem Center for
Public Aﬀairs
www.jcpa.org
The Jerusalem Center for Public Aﬀairs is a leading independent research
ins tute specializing in public diplomacy and foreign policy. Founded in
1976, the Center has produced hundreds of studies and ini a ves by leading
experts on a wide range of strategic topics. Dr. Dore Gold, Israel’s former
ambassador to the UN, has headed the Jerusalem Center since 2000.
Jerusalem Center Programs:
• Defensible Borders Ini a ve – A major security and public diplomacy
ini a ve that analyzes current terror threats and Israel’s corresponding
territorial requirements, par cularly in the strategically vital West Bank,
that Israel must maintain to fulﬁll its existen al security and defense
needs.
• Iran and the New Threats to the West – Prepara on of a legal
document jointly with leading Israeli and interna onal scholars and
public personali es on the ini a on of legal proceedings against Iranian
President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad for incitement to commit genocide
and par cipate in genocide. This program also features major policy
studies by security and academic experts on Iran’s use of terror proxies
and allies in the regime’s war against the West and its race for regional
supremacy.
• Ins tute for Contemporary Aﬀairs (ICA) – A program founded in 2002
jointly with the Wechsler Family Founda on that presents Israel’s case
on current issues through high-level brieﬁngs by government and
military leaders to the foreign diploma c corps and foreign press, as
well as produc on and dissemina on of informa on materials. The
38

The Arab Peace Initiative: A Primer and Future Prospects
program’s Arabic language website provides informa on and ar cles on
Israel and the region for Arabic speakers living in and out of the Middle
East (www.infoelarab.org).
• Global Law Forum – This ground-breaking program undertakes
studies and advances policy ini a ves to protect Israel’s legal rights
in its conﬂict with the Pales nians, the Arab world, and radical Islam
(www.globallawforum.org).
• An -Semi sm A er the Holocaust – Ini ated and directed by Dr.
Manfred Gerstenfeld, this program includes conferences, seminars, and
publica ons discussing res tu on, the academic boyco , Holocaust
denial, and an -Semi sm in the Arab world, European countries, and the
post-Soviet states.
• Global Terrorism – Using previously unpublished documents, JCPA
President Dore Gold explored the inﬂuence of Saudi Wahhabism on 9/11
in the New York Times bestseller Hatred’s Kingdom: How Saudi Arabia
Supports the New Global Terrorism (Regnery, 2003).
• Jerusalem in Interna onal Diplomacy – Dr. Dore Gold analyzes the
legal and historic rights of Israel in Jerusalem and exposes the dangers
of compromise that will unleash a new jihadist momentum in his book
The Fight for Jerusalem: Radical Islam, the West, and the Future of the
Holy City (Regnery, 2007). Justus Reid Weiner looks at Illegal Construc on
in Jerusalem: A Varia on on an Alarming Global Phenomenon (2003).
Prominent journalist Nadav Shragai assesses the imminent security
threats to Israel’s capital resul ng from its poten al division, and oﬀers
alterna ve strategies for managing Jerusalem’s demographic challenges
in his monograph Jerusalem: The Dangers of Division (2008).
• New Models for Economic Growth in Israel – This comprehensive, 10-
year project has studied the applica on of ﬁnancial innova ons in Israel.
Sponsored by the Milken Ins tute, the project includes nine published
volumes in Hebrew and English.
39

Jerusalem Center Serial Publications:
• Jerusalem Viewpoints - providing in-depth analysis on changing events in
Israel and the Middle East since 1977.
• Jerusalem Issue Briefs - insider brieﬁngs by top-level Israeli government
oﬃcials, military experts, and academics, as part of the Center’s Ins tute
for Contemporary Aﬀairs.
• Daily Alert - a daily digest of hyperlinked news and commentary on Israel
and the Middle East from the world and Hebrew press.
• Post-Holocaust and An -Semi sm - a monthly publica on examining
an -Semi sm a er the Holocaust.
• Jewish Poli cal Studies Review - A scholarly journal founded in 1989.
Jerusalem Center Websites
•
www.jcpa.org (English)
•
www.jcpa.org.il (Hebrew)
•
www.infoelarab.org (Arabic)
•
www.jcpa-lecape.org (French)
•
www.jer-zentrum.org (German)
•
www.mesi.org.uk (United Kingdom)
•
www.globallawforum.org (Global Law Forum)
40